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ABSTRACT 
The astounding success of the Japanese economy has In the past 
decade or so been believed by many to provide an answer to the 
West's re l a t i v e economic decline. This thesis attempts to 
provide a more complete account of the factors Involved In the 
Japanese success than that which Is generally found In the 
l i t e r a t u r e on the subject; the purpose of t h i s Is to suggest that 
the transference of only one success factor or element of the 
Japanese system may not be the simple solution to Western 
problems as Is so often assumed. I t begins with a chapter on 
Japanese economic development fo r background. Chapters 3 and 4 
respectively cover corporate culture and the management practices 
considered unique to Japan. These two areas have received the 
most attention in the l i t e r a t u r e on how the West can benefit from 
the Japanese example, the assumptions being that i f these are 
transferred to or copied by the West, than an economic turnaround 
would ensue. For balance, the next chapter discusses the 
concomitants of these management practices which may be 
considered negative by the West. I t continues with an 
examination of Japanese subsidiaries In the United States and 
Great B r i t a i n and then presents the theories of whether or not 
the system i s in a c t u a l i t y transferable to the West by Western 
managers. The las t chapter presents other factors In Japan's 
economic success in order t o argue that the 'popular' assumptions 
may be too s i m p l i s t i c to provide the resultant success expected. 
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D e c l a r a t i g n 
None o f t h e m a t e r i a l c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s t h e s i s has 
p r e v i o u s l y been s u b m i t t e d f o r a degree i n t h i s o r any 
o t h e r u n i v e r s i t y and t h e work i s e n t i r e l y t h e a u t h o r ' s 
i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n . 
V I 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The economic success o f t h e Japanese has gained 
widespread a t t e n t i o n i n t h e p a s t decade o r so. The 
r e l a t i v e d e c l i n e o f Western c o u n t r i e s such as B r i t a i n 
and America, p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d u n i m a g i n a b l e , has 
a l s o been t h e s u b j e c t o f much concern. Not 
s u r p r i s i n g l y , much l i t e r a t u r e , w r i t t e n both by s c h o l a r s 
and e x p e r i e n c e d business people, has focussed on how 
t h e success o f t h e Japanese can b e n e f i t t h e West. 
T h i s t h e s i s w i l l examine t h e i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n 
t h i s debate. Chapter 2 w i l l p r o v i d e t h e background: 
t h e development o f t h e Japanese economy s i n c e 1868 and 
Japan's p r e s e n t and p o s s i b l e f u t u r e economic s t a t e s . 
Next, t h e s u b j e c t o f c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e has become 
p o p u l a r i n t h e p a s t few years as b e i n g a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
i n f l u e n c e on t h e success o r f a i l u r e o f companies; 
g a i n i n g a s t r o n g c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e , such as t h a t found 
i n Japanese companies or t h e s u c c e s s f u l Western 
companies, i s b e l i e v e d t o be t h e way t o t h e t o p o f t h e 
economic success l a d d e r . Because o f t h i s c u r r e n t 
p o p u l a r i t y , a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e t o p i c has been i n c l u d e d 
and appears i n c h a p t e r 3. 
Chapters 4 and 5 p r o v i d e a d i s c u s s i o n o f what has 
been most w i d e l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e area t o examine i n 
o r d e r t o p r o v i d e t h e g r e a t e s t b e n e f i t t o t h e West: t h e 
management and employment system c o n s i d e r e d unique t o 
Japan. Books and a r t i c l e s have abounded w i t h 
d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h i s seemingly m i r a c u l o u s system. Thus, 
c h a p t e r 4 p r e s e n t s what are c o n s i d e r e d t h e elements o f 
t h e system and c h a p t e r 5 p r o v i d e s a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e 
as p e c t s o f t h e system which may be c o n s i d e r e d n e g a t i v e 
i n o r d e r t o g a i n a w e l l - b a l a n c e d i l l u s t r a t i o n . 
The number o f Japanese-owned s u b s i d i a r i e s i n t h e 
West has reached a s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l . T h i s has l e d t o 
a number o f s t u d i e s on what has been t r a n s f e r r e d t o the 
Western workers i n these companies. These s t u d i e s have 
g e n e r a l l y been i n t e n d e d t o o f f e r an i n s i g h t i n t o what 
elements o f t h e system t h e Western companies w i l l be 
a b l e t o t r a n s f e r s u c c e s s f u l l y w i t h t h e goal o f 
i m p r o v i n g t h e i r economic s t a n d i n g . Chapter 6 w i l l 
examine t h e s e s t u d i e s . 
The t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y o f t h e Japanese management 
system t o t h e West has been proposed by many i n t h e 
p a s t decade as t h e answer t o t h e West's economic i l l s . 
A d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e 3 main arguments as t o whether t h i s 
t r a n s f e r e n c e i s p o s s i b l e i s found i n ch a p t e r 7. 
F i n a l l y , c h a p t e r 8 s t r a y s f r o m t h e l i n e o f 
argument t h a t t h e Japanese management system i s t h e 
p r i m a r y cause o f t h e Japanese economic success. I t 
p r e s e n t s t h e o t h e r f a c t o r s which may have played a r o l e 
i n t h i s success, a r o l e which some argue i s more 
i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e management system. 
The purpose o f c h a p t e r 8 i s t o pr e s e n t a more 
complete p i c t u r e o f what has l e d t o t h e success o f t h e 
Japanese i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e almost a warning t h a t t h e 
s i m p l e t r a n s f e r o f t h e management system, because i t i s 
o n l y one element, may n o t p r o v i d e t h e i n s t a n t c u r e - a l l 
many ex p e c t . F u r t h e r t o t h i s c a u t i o n a r y s t a n c e , a 
d i s c u s s i o n o f how t h e Japanese management system i s 
changing i n Japan i t s e l f i s present e d i n c h a p t e r 7. 
L a s t l y , i t s h o u l d be noted here i n t h e 
i n t r o d u c t i o n t h a t t h r o u g h o u t t h e t h e s i s I use t h e term 
'Western' a l t h o u g h t h e b u l k o f t h e research c o n t a i n e d 
i n t h e t h e s i s i s on B r i t i s h o r American companies. 
Though some may argue d i f f e r e n t l y , I agree w i t h White 
and Trevor (1983) t h a t t h i s broad term i s both u s e f u l 
and a c c e p t a b l e 'because i n many r e s p e c t s t h e r e i s a 
common approach t o management across t h e l e a d i n g 
Western i n d u s t r i a l n a t i o n s — an approach which has 
been g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d by American management 
t h i n k i n g . ' ( p . 1 3 7 ) . 
CHAPTER 2 
THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 
2.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
' I t i s no s e c r e t t h a t t h e Japanese economy i s now 
more dynamic and expansive than America's. 
Concrete p r o o f o f Japan's commercial success i s 
found i n i t s e x p o r t s . I n 1945, Japan was a 
s h a t t e r e d , conquered c o u n t r y w i t h i t s economy 
almost c o m p l e t e l y d e v a s t a t e d ; now Japan's e x p o r t s 
c h a l l e n g e America's i n a l a r g e number o f markets, 
from pianos t o t e l e v i s i o n s e t s , from s t e e l t o 
au t o m o b i l e s , and from t r a n s i s t o r r a d i o s t o 
computer c h i p s . The l i s t i s now almost e n d l e s s , 
and i n c r e a s i n g l y so.' ( A l s t o n , 1986:3). 
Of g r e a t concern t o both Western a u t h o r s and 
business l e a d e r s has been t h e r e l a t i v e economic d e c l i n e 
o f t h e B r i t i s h and American economies. The cause or 
causes o f t h i s t u r n around and p o s s i b l e ways t o 
a l l e v i a t e Western economic problems have, as a r e s u l t , 
been t h e s u b j e c t o f much debate. 
Some reasons p o s t u l a t e d f o r t h e weakening o f t h e 
economies o f these two c o u n t r i e s are as f o l l o w s . S e t h i 
e t a l . (1984) has pr e s e n t e d Business Week magazine's 
view on America: ' I n a s p e c i a l r e p o r t a n a l y s i n g 
America's c u r r e n t economic ma l a i s e . Business Week 
blames i t on a f a i l u r e by labour and management t o end 
t h e i r a d v e r s a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p , c o n t r a d i c t o r y government 
r e g u l a t i o n and p o l i c i e s , and t h e d e c l i n e o f 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and t h e e d u c a t i o n a l system. 
F u r t h e r m o r e , i t argues t h a t decades o f r e c e s s i o n s , 
b o u t s o f r o a r i n g i n f l a t i o n , near d e p r e s s i o n l e v e l s o f 
unemployment, t h e d e t e r i o r a t i n g c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s o f 
b a s i c i n d u s t r i e s , s l i d i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y , t h e p a i n f u l 
a d j u s t m e n t t o dependence on h i g h p r i c e d f o r e i g n a i d , 
and a s t a g n a t i n g s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g have shaken 
America's c o n f i d e n c e and i t s a b i l i t y t o prosper and 
remain t h e w o r l d ' s l e a d i n g i n d u s t r i a l power.' ( p . 2 4 8 ) . 
S i m i l a r l y , K. Smith (1984) has p r e s e n t e d t h r e e 
e x p l a n a t i o n s t h a t have been proposed f o r B r i t a i n ' s 
d e c l i n e : 1. E n t r e p r e n e u r i a l f a i l u r e — ' . . . B r i t i s h 
managers and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s have f a i l e d . They have 
l a c k e d e n t e r p r i s e , t h e y have lacked t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
s k i l l o f f o r e i g n managers, they have n o t i n v e s t e d 
enough: t h e y a r e bad " e n t r e p r e n e u r s " ' , (p.187-188). 2. 
I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s — ' . . . B r i t i s h t r a d e unions and 
w o r k i n g p r a c t i c e s are a t f a u l t i n v a r i o u s ways. 
B r i t i s h i n d u s t r y i s "overmanned"; i t i s s t r i k e prone, 
and unions a r e t o o r i g i d i n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e 
changes and work p r a c t i c e s which t e c h n o l o g i c a l change 
i n v o l v e s . ' ( p . 1 8 8 ) . 3. Investment — 
' . . . l o o k s n o t a t a p a r t i c u l a r people, b u t a t an 
economic process. I t argues t h a t B r i t a i n ' s 
problems stem from i n s u f f i c i e n t i n v e s t m e n t . T h i s 
t h e s i s i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y s e p a r a t e f r o m t h e 
p r e v i o u s two, i n t h a t poor management and bad 
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s are f r e q u e n t l y c i t e d as the 
cause o f low in v e s t m e n t . But i n e i t h e r v e r s i o n , 
inadequate investment i s t h e immediate cause o f 
B r i t a i n ' s problems, and r a i s i n g i n v e s t m e n t would 
serve t o overcome them.' ( p . 1 8 8 ) . 
There i s some debate, however, as t o whether any 
o f these a r e t h e case, though none has been r e j e c t e d as 
b e i n g c o m p l e t e l y w i t h o u t m e r i t . 'So none o f these 
f a c t o r s ... can be d i s m i s s e d as problem areas w i t h i n 
t h e B r i t i s h economy. On t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e y i n v o l v e 
complex and seemingly i n t r a c t a b l e problems which must 
be overcome. The p o i n t , r a t h e r , i s t h a t t h e s t o r i e s 
t h a t are based on them do not s t a n d up as s i n g l e a l l 
encompassing e x p l a n a t i o n s o f B r i t a i n ' s d e c l i n e i n t o 
c r i s i s . ' ( S m i t h , 1984:188). 
Whatever t h e e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e r e s u l t i s s t i l l t h e 
same: 
'The u n c o m p e t i t i v e performance o f many B r i t i s h 
companies s i n c e t h e war has become p a i n f u l l y 
o b v i o u s . B r i t i s h m a n u f a c t u r e r s i n key i n d u s t r i e s 
l i k e motor v e h i c l e s and e l e c t r o n i c s have f a i l e d t o 
keep t h e i r home markets, w h i l e i n d u s t r i e s l i k e 
aerospace and n u c l e a r power g e n e r a t i o n have n o t 
r e a l i z e d t h e i r e a r l i e r promise and have l o s t t h e 
lea d t h e y once had. Imported p r o d u c t s t h a t have 
taken t h e p l a c e o f goods t h a t were once 
c o m p e t i t i v e l y manufactured by B r i t i s h f i r m s are 
conspicuous i n shops and homes.' ( T r e v o r , 1988:1). 
I n r e g a r d s t o t h e a l l e v i a t i o n o f these problems, 
one p a r t i c u l a r area o f i n t e r e s t has been concerned w i t h 
t h e prosperous economy o f Japan — one which was 
v i r t u a l l y s h a t t e r e d f o l l o w i n g World War I I but has now 
grown t o remarkable h e i g h t s . Japan's success, i f 
u n d e r s t o o d , i s b e l i e v e d by many t o be t h e answer f o r 
B r i t a i n and t h e U.S.. T h i s s u b j e c t , t h e n , i s o f 
o b v i o u s i m p o r t a n c e . 
Many areas must be examined t o achi e v e a b e t t e r 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g and t o determine whether s t u d y i n g o r even 
c o p y i n g t h e Japanese w i l l indeed be u s e f u l f o r t h e 
West. T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l p r o v i d e a b r i e f o v e r v i e w o f 
Japanese economic development, t h e i r p r e s e n t economic 
s t a t e , and t h e i r p o s s i b l e economic f u t u r e . 
2.2 Japanese Economic Development 
Before b e g i n n i n g , i t s h o u l d be noted t h a t t h i s 
s e c t i o n r e l i e s h e a v i l y on Yoshihara Kunio's Japanese 
Economic Development. T h i s book p r o v i d e s a s t a n d a r d 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e Japanese economic development n o t 
d i s s i m i l a r t o o t h e r s found on t h e s u b j e c t . The t i m e 
frame d i v i s i o n s a r e a l s o t a k e n f r o m Kunio and again 
t h e s e d i v i s i o n s a re commonly found i n o t h e r l i t e r a t u r e . 
1868-1885 
I n 1869 Japan a b o l i s h e d t h e f e u d a l i s m o f t h e 
Tokugawa p e r i o d (1603-1867) and e n t e r e d a new economic 
age. There were s i g n i f i c a n t s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
r e f o r m s i n t h e f i r s t few ye a r s o f t h e M e i j i e r a , and 
t h e s e years i n c l u d e d t h e m o d e r n i z a t i o n o f t h e monetary 
and f i s c a l systems. A l s o , s t r e s s was placed upon t h e 
need f o r i m p o r t i n g Western t e c h n o l o g y ; because o f i t s 
modernness, i t was b e l i e v e d t h a t i t c o u l d a l l e v i a t e t h e 
Japanese m i l i t a r y weakness and economic backwardness 
t h u s e n s u r i n g t h e i r independence. 'Defence... became 
t h e main t a s k o f t h e new Government, w h i l e those 
numerous Japanese whose f e a r o f t h e Western n a t i o n s was 
m i n g l e d w i t h a d m i r a t i o n o f t h e i r prowess overseas 
c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e a d o p t i o n o f Western m a t e r i a l 
equipment m i g h t enable Japan t o f i n d a p l a c e among t h e 
a g g r e s s o r s i n s t e a d o f among t h e v i c t i m s o f a g g r e s s i o n . ' 
A l l t h i s t o o k s e v e r a l years so t h a t t h e new economic 
system was n o t f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d u n t i l t h e mid-1880s. 
A s i g n i f i c a n t e v e n t i n t h i s p e r i o d was t h e r e f o r m 
and s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n o f t a x a t i o n . During t h e Tokugawa 
p e r i o d , t h e l o c a l and c e n t r a l governments o b t a i n e d t h e 
b u l k o f t h e i r revenue f r o m t h e lan d t a x which was 
a r b i t r a r y i n amount and p a i d w i t h r i c e . A u n i f o r m 
monetary t a x was needed s i n c e t h a t i s what i s r e q u i r e d 
o f a modern fo r m o f t a x a t i o n and t h e M e i j i government 
i n t r o d u c e d a new l a n d t a x as a means o f reform. A p a r t 
f r o m p r o v i d i n g t h i s u n i f o r m i t y , t h i s new land t a x was 
a l s o i m p o r t a n t i n p r o v i d i n g t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t source 
o f t a x revenues needed by t h e government f o r 
development r e q u i r e m e n t s . A l s o , t h i s system enabled 
t h e t a x payer t o become t h e l e g a l owner o f t h e l a n d , 
t h u s l a y i n g t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h e p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y 
system. 
The monetary system o f t h e Tokugawa p e r i o d a l s o 
was q u i t e i n e f f i c i e n t as t h e r e was no c e n t r a l c o n t r o l 
over t h e i s s u e o f money and t h e r e were r e g i o n a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e money s t a n d a r d . I n 1871 t h e r e was a 
monetary r e f o r m which s t a n d a r d i z e d a sound c u r r e n c y . 
T h i s was accomplished t h r o u g h t h e f o l l o w i n g t a c t i c s : 
t h e c e n t r a l government i s s u e d money; a decimal system 
o f monetary s t a n d a r d w i t h t h e yen as the ba s i c monetary 
u n i t was is s u e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y ; and t h e g o l d 
s t a n d a r d was adopted w i t h paper notes i s s u e d on a 
c o n v e r t i b l e b a s i s . 
However, t h e new system had i t s problems. The 
g o l d s t a n d a r d began t o c o l l a p s e i n t h e mid-1870s. The 
g o l d c o i n was d e s i g n a t e d as s t a n d a r d but 1-yen s i l v e r 
c o i n s , equal t o 1/16 o f a g o l d u n i t , were a l s o minted 
and c i r c u l a t e d i n r e s t r i c t e d areas i n o r d e r t o 
f a c i l i t a t e t r a n s a c t i o n s among merchants engaged i n 
f o r e i g n t r a d e . By 1876, t h e r a t i o o f t h e r a t e of 
s i l v e r t o g o l d i n Japan h e l d a t 1:20. However, abroad 
t h e r a t e was h i g h e r and t h i s a t t r a c t e d f o r e i g n buyers 
who t h e n exchanged t h e i r s i l v e r f o r g o l d and 
s u b s e q u e n t l y d e p l e t e d Japan's g o l d r e s e r v e s . The 
government had no c h o i c e but t o adhere t o t h e s i l v e r 
s t a n d a r d and t h e u n r e s t r i c t e d use o f s i l v e r c o i n s . 
By 1881, t h e r e was a s u r p l u s o f paper money i n 
Japan which was c a u s i n g many i n f l a t i o n a r y problems. 
Matsukata Masayoshi, who had become M i n i s t e r o f Finance 
i n t h a t year, i n response t o these problems, c r e a t e d 
new t a x e s and reduced government e x p e n d i t u r e by 
c r e a t i n g s u r p l u s e s w i t h i n t h e government i t s e l f which 
were a b l e t o absorb t h e excess paper money. Th i s 
p o l i c y , known as 'Matsukata d e f l a t i o n ' was used 
s u c c e s s f u l l y u n t i l 1885 and l e d t o t h e v i r t u a l 
r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e c o n v e r t i b i l i t y o f paper not e s . 
Matsukata t h e n e s t a b l i s h e d t h e Bank o f Japan as t h e 
o n l y note i s s u i n g bank and the r e b y l a i d t h e f o u n d a t i o n s 
f o r c o n s e r v a t i v e monetary management. 
The b u i l d i n g o f t h e c o u n t r y ' s i n f r a s t r u c t u r e was 
begun i n t h i s p e r i o d w i t h t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f r a i l w a y s 
and a modernized communications network t h r o u g h t h e 
i n t r o d u c t i o n o f p o s t a l and t e l e g r a p h i c systems; 
overseas t e l e g r a p h i c communication was a l s o p o s s i b l e 
a l t h o u g h t h e t e l e p h o n e s e r v i c e saw l i t t l e p r o g r e s s . 
J o i n t s t o c k companies were e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1873 
because t h e y were b e t t e r s u i t e d t o t h e economic 
c l i m a t e : f a m i l i e s by themselves c o u l d n o t f i n a n c e t he 
i n i t i a l i n v e s t m e n t s . The success o f these companies i s 
bourne o u t by t h e s t a t i s t i c s f o r by 1885 t h e r e were 
over 1200 companies w i t h an accumulated c a p i t a l o f 50 
m i l l i o n yen. 
The government moved t h e economy toward t h e wide 
use o f machines i n i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n : t h e y imported 
machinery, and t h e t e c h n i c i a n s t o s e r v i c e them, from 
t h e West. T h i s p o l i c y l e d t o t h e o p e r a t i o n o f v a r i o u s 
mines and f a c t o r i e s and t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f t e x t i l e s , 
cement, g l a s s and s h i p b u i l d i n g . There was no g r e a t 
p r o g r e s s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d but ' a l t h o u g h t h e o v e r a l l 
impact o f machine p r o d u c t i o n was s m a l l , i t s r i s e i n 
t h e s e i n d u s t r i e s s i g n a l l e d t he b e g i n n i n g o f t h e machine 
age i n Japan.' ( K u n i o , 1986:6). 
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1686-1911 
During the second p a r t of the M e i j i era, Japan 
became a p a r t of the Great Powers a f t e r winning 2 major 
wars — the Si no-Japanese War (1894-1895) i n which they 
obtained Taiwan as a colony, and the defeat of Russia 
i n the f i g h t over China and Korea (1904-1905). Since 
they had defeated a Western country, they were f i n a l l y 
accepted by the Western Powers and the 5 per cent 
c e i l i n g on the t a r i f f r a t e t h a t Japan could impose on 
imported goods was l i f t e d . This was not enough, 
however, as Japan wanted supremacy over a l l of East 
Asia; i n 1910, Korea was annexed. 
Throughout t h i s period the country's 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e continued t o grow as d i d the importance 
of overseas investment. The l a t t e r was p r i m a r i l y the 
r e s u l t of the r i s e of the cotton t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y ; i n 
1897 exports exceeded imports. New technology was 
adopted and there was an increase i n the use of 
machines i n i n d u s t r i a l production. 
A g r i c u l t u r e also developed impressively, though 
not as much as i n d u s t r y . This growth was important 
because the growth of the o v e r a l l economy was a f f e c t e d 
by a g r i c u l t u r e : as i n d u s t r i a l production 
increased, more and more people moved from a g r i c u l t u r a l 
production t o consumption. Consequently, an 
i n c r e a s i n g l y large percentage of the population was 
forced t o purchase food.' (Kunio, 1986:9). I f food had 
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t o be imported, i t would i n v a r i a b l y d r a i n finances 
necessary f o r i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n so the government had 
t o s t i m u l a t e i n t e r n a l markets. These requirements were 
met i n t e r n a l l y i n the end, and t h i s danger was avoided. 
Supplementary revenue was generated by the 
government's use of the land tax. Funds created by 
t h i s tax were used t o promote in d u s t r y without 
burdening e x i s t i n g funds. The tax also increased tea 
and s i l k production: these products were e s s e n t i a l f o r 
earning f o r e i g n currency which Japan needed t o purchase 
the machinery and raw m a t e r i a l s from abroad. 'In 
s h o r t , a g r i c u l t u r e played an important supportive r o l e 
i n Japanese i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ; without the vigour of 
a g r i c u l t u r e , the r a p i d pace of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i n 
t h i s period would have been inconceivable.' (Kunio, 
1986:10). 
1912-1936 
A g r i c u l t u r e g r a d u a l l y declined i n importance 
duri n g these years both as an earner of f o r e i g n c a p i t a l 
and as a percentage of the n a t i o n a l income, and by 
1936, i t had been surpassed by i n d u s t r i a l income: i t 
was now less than 20% of the t o t a l . 
This period instead saw the r i s e of l i g h t 
i n d u s t r i a l goods: co t t o n f a b r i c production increased 
and as a r e s u l t Japan became the world centre of 
t e x t i l e production i n t h i s period. 
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Heavy i n d u s t r y was even more important. I t d i d n ' t 
suddenly appear on the scene at t h i s time as i t had i t s 
base from the Tokugawa era, though i n t h a t period i t 
was weak and unnoticeable. 'In t h i s period, o v e r a l l 
economic progress and the accelerated m i l i t a r y build-up 
i n the 1930s led t o rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of the 
heavy i n d u s t r y sector. By the end of the period, a 
f a i r l y wel1-developed i n d u s t r i a l complex had emerged in 
Japan.' (Kunio, 1986:11). 
World War I was good f o r Japan's economy; the 
Japanese sided w i t h the a l l i e s but no f i g h t i n g a c t u a l l y 
took place on Japanese s o i l so there was no need f o r a 
m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p . Imports from the West stopped so 
t h a t p r i c e s were raised and a favourable economic 
environment f o r production i n Japan arose. This boom 
was not t o l a s t , however, as s h o r t l y a f t e r the war 
ended i n 1918, the West returned t o recapture t h e i r 
markets and the Japanese government had t o erect 
t a r i f f s t o p r o t e c t domestic in d u s t r y . 
As a r e s u l t , the p r o s p e r i t y of 1914-1919 was 
fol l o w e d by the gloomy economy of the 1920s. Many 
companies s u f f e r e d losses and bankruptcies and many 
people became unemployed. The economy suf f e r e d f u r t h e r 
because of the Tokyo earthquake of 1923; the f i n a n c i a l 
c r i s i s of 1927 which shook confidence i n banks; and i n 
1929, the American stock market crashed r e s u l t i n g i n a 
de c l i n e i n the American market which meant a decline i n 
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the exports of raw s i l k and s i l k f a b r i c f o r the 
Japanese. 
For 12 years a f t e r the success of 1914-1919, 
p r i c e s continued t o f a l l , but the government eventually 
adopted expansionary measures which s u c c e s s f u l l y halted 
the slump i n 1932. 
Economic concentration increased i n the 1930s. 
For instance, a f t e r many banks had closed i n the 
f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s of 1927, M i t s u i , M i t s u b i s h i , Sumitomo 
and Yashuda became dominant and heavy industry became 
o l i g o p o l i s t i c . This i s not unusual i n c a p i t a l i s t 
c o u n t r i e s but what was unusual was t h a t the zaibatsu 
( f a m i l y owned f i n a n c i a l combines; 'The term zaibatsu 
means l i t e r a l l y "money-cliques", and i s used t o s i g n i f y 
c e r t a i n great Japanese business houses w i t h extremely 
wide-spread i n t e r e s t s . ' ( A l l e n , 1981:137)) began t o 
ex e r t a considerable influence on the economy i n the 
l a t t e r p a r t of the period. Because the government had 
no large middle class w i t h f i n a n c i a l resources and 
e x p e r t i s e t o help i n executing t h e i r p o l i c y of 
Westernization, they turned t o the family-owned 
combines, the zaibatsu, who had been i n banking and 
commerce f o r many years w i t h some having p a r t i a l l y 
financed the p o l i t i c a l movements which led t o the 
Rest o r a t i o n . 
'The new M e i j i Governments n a t u r a l l y turned t o 
these f a m i l i e s f o r f i n a n c i a l help i n t i d i n g them 
over t h e i r i n i t i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , and they looked 
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t o them t o carry out any f i n a n c i a l or commercial 
operations, or t o launch any new e n t e r p r i s e s , 
which were considered necessary as p a r t of the 
general p o l i c y . So these f a m i l i e s , together w i t h 
notable r e c r u i t s from the ranks of the samurai, 
became agents f o r the execution of the 
Government's economic p o l i c y and t h i s f u n c t i o n 
soon led t o a concentration of economic power i n 
them.' ( A l l e n , 1981:136-137). 
M i t s u b i s h i , M i t s u i and Sumitomo were the most 
d i v e r s i f i e d and powerful. Through holding companies, 
they c o n t r o l l e d companies i n finance, mining, industry 
e t c . The government stimulated t h e i r growth through 
subsidies, p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f s , the approval of c a r t e l 
f ormation e t c . This encouraged the zaibatsu t o enter 
heavy i n d u s t r y . In 1929, they reached the height of 
t h e i r power: 'whereas i n e a r l y M e i j i days they could be 
regarded as agents of the Government, though probably 
never as merely passive agents, by the l a t e r twenties 
they had reached a p o s i t i o n i n which they could, t o an 
increasing e x t e n t , impose t h e i r wishes on the 
Government.' ( A l l e n , 1981:138). As the 1930s went on, 
the government and the zaibatsu developed an even 
cl o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p as the government desired f u r t h e r 
expansion i n heavy in d u s t r y f o r m i l i t a r y purposes. As 
a r e s u l t , the zaibatsu evolved i n t o powerful p o l i t i c o -
economic organizations. 
1937-1951 
This period had two phases: 1. the war years, 
1937-1945; and 2. the occupation years, 1945-1952 (1951 
being the l a s t f u l l year of occupation). 
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1937 was the t u r n i n g p o i n t i n the Japanese economy 
f o r two reasons. F i r s t , 'the f i n a n c i a l orthodoxy which 
had been established by Matsukata i n the mid-1880s, and 
which had been instrumental i n maintaining p r i c e 
s t a b i l i t y i n the f o l l o w i n g years, was abandoned.' 
(Kunio, 1986:16). This was because the m i l i t a r y 'held 
sway' and from 1936 t o 1937 government spending more 
than doubled, and doubled again i n the f o l l o w i n g 3 
years. Second, laws were passed empowering the 
government t o impose d i r e c t c o n t r o l s on the economy; 
soon a f t e r the war broke out the government made three 
important decisions: 1. The Armament M o b i l i z a t i o n Law 
( f i r s t passed i n World War I ) which authorized an 
increase i n arms production was made applicable t o the 
present war. 2. The Law Relating t o Temporary Measures 
f o r Export and Import Control gave the government 
absolute c o n t r o l over exports and imports. 3. The 
Temporary Adjustments Law stopped c a p i t a l and c r e d i t 
from going t o nonessential i n d u s t r i e s and r e d i r e c t e d i t 
t o war-related i n d u s t r i e s . S t i l l , these three laws 
were not enough f o r the m i l i t a r y who then pressured the 
government who passed the National M o b i l i z a t i o n Law i n 
A p r i l 1938. This law gave the government power not 
only t o c o n t r o l p r i c e s and wages but also t o c o n t r o l 
d i s t r i b u t i o n t o ensure a constant supply t o the war 
e f f o r t . I n s h o r t , there was, then, a m o b i l i z a t i o n 
economy i n f o r c e . 
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There were changes i n the i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e 
during the war: l i g h t i n d u s t r y production declined 
a b s o l u t e l y and r e l a t i v e l y p r i m a r i l y as a r e s u l t of the 
Law Relating t o Temporary Measures f o r Export and 
Import C o n t r o l , and the Temporary Adjustments Law; 
production of heavy in d u s t r y rose u n t i l mid-1944 
because government p o l i c i e s concentrated a v a i l a b l e 
resources on what was considered e s s e n t i a l t o the war 
e f f o r t (heavy i n d u s t r y ' s share was 50% of t o t a l 
i n d u s t r i a l production i n 1936 but more than 70% i n 
1942). 
Also important i n t h i s f i r s t phase of t h i s period 
was t h a t ' I n order t o e s t a b l i s h more e f f e c t i v e economic 
c o n t r o l and o b t a i n greater e f f i c i e n c y i n the 
u t i l i z a t i o n of scarce resources, the government 
p r e f e r r e d t o deal w i t h only a small number of large 
companies i n each i n d u s t r y and pressed f o r mergers by 
using m o b i l i z a t i o n measures as a weapon.' (Kunio, 
1986:18). This obviously led t o greater economic power 
f o r the zaibatsu who took f u l l advantage of t h i s 
p o s i t i o n . 
I n mid-1944, t r o u b l e began f o r the Japanese. Due 
t o t h e i r loss of naval supremacy, they could no longer 
ensure supplies of raw m a t e r i a l s from t h e i r overseas 
t e r r i t o r i e s which were t h e i r biggest s u p p l i e r s . As a 
r e s u l t , production of basic m a t e r i a l s declined sharply 
which a f f e c t e d the production of f i n a l goods. At the 
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beginning of 1945, acute shortages of o i l , bauxite, 
i r o n ores and other raw materials were beginning t o 
c r i p p l e the Japanese. F i n a l l y , an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of 
bombing d e l i v e r e d the coup de grace t o the Japanese 
economy. 
At the end of the war, the Japanese economy was 
s h a t t e r e d . I n d u s t r i a l production was low, as was food 
production which r e s u l t e d i n a food c r i s i s at the end 
of 1945. 'The shortage of goods was made more acute by 
the breakdown of the government machinery f o r 
c o l l e c t i n g and d i s t r i b u t i n g goods at f i x e d p r i c es. The 
defeat caused a lack of confidence i n the government, 
and brought about a s t a t e of near anarchy.' (Kunio, 
1986:19). 
Economic recovery was d i f f i c u l t because the 
bombing had destroyed approximately 25X of the national 
wealth and had caused acute housing shortages i n major 
c i t i e s ; they had l o s t the colonies Taiwan and Korea 
which meant they couldn't get natural resources at a 
concessionary r a t e and the m i l l i o n s of Japanese there 
had t o r e t u r n t o already overcrowded c o n d i t i o n s ; 
overseas assets which had provided income and were a 
basis f o r overseas operations were confiscated; the 
Japanese had t o meet occupation f o r c e s ' demands f o r 
housing and t r a n s p o r t . F i n a l l y , the war had caused 
p o l i t i c a l upheaval i n Asia so t h a t the Japanese 
government could no longer r e l y on the pre-war 
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i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c i e s , i n which Asia was a market f o r 
exports, t o a i d recovery. 
Mid-1945 through e a r l y 1949 was a period of 
h y p e r i n f l a t i o n . However, production increased i n 1948 
and 1949. Following t h i s b r i e f increase, the 
government used expenditure cuts and tax increases i n 
the budget i n an attempt t o s t a b i l i z e the economy which 
was now high p r i o r i t y . To r e i n f o r c e t h i s attempt, the 
government adopted a s i n g l e exchange ra t e (360 yen t o 
one U.S. d o l l a r ) i n A p r i l of t h a t year. The government 
then monitored the movement of prices and adjusted 
monetary p o l i c y accordingly t o maintain the f i x e d 
exchange r a t e . 'As these measures became e f f e c t i v e i n 
securing economic s t a b i l i t y , the government removed 
various measures of d i r e c t c o n t r o l . By mid-1950, the 
market economy had been e s s e n t i a l l y restored.' (Kunio, 
1986:20). 
Economic recovery progressed through t o the 
middle of 1950. Then, i n June 1950, the Korean 
C o n f l i c t began. Japan was used as a supply base and a 
r e s t and r e l a x a t i o n spot f o r American s o l d i e r s . This 
led t o a sharp increase i n demand f o r Japanese goods 
and Japan had i t s f i r s t boom of the post-war era. This 
provided the f i n a l push f o r economic recovery; many 
companies had large p r o f i t s which were mostly retained 
and used l a t e r f o r p l a n t renewal and expansion. These 
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p r o f i t s also provided f o r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new 
technology from abroad. 
The occupation p o l i c i e s a f f e c t e d recovery as w e l l . 
Despite an i n i t i a l p o l i c y of ' n o n - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' , i t 
soon became clear t h a t food aid would be needed t o 
prevent a famine i n 1946. The SCAP (Supreme Commander 
f o r the A l l i e d Powers) assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
preventing disease and unrest, and by the end of 1946, 
allowed the economy t o r e t u r n t o pre-war l e v e l s by 
pro v i d i n g a i d i n o i l , i r o n ores, coal and other raw 
mat e r i a l s . At the end of 1948, the SCAP saw t h a t the 
Japanese government needed t o s t a b i l i z e t h e i r economy 
and r e t u r n t o the economic l e v e l s of the pre-war period 
and thus supported a l l attempts t o a t t a i n these goals. 
This change i n p o l i c y r e s u l t e d from the U.S.'s 
development of a p o s i t i v e view of Japan's r o l e i n the 
s e c u r i t y of post-war Asia due t o an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of 
the cold war (the Communists were winning i n the 
Chinese c i v i l war and Japan was seen as a counter 
f o r c e ) . This view persuaded the a l l i e s t o end the 
occupation and they d i d so i n 1952. 'The f a c t t h a t the 
United States shaped the occupation p o l i c y and restored 
Japan's sovereignty determined the domestic and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l framework of the Japanese economy i n the 
post-war period.' (Kunio, 1986:22). 
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1 9 5 2 - 1 9 7 3 
One consequence of the war was a de c l i n e i n the 
growth of the GNP and o v e r a l l per c a p i t a incomes. 
Despite t h i s slowing o f the growth tr e n d from 1937 t o 
1951, there was s t i l l a great p o t e n t i a l f o r growth. 
The occupation of the A l l i e s had r e s u l t e d i n land 
reforms, labour reforms, education reforms and most 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the break up of the zaibatsu's 
monopolies; t h i s more e g a l i t a r i a n and democratic 
environment of post war Japan allowed f o r more 
competition. Growth was also aided by peace: the 
government no longer had t o shoulder the heavy burden 
of m i l i t a r y expenditure. Therefore, energies and 
finances could once more be channelled i n t o economic 
recovery and improvements. 
During the war years, heavy ind u s t r y advanced 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y , but the importance of i n d u s t r y 
declined b r i e f l y f o l l o w i n g the war because there was no 
longer a m i l i t a r y demand or one f o r consumer goods. 
But not a l l was l o s t : 'The experiences of the war 
years, however, provided a basis not only f o r 
developing new products w i t h great growth p o t e n t i a l , 
but also f o r absorbing new Western technology; a l l of 
these f a c t o r s made i t possible f o r heavy i n d u s t r y t o 
act as a spearhead f o r post-war economic growth.' 
(Kunio, 1986:23).^ Japan's growth p o t e n t i a l was helped 
by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment: economic cooperation 
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between the West and Japan took shape through removing 
the b a r r i e r s o f the 1930s and a l l o w i n g the Japanese 
access t o Western technology. The economic t i e s were 
strengthened by the Bretton Wood system. One part of 
t h i s system was the General Agreement on T a r i f f s and 
Trade (GATT) which maintained t h a t a country's well 
being could be enhanced by the engaging i n f r e e trade. 
The f i n a n c i a l partner t o t h i s system was the IMF 
( I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund) which provided the 
necessary finances f o r s t a b l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade. 
These f a c t o r s were e s p e c i a l l y good f o r Japan as they 
'not only enabled Japan t o increase the volume of i t s 
f o r e i g n trade and t o enjoy greater gains from t h i s 
t r a d e , but also c o n t r i b u t e d t o increased e f f i c i e n c y by 
s u b j e c t i n g Japanese companies t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
competition and by enl a r g i n g the size of the market.' 
(Kunio 1986:24). 
By the end of the occupation, there was a r e t u r n 
t o the 1934-1936 l e v e l of a g r i c u l t u r a l production, 
i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n , n a t i o n a l income, per c a p i t a 
income, per c a p i t a consumption, labour production, real 
wages and most other i n d i c a t o r s of economic 
development. But there was no r e t u r n t o trade l e v e l s . 
The major b a r r i e r t o Japanese exports was the renewed 
demand i n favour of heavy i n d u s t r i e s . Japan had t o 
become co m p e t i t i v e i n t h i s f i e l d . There was 
improvement by 1960 gained through a p o l i c y of 
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m a i n t a i n i n g large subsidies f o r p l a n t expansion and 
renewal i n order t o encourage the use of up t o date 
machinery and technology. The Japanese b u i l t large 
i n d u s t r i a l estates along the coast f o r b e t t e r 
c o o r d i n a t i o n and t o reduce t r a n s p o r t costs. The 
p r o t e c t i o n of the coal industry was replaced w i t h the 
use and promotion of o i l where possible. In 1960, 
heavy i n d u s t r y was i n i t i a l l y competitive and included 
the manufacturing of ships, s t e e l , cement and more. 
Japan increased production of passenger cars, synthetic 
f i b r e s , e l e c t r o n i c products, and the volume of exports 
returned t o pre-war l e v e l s by the mid-1960s and 
mushroomed several times i n t o the e a r l y 1970s. This 
increase i n exports i n t u r n c o n t r i b u t e d t o i n d u s t r i a l 
p r o d u c t i o n . 'By the e a r l y 1970s, i n terms of both 
volume and d i v e r s i t y , Japanese in d u s t r y had become one 
of the most advanced i n the world.' (Kunio, 1986:26). 
The r a p i d growth i n the 1960s had a number of 
c o n t r i b u t o r y elements. F i r s t , there was an increase i n 
the labour f o r c e , an increase at an annual rate of 
2.2%. The reasons f o r t h i s was the absorption of 
excess labour a f t e r the war; a r i s e i n the b i r t h r a t e ; 
the r i s e of educational standards leading t o a b e t t e r 
q u a l i t y work f o r c e ; and compositional changes i n the 
work f o r c e , i . e . male workers between the ages of 20 
and 64 increased. 
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Second, there was an increase i n c a p i t a l . I t 
increased at an annual rate of 11 per cent — very much 
higher than other countries. This was a r e s u l t of a 
very high savings rate — 40X of GNP. There are a t 
l e a s t three explanations f o r t h i s phenomenon: 1. 
household savings were (and s t i l l are) high f o r a 
v a r i e t y of reasons i n c l u d i n g 'a general h a b i t of the 
Japanese people, high growth rate but consumption 
lagging behind the r i s e i n income, inadequate s o c i a l 
s e c u r i t y system causing people t o prepare themselves 
f i n a n c i a l l y f o r disease and o l d age, low ownership of 
houses and f i n a n c i a l assets w i t h people saving as much 
as they can t o buy a home.' (Kanamori, 1985:219-220). 
2. Enterprise savings were high because they 'have few 
i n d i v i d u a l stockholders and because banks and insurance 
companies have greater influence among the 
stockholders. These so-called i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors 
wanted t o reserve t h e i r p r o f i t s and t o use them t o 
provide f o r e n t e r p r i s e growth r a t e rather than t o 
d i s t r i b u t e them among stockholders as dividends.' 
(Kanamori, 1985:220). 3. The government had high 
savings since they spent l i t t l e on so c i a l s e c u r i t y and 
armaments. Also taxes were 20 per cent of the nat i o n a l 
income i n Japan and the government was able t o save a 
great deal of i t s annual income. F i n a l l y , 'the ra t e of 
investment i n housing was also low, leaving most funds 
a v a i l a b l e f o r productive purposes. These investments 
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enabled new technologies t o be employed.' (Kanamori, 
1985:220). 
T h i r d , and probably the biggest c o n t r i b u t o r t o 
growth i n the 1960s, was the r i s e of p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
'This r i s e i s explained p a r t i a l l y by the f a c t t h a t 
labour and c a p i t a l moved from a g r i c u l t u r e and s e l f -
supporting e n t e r p r i s e s w i t h low p r o d u c t i v i t y t o 
manufacturing and b i g businesses w i t h higher 
p r o d u c t i v i t y . But the most important reason was 
innovation.' (Kanamori, 1985:220). This innovation was 
enabled by post-war s t r u c t u r a l changes, e.g. the land 
reform which abolished landlordship and created landed 
farmers, d i s s o l v i n g of the zaibatsus, and the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n of labour unions. When Japan regained i t s 
independence, new technologies from the United States 
were introduced i n c l u d i n g new products and new 
production methods; w i t h the land reform, these 
technologies provided a higher income f o r farmers which 
meant more consumers, e s p e c i a l l y of motor-cars. A 
l o c a l market then developed and mass production 
f o l l o w e d . Soon the Japanese were exp o r t i n g t o American 
markets. 
Fourth, there was a strong growth of consumer 
demand. 
F i f t h , the r e g u l a t i o n of supply and demand by the 
government. The government provided aid i n times of 
recession caused by investment r i s i n g too r a p i d l y . 
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And s i x t h , the r o l e of the government i n general. 
The s i z e and importance a t t r i b u t e d t o the government's 
r o l e i s the subject of some debate and the view of i t 
being e s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t w i l l be f u r t h e r examined 
i n Chapter 8. I t can a t le a s t be mentioned here t h a t 
immediately a f t e r the war, a government planning system 
came i n t o being. 
The one area t h a t did not increase was the 
investment i n housing. This was due t o the high p r i c e 
of land and i s an endemic problem t h a t has yet t o be 
solved. 
This p e r i o d , then, was one of i n d u s t r i a l 
expansion. Other sectors of the economy grew r a p i d l y 
and GNP had a large increase. The 1959 growth rate 
exceeded ^0% and i n 1960, the Japanese economy was 
termed an economic miracle. The growth r a t e was 
maintained through the 1960s and the increase of GNP 
averaged ^0%. I n 1970-1973, there was a s l i g h t 
declined t o 7.8% but t h i s was s t i l l high by 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l standards. 
1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 4 
Rapid growth stopped w i t h the beginning of the o i l 
c r i s i s i n October 1973. There was f i r s t an o i l embargo 
which was temporary so t h a t there were only temporary 
e f f e c t s . However, a t the time, Japan imported a l l of 
i t s o i l and 90% of i t s o v e r a l l energy requirements; 
because of t h i s dependence, Japan was devastated by the 
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OPEC nations t r i p l i n g o i l prices and by 1974, Japan had 
a negative growth r a t e of -1.3X, the worst since the 
Second World War. 
The economy d i d b e t t e r i n 1975 w i t h a 2.4% growth 
r a t e . This was much slower than before but b e t t e r than 
t h a t of the West. I n 1976, i t rose t o over 5* and 
seemed t o s t a b i l i z e there. In 1978, o i l p r i c e s rose 
slowly again. The r i s e accelerated i n 1979 marking the 
beginning of the second o i l c r i s i s . The pace slowed i n 
1980 but o i l p r i c e s continued t o increase. At the 
highest p o i n t , o i l p r i c e s had t r i p l e d which was 
t e r r i b l e f o r the Japanese economy. However, t h i s time 
the Japanese were b e t t e r prepared, i . e . less dependent 
on o i l so t h a t there was no decline i n GNP although 
growth was down t o A% i n 1981 and 3.3.X i n 1982-1983. 
I n 1984, i t returned t o 5* as o i l p r i c e s declined 
s l o w l y a f t e r the highest p o i n t i n 1981. 
2.3 The Dark Side of Japanese Development 
The growth of the Japanese economy can be said to 
have come a t a p r i c e . During the economic development 
p r i o r t o World War I I , the average person's standard of 
l i v i n g rose but many suff e r e d instead of prospering, 
e.g. f a c t o r y workers, o f t e n indentured by parents, had 
t o withstand h o r r i b l e working c o n d i t i o n s and long hours 
(12-15 hour days) every day w i t h only one or two days 
o f f per month. Many died from i n d u s t r i a l accidents and 
diseases. 
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Also punished were the tenants i n v i l l a g e s who 
were the poorest among the r u r a l population. Their 
p l i g h t e x i s t e d also i n the Tokugawa era but became more 
serious i n the modern period. The property law 
increased the power of landlords and tenants' periods 
of tenure o f t e n became shorter and less c e r t a i n . Also 
t h e r e was a greater p r o p o r t i o n of tenants which led t o 
an economic and s o c i a l problem: t h a t of many peasants 
l i v i n g only a t subsistence l e v e l and not b e n e f i t i n g 
from a g r i c u l t u r a l developments. L i v i n g conditions did 
not improve as development increased and large slum 
areas were abundant. 
Another negative consequence of economic 
development was t h a t of environmental p o l l u t i o n of a l l 
v a r i e t i e s : noise, a i r and water. 'While t h i s i s not a 
uniquely Japanese phenomenon, the problem i s most 
serious i n Japan.' (Kunio, 1986:169). The p o l l u t i o n 
a f f e c t e d both mental and physical health. Water i n 
some p a r t s was p o l l u t e d w i t h cadmium, mercury and other 
poisonous chemicals, a i r i n major c i t i e s and near 
i n d u s t r i a l complexes contained carbon monoxide, 
s u l p h u r i c a c i d gas, n i t r i c oxide and lead compounds 
(Kunio, 1986) which led t o asthma, b r o n c h i t i s and lung 
cancer. 
Admittedly, the housing shortages and the density 
of the large population played a r o l e i n t h i s 
p o l l u t i o n . 'However, a large p a r t o f the 
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f a l l s upon e n t e r p r i s e s which pursued 
p r i v a t e p r o f i t s and ignored the s o c i a l costs of 
production, and upon the government which allowed 
business i n t e r e s t s t o d i c t a t e environmental p o l i c y . ' 
(Kunio, 1986:170). An example of t h i s negligence by 
the government and ind u s t r y i s t h a t of the mercury 
poisoning a t Minamata i n Kyushu. The f i s h i n the sea 
around Minamata were poisoned by the organic mercury 
discharged by a chemical f a c t o r y i n the c i t y . 
Fishermen and f a m i l i e s i n the area ate the f i s h and 
l a t e r 100 of them died while 600 remained s i c k , i . e . 
they could not walk, hear, or see properly and some 
were t o t a l l y i ncapacitated. The o r i g i n a l poisoning was 
most l i k e l y u n i n t e n t i o n a l , but when the problem came t o 
the government's a t t e n t i o n , i t d i d not stop the 
poisoning immediately — i f i t had, fewer would have 
been a f f e c t e d and the extent t o which those who s t i l l 
would have been a f f e c t e d would have been less. 'The 
government, MITI i n p a r t i c u l a r , objected t o proposed 
precautionary measures f o r fear t h a t approval of such 
measures might necessitate a re-evaluation of i t s 
o v e r a l l p o l i c y , thereby adversely a f f e c t i n g i n d u s t r i a l 
production w i t h i n the country as a whole.' (Kunio, 
1986:171). So despite a medical team p o i n t i n g out the 
causal e f f e c t s of the chemical discharge, the 
government allowed the f a c t o r y t o continue discharging 
f o r 10 more years. 
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Some people argue t h a t economic development has 
not increased happiness i n Japan. Famine has gone and 
most now have b e t t e r n u t r i t i o n , there i s a prolonged 
l i f e expectancy, b e t t e r housing, increased l e i s u r e 
time, b e t t e r education, b e t t e r medical care, improved 
communication and t r a n s p o r t systems, and increased 
employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s , but new problems have 
replaced the o l d : the fear of competition, fear of 
bankruptcy, boredom at r e p e t i t i v e , simple work, 
adjustment problems i n h i e r a r c h i c a l corporate 
s t r u c t u r e s and i n d u s t r i a l sickness and accidents, 
p o l l u t i o n and noise. 
'To some economists, avoiding such excesses and 
maintaining high e f f i c i e n c y a t the same time are 
incompatible concepts; i n other words, i f the excesses 
are t o be avoided, economic e f f i c i e n c y must be 
s a c r i f i c e d . However, since Sweden has succeeded i n 
achieving a f a i r l y high growth despite large welfare 
expenditures, i t seems possible t o devise an economic 
system which would meet the above requirements.' 
(Kunio, 1986:172). 
2.4 Present Dav Japanese Economy 
On March 16th, 1990, i t was announced by the 
Economic Planning Agency i n Japan t h a t rea l economic 
growth i n 1989 was 4.9%. 'The expansion was led by 
strong domestic demand, i n c l u d i n g continued b r i s k 
c a p i t a l investment and consumer spending. External 
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demand contracted, dampening economic growth by 1 
percentage p o i n t . Economic growth i n the October — 
December quarter was 3.0% i n annual terms.',(Economic 
£yfl, 1990:32). The economy i s expected t o grow a t 
another 4.5X t h i s year as w e l l . Japan has reached f u l l 
employment, has more or less balanced i t s budget, and, 
i n the o p i n i o n of Y. Kosai (1990), the balance of 
payments i s i n a healthy p o s i t i o n . Japan's savings 
r a t e , a f t e r c a p i t a l used f o r r e p a i r s i s spent, i s 17X 
of GNP, wh i l e the U.S.'s i s less than 5% and the EC's 
i s 10%. 
S t i l l , Japan has i t s problems too. For instance, 
on the 20th of March, 1990, the Bank of Japan raised 
the discount r a t e by 1 p o i n t t o 5.25%, the highest 
l e v e l since October 1983. This, the f o u r t h hike i n 
less than a year, was done t o stop the yen from 
weakening f u r t h e r and t o prevent higher i n f l a t i o n . 
There are problems at the Tokyo Stock Exchange as well 
as a r e s u l t of fears of r i s i n g i n t e r e s t r a t e s , 
i n f l a t i o n , a weakening currency, program t r a d i n g and — 
v i r t u a l l y unheard of f o r Japan — a p o l i c y c o n f l i c t 
between the c e n t r a l bank and the government. (The 
c o n f l i c t went as f o l l o w s : 'Bank of Japan Governor 
Yasushi Mieno, a h a r d l i n e r against i n f l a t i o n , 
i n f u r i a t e d Finance M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s when he f a i l e d t o 
consult them about an increase i n the discount r a t e , t o 
4.25%, l a s t December. His repeated warnings about 
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i n f l a t i o n have, convinced many i n v e s t o r s t h a t another 
hike i s imminent. With the m i n i s t r y — and the r u l i n g 
L i b e r a l Democratic Party — opposed t o f u r t h e r 
i n t e r e s t - r a t e hikes, some in v e s t o r s are uns e t t l e d by 
what they see as an u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c lack of consensus. 
"The Bank of Japan could not have handled matters more 
poor l y , " says Edwin C. Merner, d i r e c t o r of Schroeder 
Investment Management (Japan). "There has been no 
c o o r d i n a t i o n , and t h a t ' s bad f o r the market."' 
( I n t e r n a t i o n a l B u s i n e s s Week, 1 9 9 0 : 4 0 ) . ) . on 26 
February, the stock market plunged 1569 p o i n t s , i . e . 
4.5% of the market's value — i t s second worst dive 
ever. 
At present, however, Japan has plenty t o be happy 
about. I t ' s the t h i r d year i n a row t h a t Japan has had 
a GNP growth around 5 per cent which had led Japanese 
economists t o introduce the term the 'Hesei boom' 
(named a f t e r the new emperor). This boom has taken 
place during a period of s i g n i f i c a n t r e s t r u c t u r i n g of 
the Japanese economy: they've survived the high yen 
and, 'contrary t o common perceptions abroad, [ t h e 
economy] now r e l i e s on domestic demands rather than 
exports t o f u e l growth. The gra d u a l l y d e c l i n i n g trend 
i n both trade and current-account surpluses i s l i k e l y 
t o continue i n 1990, even though the o v e r a l l s i z e of 
these surpluses i s s t i l l a potent source of f r i c t i o n 
w i t h t r a d i n g partners, e s p e c i a l l y the United States.' 
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(Bridges, 1990:60). Furthermore, Japan i s the world's 
biggest c r e d i t o r n a t i o n , an in v e s t o r whose overseas 
investment i s increasing almost e x p o n e n t i a l l y , and i n 
s t a r t i n g 1989, the world's l a r g e s t provider of overseas 
development assistance. I n s h o r t , Japan i s f a s t 
becoming recognized as an economic superpower. 
2.5 The Economic Future of Japan 
What does the f u t u r e hold f o r Japan? W i l l i t 
remain an economic leader and, i f so, w i l l i t be able 
t o take up the global r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t h i s p o s i t i o n 
u s u a l l y e n t a i l s ? 
Some have taken a p e s s i m i s t i c view of Japan's 
f u t u r e . I t i s argued t h a t Japan may not be as 
economically dominant i n the f u t u r e as many expect. 
Most of these expectations of Japanese domination, 
argues J e f f r e y Garter, are based on a few years' 
evidence and don't consider changes t h a t have already 
begun and conceivably w i l l and do have a great e f f e c t , 
i . e . some of the f a c t o r s which have pr e v i o u s l y been the 
causes f o r success are changing. 
F i r s t , the Japanese used t o maintain growth 
through exports but now they are emphasizing domestic 
demand growth and are importing more and ' d i v e r t i n g t o 
domestic consumers production once destined f o r 
overseas ... I n 1988, Japan's GNP expanded by more than 
6 per cent, and i t s imports expanded 1987 l e v e l s by 
more than 10 per cent.' (Garter, 1990:47). 
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Second, Japan's high persona!-savings rate i s 
d e c l i n i n g . 'According t o recent studies c i t e d by 
W i l l i a m Emmott of The Economist, Japanese c i t i z e n s i n 
1975 saved 23% of t h e i r disposable income, whereas 10 
years l a t e r they saved only 16%.' (Garter, 1990:47). 
They s t i l l save more than Westerners but i t looks l i k e 
they w i l l d e s i r e spending more: 'A new post-war 
generation w i t h o u t memories of hard times has become 
preoccupied w i t h b e t t e r housing, washing machines, big 
cars, designer c l o t h i n g and t r a v e l . ' (Garter, 1990:47). 
T h i r d , the Japanese are expected t o spend 
t r i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s i n the next 10 years on in-country 
improvements such as roads, p o r t s , a i r p o r t s , housing, 
and medical and research f a c i l i t i e s . 
Fourth, f o r e i g n pressure has caused them t o 
increase f o r e i g n a i d . I t ' s expected t o be about $30 
m i l l i o n t h i s year. 
F i f t h , m i l i t a r y budgets w i l l probably grow — they 
have now reached the l e v e l of the world's t h i r d highest 
spender. 
And f i n a l l y , there may be d e s t a b i l i z i n g events; 
f o r example, i f o i l p r i c e s were t o shoot up, they would 
face some serious problems because they s t i l l import 
90% of t h e i r l i q u i d f u e l ( i n l i g h t of the present 
s i t u a t i o n i n the Gulf, whether these problems would be 
s i g n i f i c a n t may soon become apparent), or i f the 
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overheated stock market crashed, there would c e r t a i n l y 
be an economic downturn. 
S i m i l a r l y , Misawa (1987) has put forward his three 
reasons f o r why Japan's economic success may decline. 
I n the past, the Japanese prospered by improving on 
o t h e r s ' technology; now, however, basic research and 
innov a t i o n i s a must f o r success. Second, there has 
been a change i n the nature of demand f o r goods — 
people have a l l t h e i r 'necessities' already so there i s 
a smaller market f o r the Japanese. And l a s t l y , as w i l l 
be seen i n chapter 3, the Japanese youth i s becoming 
more i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and, because they have grown up i n 
prosperous times, they no longer have the d r i v e t o 
achieve Japanese economic success. 'With fewer workers 
w i l l i n g t o work f i e r c e l y and o l d products t h a t w i l l not 
s e l l w e l l even w i t h the expanded use o f improved 
technology, the s t r e n g t h of Japanese-style management 
w i l l n a t u r a l l y d i m i n i s h . No one expects Japanese 
i n d u s t r y t o collapse e a s i l y . However, i f the s i t u a t i o n 
remains the same, one must recognize t h a t Japanese 
i n d u s t r y w i l l d e c l i n e i n the long run.' (Misawa, 
1987:14). 
As regards the problems at present, as seen i n 
s e c t i o n 3, a p e s s i m i s t i c view can be taken: 'In the 
past, most of the Japanese stock market i l l s could be 
cured by changing a r u l e here or th e r e , or i n s t i t u t i n g 
some new r e g u l a t i o n . But the problems of r i s i n g 
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i n t e r e s t rates and a weakening currency are not so 
e a s i l y f i x e d . ' ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l Business Week. 1990:40). 
More o p t i m i s t i c views, however, can also be found: 
'the present expansion i s already one of the l a r g e s t i n 
modern Japanese h i s t o r y . The sustained upswing i n the 
United States and the e a r l i e r expansionary phases i n 
Japan, such as the Izanagi boom of 1965-1970, featured 
several dips t h a t , by l e t t i n g o f f excess steam, 
prolonged the p r o s p e r i t y . Since the Japanese economy 
s t i l l has considerable reserves, the current breather 
may be j u s t what we need t o keep the good times 
r o l l i n g . ' (Kosai, 1990:17). 
The global climate should be r e l a t i v e l y favourable 
i n the 1990s and i t has been proposed t h a t the main 
tasks f o r Japan w i l l be i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , 
d e r e g u l a t i o n and ,responding t o the aging of the 
population (Yashiro, 1990). 'The 1990s may be Japan's 
f i n a l golden years before the b i l l s f o r an old-aged 
s o c i e t y s p i r a l upward. We must take the f u l l e s t 
possible advantage of these remaining years t o ease 
government r e g u l a t i o n s and adopt p o l i c i e s t o promote 
t r u e competition.' (Yashiro, 1990:21). 
Though no one can be c e r t a i n of Japan's f u t u r e 
economic s t a t e , i t i s c l e a r t h a t presently they are i n 
a p o s i t i o n t o become a global superpower. 
In order f o r them t o take on t h i s p o s i t i o n , Japan 
must open i t s e l f t o the r e s t of the world. They were 
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able t o do t h i s i n the 80s and i t looks as though 
t h e y ' l l continue t h i s r e l a x a t i o n . ' I f the Japanese can 
also prove t h a t they stand f o r u n i v e r s a l values, not 
e x c l u s i v e ones, they w i l l f i n d i t easier t o persuade 
the world t h a t t h e i r new assertiveness i s t o be 
welcomed. Their a b i l i t y t o do t h i s w i l l decide, more 
than anything else, how peaceful and prosperous post-
cold-war Asia w i l l be.' (The Economist. 1990:12). 
S i m i l a r l y , 
'the Japanese recognize ... t h a t t o be much of a 
leader i n Asia, l e t alone g l o b a l l y , they w i l l have 
t o generate ideas about government, s o c i a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n , and c u l t u r e t h a t a l l s o r t s of people 
can aspire t o . Japanese profess confidence t h a t 
t h e i r i m i t a t i v e phase i s over, t h a t they are 
producing o r i g i n a l t h i n g s t h a t can sweep the 
world. 
What th i n g s exactly? Concentrated soap powder, 
they say: s k i n creams, Nintendo games. These 
th i n g s do matter: i n America's powerful 1950s, 
Coca-Cola d i d seem t o embody American values. But 
they are not enough. Japan needs the s h e l t e r of 
i t s American a l l i a n c e f o r a good many years before 
i t can hope t o produce the deeper examples and 
i n s p i r a t i o n s t h a t would make i t a superpower too.' 
(The E c o n g m i s t . 1990:56). 
I t has been argued as well t h a t Japan w i l l have a 
harder time than Germany w i l l i n reaching the top rank 
of power f o r 2 reasons: 1. Asia i s a more complicated 
and dangerous place than Europe; the northeast s t i l l 
take cold war postures, f o r example China, who have 
nuclear c a p a b i l i t i e s , glower at those who threaten 
them; and the Koreas s t i l l d i s l i k e each other and are 
antagonists of Japan. Peace has been kept by the 
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United States f o r 40 years and i t appears t h a t a US-
Japan a l l i a n c e w i l l be necessary t o maintain t h i s 
s t a b i 1 i t y . 
2. Japan i s more deeply mistrusted than Germany. 
Germany has apologised more and confronted the past, so 
i s more reassuring. 'The Japanese s t i l l appear, t o 
themselves and t o t h e i r neighbours, as too sin g u l a r a 
race t o o f f e r an example of i n s p i r a t i o n t o other 
people. Germany i s at l e a s t groping towards a common 
European i d e a l . Japaneseness i s a creed which, by 
d e f i n i t i o n , has l i t t l e appeal t o non-Japanese.' (The 
Economist. 21-27 Ju l y , 1990:11). 
2.6 Conclusion 
Japan's place i n the world economy has reached 
astounding p r o p o r t i o n s p r e v i o u s l y unthinkable f o l l o w i n g 
the Japanese devastation during World War I I . At the 
same time, however, B r i t a i n and America are 
experiencing a r e l a t i v e d e c l i n e . The question a r i s e s , 
then, as t o whether B r i t a i n and the United States can 
look t o Japan f o r guidance and example i n order t o get 
back on t r a c k . 
I n response t o what i s the c u r r e n t t r e n d i n the 
l i t e r a t u r e on the subject today, two possible causes of 
the great success of the Japanese economy w i l l be 
examined a t length. F i r s t , corporate c u l t u r e has 
received widespread a t t e n t i o n of l a t e so t h a t a 
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discussion of i t i n r e l a t i o n t o Japans's economic boom 
appears r e l e v a n t . Second, i t i s the management 
p r a c t i c e s considered p e c u l i a r t o Japan which have 
received the most a t t e n t i o n and have been argued, by 
both Western and Japanese authors and business people, 
t o be the primary key t o Japan's success. This issue 
w i l l be discussed and examined i n the most depth i n the 
f o l l o w i n g chapters. F i n a l l y , Chapter 8 w i l l present 
those p o s s i b l e causes t h a t have received less g l o r i f i e d 
a t t e n t i o n . 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ROLE OF CORPORATE CULTURE 
'In the mid-1960'8, before c u r r e n t notions about 
'Japanese o r g a n i z a t i o n ' became popular, I had a 
group of Japanese students make a presentation t o 
my MBA class about organizations i n Japan. 
Despite some minor language problems, things went 
we l l u n t i l the discussion turned on the Japanese 
system of s e n i o r i t y i n determining promotion 
upward i n the management hierarchy. 
'Several of my American students became a g i t a t e d . 
But t h a t w i l l never work, they protested. What i s 
there t o motivate managers t o do the best possible 
job? But there was consternation on the other 
side as w e l l . What do you mean, won't work? the 
Japanese r e p l i e d , i t dflfis work! In retrospect, 
I'm not sure t h a t e i t h e r group learned very much 
t h a t afternoon. But the p o i n t should be clear 
enough: you can't understand the workings of 
Japanese organizations without understanding the 
Japanese corporate c u l t u r e — nor, i n t h i s case, 
without understanding the c u l t u r e of Japanese 
s o c i e t y . ' ( R i t t i and Funkhouser, 1987:255). 
The catch-phrase on the l i p s of most managers i n 
the 1980's and now i n t o the 1990's has been 'corporate 
c u l t u r e ' . Through such best s e l l i n g books as Peters 
and Waterman's I n Search of Excellence (1982) and 
Deal's Corporate Culture (1982), the idea t h a t the 
'best companies' have a strong c u l t u r e and lesser 
companies who i n t e n t i o n a l l y implement a strong c u l t u r e 
w i l l become 'best companies' has gained considerable 
p o p u l a r i t y . The Japanese are said t o be at the top of 
in d u s t r y as a r e s u l t of t h e i r corporate c u l t u r e . This 
emphasis on i t s importance t o company success leads t o 
some obvious questions: what a c t u a l l y i s corporate 
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c u l t u r e ? £fln_it d r a m a t i c a l l y t u r n a company around? Can 
i t be c o n t r o l l e d ? 
As t h i s subject has become so prominent, i t seems 
impossible t o neglect i t when discussing the economic 
success of the Japanese. Though controversy surrounds 
i t s importance and manageability, a discussion of i t 
w i l l i n any case c o n t r i b u t e t o the understanding of the 
Japanese system. This chapter w i l l include, then, an 
overview of Japanese corporate c u l t u r e . 
3.1 D e f i n i t i o n of Corporate Culture 
There i s , as yet, no set , textbook d e f i n i t i o n of 
corporate c u l t u r e and there i s some v a r i a t i o n across 
the f i e l d . However, the most consensual ideas are as 
f o l l o w s : 'The unique c l i m a t e , processes and prac t i c e s 
found i n an org a n i z a t i o n may be r e f e r r e d t o as i t s 
' c u l t u r e ' — defined as the philosophy, a t t i t u d e s , 
b e l i e f s , and shared values upon which the organization 
operates and which determine the problem s o l v i n g 
behaviour of a l l i t s employees.' ( V i l j o e n , 1986:20); or 
shared assumptions held by a l l the members of an 
or g a n i z a t i o n which can be characterised as ' i m p l i c i t 
s o c i a l c o n t r a c t s which f i l l i n the gap between formal 
employment con t r a c t s and the inform a t i o n employees 
le a r n regarding the way t h i n g s r e a l l y work. These 
shared assumptions are applied u n t h i n k i n g l y by 
i n d i v i d u a l s i n an or g a n i z a t i o n and r e i n f o r c e d by the 
- f a c t t h a t other members also take them f o r granted.' 
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(Smith and K l e i n e r , 1987:10). Furthermore, 'These 
values or p a t t e r n s of b e l i e f are manifested by symbolic 
devices such as myth, r i t u a l , s t o r i e s , legends, and 
s p e c i a l i z e d language.' (Smircich, 1983:344). 
A f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n should be made between 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e and corporate c u l t u r e (although 
many authors and managers use the terms i n t e r -
changeably). Organizational c u l t u r e i s s p e c i f i c t o a 
p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n : every o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l have 
i t s own c u l t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as those discussed 
above. Cultures vary from company t o company i n terms 
of s t r e n g t h , pervasiveness, d i r e c t i o n and content. 
What c u l t u r e i s appropriate f o r a c e r t a i n o r g a n i z a t i o n 
'depends on many f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g the age of the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n , i t s market, i t s geographical l o c a t i o n , 
h i s t o r y , and even the preferences of the Chief 
Executive and top management.' (Gorman, 1987:4). The 
corporate c u l t u r e , on the other hand, i s more 
encompassing and r e f e r s t o 'the i n t e r p r e t i v e framework 
shared among a l l corporate organizations i n 'Western' 
c o u n t r i e s . ' ( R i t t i and Funkhouser, 1987:254-255). 
These terms have been taken from anthropology's 
idea of c u l t u r e . They lose a b i t i n the t r a n s l a t i o n , 
however, as only p a r t i c u l a r aspects are taken and 
a p p l i e d . One problem may a r i s e from the f a c t t h a t 
there are d i f f e r e n t concepts of c u l t u r e i n anthropology 
depending on which school i s r e f e r r e d t o : i n c o g n i t i v e 
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anthropology, c u l t u r e c o n s i s t s o f shared knowledge; i n 
symbolic anthropology, i t i s a system of shared 
meaning; and t o s t r u c t u r a l anthropology and 
psychodynamics, c u l t u r e i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n and 
expression of the mind's unconscious operation 
(Smircich, 1983). 
F i n a l l y , i t should be noted t h a t i n most cases 
there i s n ' t j u s t a s i n g l e , homogeneous c u l t u r e , but 
there e x i s t s a l s o w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n subcultures 
and c o u n t e r - c u l t u r e s which may c o n f l i c t w i t h , threaten, 
or take over the e x i s t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e . They 
compete t o 'define the nature of s i t u a t i o n s w i t h i n 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l boundaries.' (Smircich, 1983:346). For 
example, w i t h i n a u n i v e r s i t y the professors may have 
more a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e i r profession than t o the 
u n i v e r s i t y so c o n f l i c t a r i s e s as the u n i v e r s i t y ' s ( i . e . 
the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s ) goals are not met. This 
m u l t i c u l t u r a l i t y , as we s h a l l see, can play a very 
important r o l e i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
3.2 The Development of an Organizational Culture 
Again there i s no s i n g l e , widely accepted theory 
of how an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e develops. Smith and 
K l e i n e r (1987) contend t h a t i t i s the company's founder 
who has the g r e a t e s t e f f e c t on the c u l t u r e — the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e r e f l e c t s what the founders have 
brought t o the company and how the employees 
subsequently l e a r n from t h e i r experiences. Only the 
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elements t h a t solve group problems, however, w i l l 
s u r v i v e . Not d i s s i m i l a r l y , Gorman (1987), though 
dismissing the importance of the founders, contends 
t h a t ' ( t ) h e c o n d i t i o n s under which past organizational 
issues and problems were resolved do not remain i n the 
consciousness of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Responses t o the 
c o n d i t i o n s become automatic and accepted as the way 
t h i n g s are done. I n t h i s way, severe s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n s 
are set on i n d i v i d u a l s ' behaviour and thought; and the 
strong but hidden impact of c u l t u r e i s established.' 
( p . 4 ) . 
W i l k i n s and Ouchi (1983) put f o r t h 3 conditions 
which encourage the development of organizational 
c u l t u r e s [they use the anthropological term 'clan' 
which i s designed t o be taken as a synonym]: 
1) A long h i s t o r y and s t a b l e membership — t h i s 
c o n d i t i o n encourages the development of a c u l t u r e as 
there i s much o p p o r t u n i t y f o r passing down social 
knowledge from generation t o generation 'thus g i v i n g 
the image of h i s t o r i c i t y t h a t Berger and Luckman (1967) 
claimed i s the beginning of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of 
s o c i a l knowledge.' (p.473). 
They give as evidence Japanese and Japanese-like 
American (what they c a l l Z f i r m s ) f i r m s who maintain a 
l i f e t i m e employment system of some kind. They found 
when comparing the successful Japanese f i r m s w i t h less 
successful American companies ' ( t ) h a t the s t o r i e s t o l d 
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by d i f f e r e n t employees were more o f t e n "shared s t o r i e s " 
t h a t i l l u s t r a t e d and l e g i t i m a t e d a common management 
philosophy' more so than i n those companies w i t h a less 
s t a b l e work fo r c e . 
2) Absence of i n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e s — Wilkins and 
Ouchi give 3 examples of how Japanese and Z f i r m s are 
able t o keep the a l t e r n a t i v e s t o the organizational 
c u l t u r e low. F i r s t , the Z f i r m they studied h i r e d 
people only f o r p o s i t i o n s lowest on the h i e r a r c h i c a l 
ladder and promotions were only from w i t h i n , thereby 
i s o l a t i n g the members from outside influences. 
Secondly, management went t o great lengths, through 
screening of a p p l i c a n t s , t o h i r e employees who already 
held s i m i l a r values and o r i e n t a t i o n s t o those of the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . F i n a l l y , a l l the p a r t i c i p a n t s of the 
company maintained a conception of t h e i r uniqueness and 
s i g n i f i c a n t s u p e r i o r i t y t o other companies. This acted 
t o ' d i s c r e d i t o r i e n t a t i o n s t h a t seemed t o d i f f e r from 
t h e i r own.' (p.473). 
3) I n t e r a c t i o n among members — t o achieve a strong 
company-wide c u l t u r e , i t i s best i f the employees are 
able t o know and communicate w i t h as many other 
employees as possible as then common i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
can be made. Cliques encourage the development of 
subcultures and counter-cultures which w i l l o f t e n 
c o n f l i c t w i t h the c u l t u r e of the or g a n i z a t i o n . Z 
Companies encourage company-wide communication through 
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the implementation of non-specialized career paths and 
c o l l e c t i v e decision-making. 
V i l j o e n (1986) gives 4 elements t h a t a f f e c t the 
nature of an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e : 
1) The organization's c r i t i c a l success f a c t o r s — a t 
l e a s t one performance c r i t e r i o n , r e l a t e d t o i t s own 
unique products, customers, competitors, i n t e r n a l 
c a p a b i l i t i e s , t echnological expertise or any other 
s i m i l a r v a r i a b l e , w i l l be c r u c i a l t o the success of the 
company. The company, then, must focus much a t t e n t i o n 
and operations onto t h a t c r i t e r i o n t o keep the company 
going. As a r e s u l t , 'every person i n the company i s 
able t o see h i s Job a c t i v i t i e s i n terms of these 
p r i o r i t i e s . ' (p.22). This does not create a c u l t u r e 
when there i s no recognized, s p e c i f i c c r i t i c a l success 
f a c t o r or i t i s not communicated we l l enough t o the 
employees so t h a t there i s no company-wide response. 
2) The values of the o r g a n i z a t i o n — these are derived 
d i r e c t l y from the c r i t i c a l success f a c t o r s and 
c o n s t i t u t e the basic philosophy and b e l i e f s which guide 
the a c t i v i t i e s and decisions of employees. V i l j o e n 
o f f e r s an example: 'a company which believes t h a t 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l leadership i s the key t o success i n i t s 
in d u s t r y may adopt the value of "innovation and 
c r e a t i v i t y . " Accordingly, i t w i l l develop a range of 
support mechanisms t o ensure t h a t these values are 
enacted.' (p.22). 
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3) The s t y l e of management predominating w i t h i n the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n — he defines management s t y l e as 'the 
approach t h a t managers adopt t o t h e i r tasks and ... 
t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e philosophy about the p r i o r i t i e s of the 
business.' (p.22). 
4) The o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s i d i o s y n c r a t i c p r a c t i c e s — a 
strong component of corporate c u l t u r e ; includes 
fundamental, t r i v i a l t h i n g s l i k e meeting formats, 
w r i t i n g s t y l e s , modes of speech, e t c . as w e l l as 
p o l i c i e s on budgeting, planning, and waste c o n t r o l . 
They are deeply entrenched and hard t o change as they 
are a f f i l i a t e d w i t h the p r a c t i c e s a f t e r many years of 
them. 
Wil k i n s and Ouchi, however, suggest t h a t 'the 
extent t o which o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i l l develop c u l t u r e s ( i n 
the sense of d i s t i n c t and l o c a l l y shared knowledge), 
e s p e c i a l l y a t the l e v e l of the whole o r g a n i z a t i o n , w i l l 
vary and indeed be r e l a t i v e l y i n f r e q u e n t . ' (1983:475). 
F i n a l l y , Gorman (1987) maintains t h a t , regardless 
of how i t developed o r i g i n a l l y , random reinforcement 
increases the p e r p e t u a l i t y of a c u l t u r e and thus a 
c e r t a i n s t r a t e g y . 
3.3 The Value of a Strong Organizational Culture 
'Texas Instruments, Proctor & Gamble, 3M, and IBM, 
f o r example, a l l pay close a t t e n t i o n t o the 
customer and each has a h i g h l y developed value 
system t h a t causes i t s employees t o i d e n t i f y 
s t r o n g l y w i t h the f i r m . Perhaps the intense 
l o y a l t y t h a t these f i r m s i n s p i r e i s j u s t an 
i n t e r e s t i n g idiosyncrasy. But we b e l i e v e , on the 
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c o n t r a r y , t h a t t h i s bond of shared values i s 
fundamental t o a l l of the r e s t . I n our view, t h i s 
i s probably the most underpublicized "secret 
weapon" of great companies.' (Pascals and Athos, 
1981:307). 
Culture has r e c e n t l y been regarded as perhaps the 
most important f a c t o r i n determining the success of a 
company. A good c u l t u r e creates happy employees 
w i l l i n g t o devote themselves t o the company: people 
'desperately need meaning i n t h e i r l i v e s and w i l l 
s a c r i f i c e a great deal t o i n s t i t u t i o n s which w i l l 
provide t h a t meaning.' (Peters and Waterman, 1982). 
Culture i s regarded as s u b t l e and a f f e c t i n g a l l 
l e v e l s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l hierarchy: 
'Past c r i s e s , achievements, successes and f a i l u r e s 
lead t o the c r e a t i o n of assumptions about r e a l i t y 
(you can't t r u s t banks), t r u t h (people are a 
company's most important a s s e t ) , time (you must 
always be seen t o be busy), human nature (women 
are less committed t o work than men) or human 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s (don't l e t subordinates get close t o 
you).' (Gorman, 1987:4). 
I t has been argued, however, t h a t c u l t u r e i s not a 
way of a l l e v i a t i n g business i l l s , but i t i s the outside 
i n f l u e n c e s , e.g. decisions about finance, investment, 
market p o l i c y e t c . , which are much more important i n 
deciding a company's success. The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
c u l t u r e i s , t h i s l i n e of argument contends, only 
important i n a i d i n g the understanding of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
l i f e . 
S t i l l , the argument f o r the importance of 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e i n a f f e c t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l i f e 
i s one which i s h i g h l y prevalent today, both i n 
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management and s o c i a l sciences, so should not be 
overlooked and ignored too e a s i l y . This section w i l l 
examine how a strong c u l t u r e i s believed t o be able t o 
increase e f f i c i e n c y and t u r n a company i n t o a success, 
and whether i t can also act as a hindrance t o a 
company. 
P o s i t i v e consequences of a strong c u l t u r e 
R i t t i and Funkhouser (1987) give 3 functions of 
c u l t u r e i n org a n i z a t i o n s : 
'1) I n t e g r a t i o n . Culture c a r r i e s w i t h i t a 
framework of meaning and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t 
enables p a r t i c i p a n t s t o i n t e g r a t e themselves and 
t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n t o a meaningful whole. 
2) Commitment. Culture provides reasons f o r 
p a r t i c i p a n t s t o be w i l l i n g t o devote energy and 
l o y a l t y t o the o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t provides reasons 
f o r s a c r i f i c e and investment of s e l f i n the f u t u r e 
of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
3) C o n t r o l . Culture l e g i t i m a t e s the st r u c t u r e s of 
a u t h o r i t y and o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t c o n t r o l a c t i v i t i e s 
w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Myth, r i t u a l , and symbol 
provide explanations f o r a c t i v i t i e s and thus help 
t o r e c o n c i l e d i f f e r e n c e s between ideals and actual 
behaviour.' (p.256). 
Their f i r s t f u n c t i o n of i n t e g r a t i o n has been most 
o f t e n considered r e l e v a n t by various authors on the 
sub j e c t . Culture gives meaning t o i n d i v i d u a l s ' l i v e s , 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a c t i o n s , and acts as a mode of 
transmission of l e a r n i n g . 'As i t regards the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n , [ c u l t u r e ] i s the cement which bonds i t 
together. Consistency i n outlook and values makes 
decision-making, c o n t r o l , c o o r d i n a t i o n , and common 
purpose possible a t a l l l e v e l s . ' (Gorman, 1987:5). A 
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shared c u l t u r e i s said t o increase e f f i c i e n c y since 
much i s then already understood and agreed upon so t h a t 
communication, cooperation, commitment, decision-
making, and implementation are aided (Smith and 
K l e i n e r , 1987). I t i s able t o reduce uncertainty f o r 
i n d i v i d u a l s : 'Through the c u l t u r e ' s myths, metaphors 
and symbols, a d i f f e r e n t world i s created; a world i n 
which the perception of complexity i s reduced and i n 
which the o r g a n i z a t i o n seems t o have more co n t r o l and 
t o engage i n r a t i o n a l a c t i o n . ' (Gorman, 1987:5). 
Pascale and Athos are perhaps the most ardent 
supporters of the second element's value: 
'Employment involves a psychological contract as 
well as a c o n t r a c t i n v o l v i n g the exchange of 
labour f o r c a p i t a l . I n many Western 
orga n i z a t i o n s , t h a t psychological c o n t r a c t , while 
never e x p l i c i t , o f t e n assumes l i t t l e t r u s t by 
e i t h e r p a r t y i n the other. I f the only basis f o r 
the r e l a t i o n of company and employee i s an 
instrumental one, i t should not be s u r p r i s i n g t h a t 
many people i n our organizations do what they must 
do t o get t h e i r paycheck but l i t t l e more. While 
there can be a l l kinds of superordinate goals, 
those of employees can play a p a r t i c u l a r l y 
important r o l e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the moral contest 
f o r t h i s psychological c o n t r a c t . I f such 
superordinate values are c o n s i s t e n t l y honoured 
.... then employees tend t o i d e n t i f y more f u l l y 
w i t h the company. They see the f i r m ' s i n t e r e s t 
and t h e i r own as more congruent and tend t o invest 
themselves more f u l l y i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n — 
i n c l u d i n g looking f o r ways t o improve how they do 
t h e i r j o b . ' (1981:304-305). 
This argument has obvious i m p l i c a t i o n s i n regards 
t o t h e o r i e s on what makes the Japanese companies so 
successful. As we s h a l l see i n the f o l l o w i n g chapters, 
employee l o y a l t y i s a h i g h l y valued goal f o r Japanese 
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management and i t s regular attainment believed by many 
t o be a reason f o r Japanese e f f e c t i v e n e s s . The 
question, however, of how important a r o l e i t plays 
remains. 
Wil k i n s and Ouchi (1983) 
'view c u l t u r e as an e f f i c i e n t mode f o r governing 
exchanges or t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
Their view i s t h a t c u l t u r e s form i n order t o lower 
t r a n s a c t i o n costs associated w i t h the most complex 
and ambiguous forms of exchange. By s o c i a l i s i n g 
the p a r t i e s t o an exchange such t h a t a general 
paradigm determines the nature of t r a n s a c t i o n s , 
the cost of these exchanges i s reduced. They 
regard c u l t u r e as an e f f i c i e n t form of t r a n s a c t i o n 
c o n t r o l . ' (Smith and Kleiner, 1987:11). 
In conclusion t o the issue of the p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s 
of strong o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e , i t should be noted, 
as Smith & K l e i n e r (1987) have, t h a t increased 
e f f i c i e n c y does not imply an increase i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s 
( ' e f f i c i e n c y i s achieved when something i s done w i t h a 
minimum expenditure of resources' ( p . 1 1 ) ) . I f the 
c u l t u r e i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e , i t can lead t o e f f i c i e n t , but 
obviously i n e f f e c t i v e , implementation of poor decisions 
e t c . The next s e c t i o n w i l l examine some of the other 
possible hazards of a strong o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e . 
N e g a t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s of a s t r o n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
c u l t u r e 
Corporate c u l t u r e , though generally thought of as 
a b e n e f i c i a l t o o l of management, can also cause t r o u b l e 
f o r a company. An o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e may be 
i n f l e x i b l e and r e s i s t a n t t o change r e s u l t i n g i n the 
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c o n t i n u a t i o n of once e f f e c t i v e operations which have 
become outdated and d e t r i m e n t a l . Sethi e t a l . (1984) 
found t h a t many of the most noteworthy 'turnarounds' 
have r e s u l t e d from an i r r e p a r a b l e break w i t h the past. 
Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) argued t h a t 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e s (once again, they use the 
anthr o p o l o g i c a l term 'clan' as a synonym f o r 
or g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e ) are e s p e c i a l l y useful when 
dealing w i t h u n c e r t a i n t y , complexity, and ambiguity. 
However, there are some less a t t r a c t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s 
which a r i s e from t h e i r theory of paradigm and goal 
congruence. 1) The clan may require the development 
and maintenance of too much s o c i a l agreement t o be 
e f f i c i e n t under less ambiguous t r a n s a c t i o n a l 
c o n d i t i o n s . 2) I n complex, ambiguous s i t u a t i o n s , the 
paradigm may not be shared by enough people or may be 
in a p p r o p r i a t e . 3) The cost of developing and 
maintaining a clan i s high. 4) A clan may form w i t h i n 
the formal o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t helps t h i s u n i t perform 
e f f i c i e n t l y but may be detrimental t o the o v e r a l l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n , i . e . c o u n t e r - c u l t u r e s . 
Sethi e t a l . (1984) maintain t h a t a corporate 
c u l t u r e should not be used as a manipulative management 
t o o l designed t o achieve management goals. 'Corporate 
c u l t u r e so defined becomes too narrow. I t runs the 
danger of f i l t e r i n g out both new values and new 
employees t h a t do not f i t a preconceived mold. I n the 
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process, i t may end up p r o t e c t i n g those i n d i v i d u a l s who 
support the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e and uphold the 
symbols of the corporate c u l t u r e w h i l e undermining i t s 
s u b s t a n t i v e aspects.' (p.293). They argue t h a t 'the 
essence of a successful corporate c u l t u r e does not l i e 
i n a unique set of shared values t h a t converts i t s 
people i n t o a t r i b e separate from the environment 
surrounding them...' but 'view the corporate c u l t u r e i n 
a more h o l i s t i c mold — one t h a t i n t e r n a l i z e s the 
values of the e x t e r n a l environment rather than 
i n s u l a t i n g the o r g a n i z a t i o n from i t . ' (p.293). 
Corporate c u l t u r e , then, according t o these 
authors, can be a valuable asset t o a company as i t 
encourages i n t e g r a t i o n , commitment and c o n t r o l , thereby 
p o s s i b l y r e s u l t i n g i n greater e f f i c i e n c y and hopefully 
(but not n e c e s s a r i l y ) e f f e c t i v e n e s s . I t can be a 
hindrance as w e l l , however, c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the 
pe r p e t u a t i o n of i n a p p r o p r i a t e business operations. As 
a r e s u l t , i t seems a good idea f o r a company t o be 
aware of i t s c u l t u r e t o see i f i t ' s gaining the r e s u l t s 
the management wants. The Japanese have a very 
e f f e c t i v e corporate c u l t u r e i t seems, but even they can 
come under the s t r a i n of the negative consequences as 
w i l l be shown i n the next s e c t i o n . 
3.4 Jaoanese Corporate Culture 
'One of the reasons f o r the s u p e r i o r i t y of 
Japanese business o r g a n i z a t i o n s i s a t t r i b u t e d t o 
the existence of a corporate c u l t u r e t h a t avoids 
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the c u l t of i n d i v i d u a l i s m , b u i l d s group l o y a l t y 
and a mutual support system, and provides an 
environment t h a t encourages i n d i v i d u a l employees 
t o excel and give t h e i r best t o the organization.' 
(Sethi e t a l . , 1984:292). 
Because Japanese success has o f t e n been a t t r i b u t e d t o a 
s u p e r l a t i v e Japanese corporate c u l t u r e , i t seems 
a l t o g e t h e r necessary t o examine Japanese corporate 
c u l t u r e and some s p e c i f i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e s of 
d i f f e r e n t Japanese companies. Also important i n 
achieving a complete p i c t u r e of the Japanese success i s 
how the c u l t u r e i s maintained and whether any changes 
are p r e s e n t l y o c c u r r i n g i n Japan. 
Corporate c u l t u r e i n Japan i s the term shafu. 
meaning l i t e r a l l y 'the way the wind blows i n a company, 
or the fashion of the company'. Kenkyusha's New 
Japanese-English D i c t i o n a r y t r a n s l a t e s the term as "the 
ways of a company; a company's custom [ t r a d i t i o n ] . " ' 
(Lu, 1987:55). 
As w i l l be seen i n chapter 4, the Japanese company 
i s o f t e n seen by the employees as a 'family' i n which 
each member works hard and does h i s share f o r the good 
of the f a m i l y . A powerful way of encouraging t h i s idea 
and c r e a t i n g a strong bond between members i s through 
legends of s p e c i f i c companies r i s i n g up from d i f f i c u l t 
times and ending i n triumph as a r e s u l t of the 
p r a c t i c e s of the company and i t s management. Even more 
pre v a l e n t i s the use of corporate philosophy t o 
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t r a n s m i t the values t o be shared by the company 
members. 
A corporate philosophy can be defined as 'a simple 
document c o n t a i n i n g the founder's i d e a l s , moral 
i n j u n c t i o n s , and l a t e r a d d i t i o n s and amendments.' (Lu, 
1987:55-56). Some examples of corporate philosophies 
f o l l o w w i t h the i n t e n t of e x t r a p o l a t i n g a c l e a r e r 
understanding both of the term and of Japanese 
corporations. 
Japanese Corporate Philosophies 
Yoshida Tadao, head of YKK, the world's biggest 
z i p manufacturers, espouses the f o l l o w i n g corporate 
philosophy: 'Sow the seeds of goodness and do good, 
then goodness i s bound t o be rewarded. Do not take but 
give. By g i v i n g , more i s given back t o the gi v e r . 
There i s i n t h i s ,world a t h i n g c a l l e d endless r e c y c l i n g 
of goodness.' (Lu, 1987:59-60). This philosophy i s 
then put i n t o p r a c t i c e by Yoshida i n h i s management of 
the company and i n labour n e g o t i a t i o n s . For example, 
' r e p a t r i a t i o n of p r o f i t s was a big issue at YKK but 
Yoshida's answer was simple: "we cannot remove p r o f i t s 
from the host c o u n t r i e s . We can accept the i n t e r e s t 
payments on our investment and nothing more. A bridge 
once b u i l t must not be withdrawn" i f the p r i n c i p l e of 
"endless r e c y c l i n g of goodness" i s t o be f u l l y 
a p p l i e d . ' (Lu, 1987:60). And another example i s as 
f o l l o w s : 8000 employees a t Kurobe wanted t o form a 
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cooperative i n l i g h t of t h e i r large combined purchasing 
power, but Yoshida opposed the idea, saying i t would be 
detrimental t o the l o c a l shopkeepers who had been good 
t o the YKK p l a n t . To do so would be contrary t o the 
idea of ' c y c l i n g of goodness' which should involve 
kindness being returned t o the town (Lu, 1987). 
Corporate philosophies can and should be modified 
a t appropriate times i n order t o r e f l e c t the present 
s i t u a t i o n . Dentsu, an a d v e r t i s i n g f i r m , espoused what 
they c a l l e d the 'Ten Spartan Rules' i n 1951 when the 
economy showed signs of recovering from the war: 
'1) Create work f o r y o u r s e l f ; don't w a i t f o r i t t o 
be assigned t o you. 
2) Take the i n i t i a t i v e i n performing your j o b 
instead of playing a passive p a r t . 
3) Grapple w i t h big jobs — p e t t y tasks debase 
you. 
4) Choose d i f f i c u l t jobs. Progress l i e s i n 
accomplishing d i f f i c u l t work. 
5) Once you s t a r t a task, never give up — 
complete i t , no matter what. 
6) Lead those around you. Leading others instead 
of being led makes a b i g d i f f e r e n c e i n the long 
run. 
7) Have a plan. A long-term plan engenders 
perseverance, planning and e f f o r t , and gives you 
hope f o r the f u t u r e . 
8) Have self-confidence. Otherwise, your work 
w i l l lack f o r c e , persistence and even substance. 
9) Use your brain t o the f u l l e s t degree a t a l l 
times. Keep your eye on a l l quarters and always 
be on the a l e r t . This i s the way we ensure 
s a t i s f a c t o r y s e r v i c e . 
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10) Don't be a f r a i d of f r i c t i o n . F r i c t i o n i s the 
mother of progress and the stimulus f o r 
aggressiveness. I f you f e a r f r i c t i o n , you w i l l 
become s e r v i l e and t i m i d . ' (Lu, 1987:57-58). 
T r a d i t i o n allows t h i s philosophy t o be supplemented and 
i n 1979, Tamura Hideharu, the leader then, proposed h i s 
5 p r i n c i p l e s : 
'1) Go one step f u r t h e r 
2) Broaden your sphere 
3) L i s t e n c a r e f u l l y t o what others have t o say 
4) Have your own viewpoint, and 
5) Don't f o r g e t the s p i r i t of the founder and the 
t e n a c i t y of our predecessors.' (Lu, 1987:58). 
In modern times characterized by continuous 
change, c r e a t i v i t y i s a l l - i m p o r t a n t t o the success of 
an a d v e r t i s i n g f i r m and t h i s gives r i s e t o Tamaru's 
f o u r t h p r i n c i p l e . He sa i d himself: 'The company needs 
a l l kinds of people of a l l kinds who possess a strong 
sense of i n d i v i d u a l i t y . Dentsu should be the organic 
i n t e g r a t i o n of such people. When Dentsu i s organized 
i n t h a t way, i t w i l l be able t o see things from many 
d i f f e r e n t angles, respond t o a l l kinds of s i t u a t i o n s , 
of a l l kinds, and make a bold leap toward t o t a l 
c r e a t i v i t y . ' (Lu, 1987:59). That i s an apt summary of 
Dentsu's corporate c u l t u r e . 
Haruo Mitsuyama, standing a u d i t o r of Yamanouchi 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., i n h i s a r t i c l e 'Corporate 
c u l t u r e and promotion of "human p r o d u c t i v i t y " ' (1987) 
discusses h i s company's philosophy. He s t a t e s t h a t h i s 
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company i s already the leader i n pharmaceuticals i n 
Japan but t h a t they wish t o become world leader. The 
corporate philosophy i s a r e f l e c t i o n of how t h i s goal 
i s t o be a t t a i n e d : 
'We have a common view t h a t a l l Yamanouchi 
employees are the b u i l d e r s of the f u t u r e , 
e s s e n t i a l f o r achieving our new goal. For i t i s 
them ( s i c ) t h a t form the basis of innovation, 
making the most of the company's a v a i l a b l e 
resources. 
'The underlying philosophy i s t h i s : new a b i l i t i e s 
and s t r e n g t h are the i n c e n t i v e s f o r one's s t r i v i n g 
f o r greater goals. The growth of each employee 
and every innovation he/she makes w i l l lead t o the 
growth and innovation of the company.' (p.13). 
Yamanouchi's corporate philosophy was enhanced 
through i n v o l v i n g a l 1 employees and allowin g them t o 
c o n t r i b u t e t o the philosophy. 33 people from lower-
l e v e l s t a f f t o middle-management got together i n 50 
groups over the course of a year and presented t h e i r 
ideas and discussed them. These ideas were l a t e r 
f i n a l i z e d through s t a f f and executive meetings and 
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o what was t i t l e d 'The Common Goals of 
Yamanouchi Employees'. The three which appeared i n the 
paper were as f o l l o w s : 
' C r e a t i v i t v The Yamanouchi employees advance every 
day w i t h creativeness, e x p e r t i s e and f o r e s i g h t . 
v i t a l i t v The Yamanouchi employees s t r i v e t o a t t a i n 
t h e i r goals i n high s p i r i t w i t h ( s i c ) f u l l of 
vigour, energy and enthusiasm. 
Team work The Yamanouchi employees work together 
t o make t h e i r company an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
e n t e r p r i s e . ' (adopted 1985) (p.14). 
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The use o f symbolism was the n p r a c t i s e d w i t h c o l o u r s 
r e p r e s e n t i n g each g o a l : 
'1) Blue f o r C r e a t i v i t y 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s c i e n c e , t h e o r y and I d e a l 
2) Red f o r V i t a l i t y 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p a s s i o n , v i c t o r y and 
a c t i v e n e s s 
3) Green f o r Team Work 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h harmony, c o o p e r a t i o n and 
n a t u r e . ' ( p . 1 4 ) . 
T h i s symbolism I s a s i m p l e b u t e f f e c t i v e way o f 
f u r t h e r i n g t h e v i s i b i l i t y o f t h e c o r p o r a t e p h i l o s o p h y . 
A s i m i l a r way o f i n c u l c a t i n g c o r p o r a t e p h i l o s o p h y i s 
though morning ceremonies, company songs, mottos, 
company f l a g s , badges and o t h e r I n s t i t u t i o n a l symbols 
( a l t h o u g h t h e s i n g i n g o f songs and r e c i t a t i o n o f 
c r e e d s , though s t i l l g e n e r a l l y found, ' i s p u b l i c l y 
r e garded as o l d f a s h i o n e d , and among i n t e l l e c t u a l s as 
l a u g h a b l e . ' ( R o h l e n , 1974:35).) 
Across most Japanese c o r p o r a t i o n s , 'wa i s 
undo u b t e d l y t h e s i n g l e most p o p u l a r component i n t h e 
mottoes and names...' (Rohlen, 1974:47). Wa i s d e f i n e d 
by Rohlen as 'a q u a l i t y o f r e l a t i o n s h i p , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
w i t h i n w o r k i n g groups, and i t r e f e r s t o t h e 
c o o p e r a t i o n , t r u s t , s h a r i n g , warmth, morale, and hard 
work o f e f f i c i e n t , p l e a s a n t , and p u r p o s e f u l 
f e l l o w s h i p . ' (1974:47). ' C o l l e c t i v e n e s s ' i s t h e most 
common g o a l . A t Uedagin, t h e Japanese bank Rohlen 
s t u d i e d , t h e i r goal i s m a n i f e s t e d i n such c a t c h phrases 
as 'one g r e a t f a m i l y ' and 'love Uedagin.' ' I n Uedagin, 
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n o t o n l y i s t h e r e a general requirement f o r common 
d i r e c t i o n and meaning, many i n f o r m a n t s i n d i c a t e t h a t 
t h e bank's p h i l o s o p h y i s u s e f u l because i t enhances t h e 
s a t i s f a c t i o n o f work by e s t a b l i s h i n g a sense o f j o i n t 
e f f o r t and shared v a l u e s . ' ( p . 3 4 ) . 
A survey conducted by Inagami i n M a r c h - A p r i l , 1984 
shows, i n r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , how much 
Japanese employees see t h e i r company's i n t e r e s t s as 
t h e i r own and t h e r e b y i n d i c a t i n g t h e i r h i g h l e v e l o f 
shared v a l u e s : 
P e r c e p t i o n o f Shared I n t e r e s t s With t h e Company (%) 
Japan U n i t e d U n i t e d Germany 
S t a t e s Kingdom Fed, Rep. 
(n=2147) (n=1669) (n=456) (n=672) 
Yes 41 .5 29.6 33.6 36.9 
To a c e r t a i n 
e x t e n t 43.8 26.7 23.6 35.2 
No 13.4 33.3 32.7 29.0 
I t w i l l work t o 7 
my d i s a d v a n t a g e 0.5 4.4 5.0 5.9 
N. A. 0.7 6.0 5.0 3.1 
Q u e s t i o n : 'Do you t h i n k t h a t by your company making 
p r o f i t your own w e l l - b e i n g w i l l be enhanced? 
(These f i n d i n g s were h i g h e r among w h i t e c o l l a r 
w o r k e r s . ) 
'Compared t o West Germany, t h e U.K. and I t a l y , 
Japanese e l e c t r i c a l machinery workers f e e l more 
s t r o n g l y t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s o v e r l a p w i t h t h e i r 
s u p e r v i s o r s , managers, and even e x e c u t i v e s . On 
th e o t h e r hand, they t h i n k t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s 
o v e r l a p t o a much s m a l l e r degree w i t h o t h e r 
workers i n t h e same i n d u s t r y . T h i s suggests t h a t 
Japanese workers c o n s i d e r t h e i r company a 
community o f s e l f i n t e r e s t . ' ( p . 2 0 ) . 
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The sense o f t h e 'company as f a m i l y ' i s i n c r e a s e d 
t h r o u g h t h e use o f u n w a l l e d o f f i c e s i n which even h i g h 
l e v e l management s i t s i n t h e same room w i t h low l e v e l 
employees, company o u t i n g s and a f t e r hours s o c i a l i z i n g . 
M i x i n g W i t h Colleagues 
Japan U n i t e d U n i t e d Germany 
S t a t e s Kingdom Fed, Rep 
(n=2147) (n=1669) (n=456) (n=672) 
Always 21 .6 9.2 5.9 5.2 
Sometimes 68.4 39.1 40.5 38.3 
O c c a s i o n a l l y 8.5 41.1 42.3 40.3 
Almost never 1.0 10.1 10.9 15.9 
N.A. 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 
Qu e s t i o n : ' t o what e x t e n t do you mix o f t e n w i t h co-
wor k e r s o u t s i d e work?' 
Inagami f u r t h e r e x t r a p o l a t e s : 
'About h a l f o f those i n managerial p o s i t i o n , 40X 
o f male workers over 35 and one t h i r d o f r e g u l a r 
male workers t h o u g h t t h a t t h e i r l i f e s t y l e was l i k e 
t h a t o f a "Company Man". One t h i r d o f managers 
and 20X o f r e g u l a r male employees t h o u g h t t h a t 
t h e y o f t e n t o o k t h e i r work home, and 72.8X o f 
managers, 64.IX o f foremen and s u p e r i n t e n d e n t s and 
52.3X o f r e g u l a r male employees t h o u g h t t h a t i t 
was n a t u r a l t o s a c r i f i c e t h e i r p r i v a t e l i v e s t o 
some e x t e n t f o r t h e company ( t h e f i g u r e was 27.1% 
f o r r e g u l a r female employees).' ( p . 2 2 ) . 
T h i s i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g i n l i g h t o f Lu's idea o f 
c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e : 
'Corporate c u l t u r e has many m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . I t i s 
t h e way o f d o i n g t h i n g s t h a t i s s p e c i a l t o t h e 
company. There i s a common u n d e r s t a n d i n g both 
spoken and unspoken. A word t h a t means one t h i n g 
i n one company may mean something d i f f e r e n t i n 
another company. People i n t h e same company, 
however, have o n l y one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h e y share 
i n common. As employees work t o g e t h e r f o r many 
years, t h e i r mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g becomes so 
i n t e n s e t h a t sometimes they j o k e about knowing 
each o t h e r ' s h a b i t s b e t t e r t h a n t h e i r Immediate 
61 
f a m i l y members. That i s c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e . ' ( L u , 
1987:62). 
The s t r e n g t h o f Japanese c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e and 
w o r k e r s ' a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e i r f i r m can, a t l e a s t 
p a r t i a l l y , be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e i r s e l e c t i v e r e c r u i t m e n t 
p r a c t i c e s i n which t h o s e who a l r e a d y h o l d views c l o s e 
t o those o f t h e company a r e employed. I n d o c t r i n a t i o n 
programs a r e a l s o very u s e f u l . These programs are 
g e n e r a l l y 3-6 months i n l e n g t h and i t i s here t h a t t h e 
employees a r e moulded i n t o 'company men'. They l e a r n 
t h e i r company's h i s t o r y , g o a l s and songs; 'They l e a r n 
t o be l o y a l employees,' and 'develop t h e " s p i r i t " and 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o work f o r t h e c o r p o r a t e good.' ( A l s t o n , 
1988:33). [Western companies such as IBM p r a c t i c e 
s i m i l a r t a c t i c s , as w i l l be seen i n c h a p t e r 7.] 
I n a p p r o p r i a t e J a p a n e s e c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e 
As was seen i n an e a r l i e r s e c t i o n , c o r p o r a t e 
c u l t u r e s can be d e t r i m e n t a l t o a company i f they are 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e or r e q u i r e m o d i f i c a t i o n . Ohmae (1990) 
p r o v i d e s an example o f t h e need f o r change i n a general 
p r i n c i p l e o f Japanese c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e . He argues 
t h a t t h e Japanese c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e i n v o l v e s an 
emphasis on a s t r a t e g y o f c o m p e t i t i o n . He uses as an 
example t h e a u t o m o b i l e i n d u s t r y . He m a i n t a i n s t h a t 
when t h e Japanese went g l o b a l , t h e y c o n c e n t r a t e d on 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g themselves f r o m t h e i r c o m p e t i t o r s and 
t h i s has become a c o s t l y r a t h e r t h a n e f f e c t i v e 
s t r a t e g y . The Japanese car m a n u f a c t u r e r s must compete 
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w i t h t h e t o p - o f - t h e - 1 i n e German companies such as BMW 
and Mercedes and low c o s t i n g Korean c a r s l i k e Hyundai. 
To e n t e r t h e Korean share o f t h e market t h e y would have 
t o c u t l a b o u r c o s t s t o t h e Korean l e v e l which I s t o o 
low t o be p o s s i b l e . Or t h e y c o u l d go up-market w i t h 
t h e Germans, b u t t h i s goes a g a i n s t t h e i r c o r p o r a t e 
c u l t u r e . For example, when compact d i s c p l a y e r s f i r s t 
h i t , everyone wanted one and t h e Japanese had an 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o e n t e r a 'Mercedes' model, b u t I n s t e a d 
' c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e and i n s t i n c t took o v e r , and they c u t 
p r i c e s t o 1/5 o f what t h e U.S. and European companies 
were g o i n g t o ask f o r t h e i r p l a y e r s . The Japanese 
i n s t i n c t was t o b u i l d share a t any c o s t . ' (p.60) The 
problem i s t h a t t h e y ' r e s t i l l p l a y i n g a 'low-cost 
market e n t r y game' when t h e y no lo n g e r need t o . 
Ohmae proposes t h a t t h e best s t r a t e g y would be f o r 
t h e Japanese c a r m a n u f a c t u r e r s t o c r e a t e v a l u e f o r t h e 
customer and d i s c a r d t h e Japanese c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e o f 
competing on p r i c e even when t h e y don't have t o . An 
example o f t h i s approach i s ta k e n from t h e pi a n o 
i n d u s t r y . Yamaha found themselves i n a s t a g n a n t market 
— t h e r e were a l r e a d y 40 m i l l i o n unplayed pianos i n 
people's homes. I n s t e a d o f c u t t i n g c o s t s , however, 
t h e y looked t o t h e customers' needs and t h r o u g h t h e i r 
t e c h n o l o g y developed a d i g i t a l s o f t w a r e package t h a t 
t u r n e d t h e p r e v i o u s l y unplayed I n s t r u m e n t s i n t o h i g h 
q u a l i t y p l a y e r p i a n o s t h a t c o u l d p l a y back t h e owners' 
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l i v e work o r p l a y t h a t o f any composer a v a i l a b l e on t h e 
s o f t w a r e . Sales have been e x p l o s i v e . 
Ohmae's a r t i c l e i l l u s t r a t e s t h e p o s s i b l e n e g a t i v e s 
a r i s i n g f r o m c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e s and shows t h a t even t h e 
Japanese make m i s t a k e s . 
Are t h e Japanese changing? 
I t c o u l d be s a i d t h a t Japanese s o c i e t y i s more 
p r e d i s p o s e d t o a s t r o n g c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e : from e a r l y 
y ears t h e Japanese a r e t a u g h t t o put t h e group ahead o f 
t h e i n d i v i d u a l and t o m a i n t a i n wa. I t i s i m p o r t a n t i n 
l i g h t o f t h i s t o no t e t h e changes t a k i n g p l a c e among 
t h e y o u t h o f today i n modern Japan. 
There i s some s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e youth are 
becoming i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c . 
' I n PPRD, MOL, ed., 1987, an image o f t h e younger 
g e n e r a t i o n as b e i n g s e l f - c e n t r e d , smart, o n l y 
d o i n g what t h e y a r e asked t o do, and l a c k i n g a 
"hungry s p i r i t " i s p o r t r a y e d . They wish t o l i v e 
more f o r themselves. Not w i s h i n g t o be "over-
c o n f o r m i s t s , " t h e y make l i t t l e a t t e m p t t o adapt 
themselves t o t h e p a t t e r n s o f behaviour r e q u i r e d 
by e s t a b l i s h e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h i s i s c a l l e d 
" m y s e l f - i s m " here.' ( I n a g a m i , 1988:22). 
Reischauer i n h i s book The Japanese, 
' r e p o r t e d t h a t younger Japanese f r e q u e n t l y 
expressed resentment a t t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e i r 
l i v e s imposed by a t i g h t l y o r g a n i z e d e d u c a t i o n a l 
and employment system. I n f a c t , a survey found 
t h a t young Japanese rank h i g h e s t among young 
people i n i n d u s t r i a l i z e d n a t i o n s i n t h e i r 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e way s o c i e t y works.' 
( s u r v e y f r o m t h e Japanese prime m i n i s t e r ' s o f f i c e , 
1984. Tokyo, Japan. Quote from I s h i i - K u n t z , 
1989:176). 
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A 1987 survey by t h e P o l i c y P l a n n i n g and Research 
Department o f t h e M i n i s t r y o f Labour i n Japan (PPRD) 
found t h a t 53.7X o f males and 57.3X o f females have 
hobbies, s t u d y o r p a r t i c i p a t e I n s o c i a l a c t i v i t y groups 
independent o f t h e i r company and co-workers ( I n a g a m i , 
1988). T h i s I n d i c a t e s a d e f i n i t e move away from 
company t i e s and towards an expanded p r i v a t e l i f e . 
F i n a l l y , i t appears t h a t t h e o l d e r workers a l s o 
a r e l e s s e n i n g company t i e s : 
'According t o Japan P r o d u c t i v i t y Centre, 1988, 
s l i g h t l y l e s s than 40* o f w h i t e - c o l l a r employees 
o f l a r g e Japanese companies a l r e a d y t h i n k t h a t 
t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e company i s merely t h a t 
o f employee and employed. Among respondents i n 
t h e i r l a t e 40's, t h e f i g u r e was a s u r p r i s i n g 45X. 
T h i s i n d i c a t e s a r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t s a c r i f i c i n g 
one's l i f e f o r t h e sake o f t h e company.' (Inagami, 
1988:22). 
3.5 Can Corporate Culture Be Managed or Created? 
I f t h e c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e o f Japanese f i r m s i s t h e 
reason f o r o r an i n g r e d i e n t i n t h e success o f Japanese 
business t h e n i t would be o f obvious v a l u e t o Western 
companies t o be a b l e t o adopt s i m i l a r c o r p o r a t e 
c u l t u r e s . But i s i t p o s s i b l e ? Once again t h e r e i s 
c o n s i d e r a b l e debate on t h e s u b j e c t . 
A common argument among t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s and 
s o c i o l o g i s t s i s t h a t ' c u l t u r e s h o u l d be regarded as 
something t h a t an o r g a n i z a t i o n " i s " , n o t as something 
t h a t an o r g a n i z a t i o n "has": i t i s n o t an independent 
v a r i a b l e , nor can i t be c r e a t e d , d i s c o v e r e d or 
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d e s t r o y e d by t h e whims o f management.' (Meek, 
1988:470). 
S t i l l , even Meek goes on t o argue t h a t 
'While i t i s m a i n t a i n e d t h a t c u l t u r e as a whole 
cannot be c o n s c i o u s l y m a n i p u l a t e d by management o r 
any o t h e r group, c u l t u r e i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y 
s t a t i c : c u l t u r e s do change w i t h i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s , 
and management does have more d i r e c t c o n t r o l than 
o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members over c e r t a i n aspects 
o f t h e c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e s , such as, c o n t r o l over 
logos and o f f i c i a l l y s t a t e d m i s s i o n s and e t h o s . ' 
(1988:262). 
W i l k i n s and Ouchi (1982) c h a l l e n g e t h e 
a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l stance head on by a r g u i n g t h a t 
' since t h e l e a r n i n g o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l " c u l t u r e " 
t y p i c a l l y o c curs i n a d u l t h o o d and s i n c e members o f 
contemporary o r g a n i z a t i o n s r a r e l y l i v e i n " t o t a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s " (Goffman, 1961) and are t h u s exposed 
t o a l t e r n a t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n s , we assume t h a t t h e 
s o c i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t o t h e 
e x t e n t t h a t they e x i s t , a r e n e i t h e r as deep nor as 
immutable as t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l metaphor would 
suggest.' ( p . 4 7 9 ) . 
The g e n e r a l consensus, t h e n , i s t h a t c u l t u r e s can 
and do change w i t h t h e debate r e s t i n g on management's 
power t o c o n t r o l o r implement t h i s change. For those 
who m a i n t a i n t h a t managers can c o n t r o l i t t o t h e i r 
b e n e f i t t h e r e a r e v a r i o u s views on how t h i s i s done and 
a v a r i e t y o f p r a c t i c a l g u ides (see f o r example Kilman 
e t a l , 1985 G a i n i n g C o n t r o l o f t h e Corporate C u l t u r e ) . 
Yet, even among these proponents o f ' c u l t u r e 
c o n t r o l ' , i t i s o f t e n p u t f o r w a r d t h a t i t i s n o t 
p o s s i b l e t o t a k e a b l u e p r i n t o f one company's c o r p o r a t e 
c u l t u r e and r e p l a c e i t i n a nother company u n l e s s t h e 
companies i n v o l v e d are s i t u a t i o n a l l y comparable. 
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'the t r u e work o f a r t , t h e r e a l e x c e l l e n c e , i s 
o n l y achieved as t h e m a t e r i a l s and c r e a t o r 
I n t e r a c t t o produce what t h e y t o g e t h e r are 
u n i q u e l y a b l e t o do...Managers need t o p r a c t i s e 
s e e i n g t h e unique g e n i u s w i t h i n a f i n i t e 
c o l l e c t i o n o f people and res o u r c e s r a t h e r t h a n 
imposing a f o r m u l a f r o m some o t h e r company on 
t h e i r raw m a t e r i a l s . ' ( W i l k i n s and P a t t e r s o n , 
1985:275). 
S i m i l a r l y , 
'A r e a l l y p o w e r f u l c u l t u r e w i l l n o t be an i m p o r t , 
i t w i l l be a n a t u r a l o u t g r o w t h o f how people f e e l 
about t h e company. Only i f t h e employees f e e l 
t h a t t h e y want t o "belong" t o t h e company w i l l 
t hey c o n s i d e r i t w o r t h w h i l e c o m m i t t i n g themselves 
t o a shared group i d e n t i t y . The e s s e n t i a l 
p r e r e q u i s i t e i s , once more, t h e t r u s t b u i l t on t h e 
b a s i s o f f u l l employment and company b e l i e f s . I f 
the b e l i e f s a r e r i c h and s t r o n g (and g e n u i n e l y 
s t r o n g l y h e l d by t o p management) i t i s more l i k e l y 
t h a t t h e r e s u l t i n g c u l t u r e w i l l be r i c h and 
s t r o n g ; as i s IBM's.' (Mercer, 1987:251). 
The q u e s t i o n , t h e n , i s whether Japanese c o r p o r a t e 
c u l t u r e , w h i l e g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d so s u c c e s s f u l , 
would be worthy o f a p p l i c a t i o n ; o r whether i t would be 
t o o c u l t u r a l l y bound t o be a model on which t o base a 
change o f one's c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e , i f t h i s i s i n f a c t 
p o s s i b l e . The answer, f r o m t h e r e s e a r c h , appears t o be 
t h a t i t i s a u s e f u l model i f t h e e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e s 
e x i s t t h a t would a l l o w t h e Japanese p h i l o s o p h i e s t o 
grow from them. Mercer (1987) d i s p u t e s t h e c u l t u r e 
bound h y p o t h e s i s w i t h c o n c r e t e examples o f how h i s 
company, IBM, m a i n t a i n s v e r y s i m i l a r p h i l o s o p h i e s and a 
s t r o n g c u l t u r e . He goes so f a r as t o say t h a t t h e 
Japanese have t a k e n t h e i r c u l t u r e f r o m IBM, n o t t h e 
o t h e r way round as so many b e l i e v e . There i s some room 
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f o r debate on t h i s l a s t p o i n t , b u t i t cannot be denied 
t h a t s i m i l a r c u l t u r e s e x i s t both i n Japan and i n t h e 
Western company IBM. 
3.6 Conclusion 
' C e r t a i n l y , a t t e m p t s t o e x p l a i n t h e marked success 
of Japan i n matching and exceeding l e v e l s o f 
p r o d u c t i v i t y , q u a l i t y , i n n o v a t i o n and s e r v i c e 
a t t a i n e d i n Western economies have tended t o p o i n t 
up t h e importance o f v a l u e s shared by Japanese 
management and workers as an i m p o r t a n t d e t e r m i n a n t 
o f t h e i r success. These v a l u e s , i t has been 
argued, r e s u l t i n b e h a v i o u r a l norms t h a t 
demonstrate a commitment t o q u a l i t y , problem 
s o l v i n g and c o - o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t i n g r e a t e r degree 
than i s general i n comparable o r g a n i z a t i o n s 
o u t s i d e o f Japan.' (Gorman, 1987:3). 
T h i s c h a p t e r has attemp t e d t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e 
c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e e x i s t i n g i n p r e s e n t day Japan. 
W h i l e , as was seen i n t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n , i t i s not 
c e r t a i n t h a t t h e Japanese c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e can be 
adapted t o Western companies, i t i s u s e f u l t o 
u n d e r s t a n d t h o s e p h i l o s o p h i e s and c u l t u r a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t are b e l i e v e d t o p l a y a r o l e i n t h e 
Japanese economic success. 
Such o b v i o u s l y c o n f l i c t i n g v a l u e s as t h e Japanese 
d e s i r e f o r group harmony and consensus and t h e Western 
d r i v e f o r i n d i v i d u a l i s m i l l u s t r a t e c o n f l i c t s which may 
o c c u r i f one company's c u l t u r e i s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
a p p l i e d t o a n o t h e r company. C u l t u r e s do change, 
however, and t h e Japanese n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e a l r e a d y 
appears t o be changing. I t w i l l be i n t e r e s t i n g t o see, 
t h e n , what changes w i l l appear i n t h e Japanese 
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c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e and s u b s e q u e n t l y i n t h e i r economy i n 
f u t u r e y e a r s . 
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CHAPTER 4 
JAPANESE MANAGEMENT: PRACTICES 
Japanese management p r a c t i c e s have been e x a l t e d i n 
the p a s t decade as a pr i m a r y reason f o r Japan's g r e a t 
economic success. That Western p r a c t i c e s d i f f e r i s t h e 
reason g i v e n f o r t h e West's r e l a t i v e d e c l i n e . The 
Japanese a r e no lo n g e r l o o k i n g t o t h e once revered 
p r a c t i c e s o f t h e U.S. but i n f a c t t h e t a b l e s , many 
b e l i e v e , s h o u l d be t u r n e d so t h a t by a d o p t i n g t h e 
w i n n i n g methods o f t h e Japanese, t h e West can r e g a i n 
economic s t r e n g t h . 
These a r e b i g c l a i m s , and the y make i t appear as 
though t h e r e i s an easy answer t o Western economic 
i l l s . J u s t what are these 'super p r a c t i c e s ' o f t h e 
Japanese? Can the y be Implemented as a whole i n 
Western businesses? Would a m i r a c l e t h e n ensue? These 
q u e s t i o n s a r e b e s t answered by f i r s t l o o k i n g 
o b j e c t i v e l y a t t h e common p r a c t i c e s o f t h e l a r g e f i r m s ; 
t h i s i s t h e purpose o f t h i s c h a p t e r . 
4.1 C u l t u r a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
I n o r d e r t o best understand t h e common managerial 
p r a c t i c e s t h a t w i l l f o l l o w i n t h e subsequent s e c t i o n s 
o f t h i s c h a p t e r , i t i s necessary t o f i r s t g a i n a t l e a s t 
a moderate u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e c u l t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s 
s p e c i f i c t o t h e Japanese as these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
permeate and a r e o f t e n c e n t r a l t o t h e Japanese system 
of management. 
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The most i m p o r t a n t element o f t h e Japanese v a l u e 
system f o r t h e i r management p r a c t i c e s i s t h e emphasis 
on m a i n t a i n i n g o r group harmony and consensus 
( A l s t o n , 1986). ' I t t r a n s l a t e s as t h e search f o r or 
t h e e x i s t e n c e o f mutual c o o p e r a t i o n so a group's 
members can devote t h e i r t o t a l e n e r g i e s t o a t t a i n i n g 
group g o a l s . ' ( A l s t o n , 1989:26). The Japanese are thus 
w i l l i n g t o p u t t h e i r own i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s a s i d e i n 
f a v o u r o f t h o s e which w i l l improve t h e group's s t a n d i n g 
and t h e members p r o f i t by t h e group's success. 
'A c e r t a i n sense o f s a t i s f a c t i o n seems t o be 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n an i n d i v i d u a l can 
make t o t h e w o r k i n g s o f a l a r g e r endeavour. I n 
f a c t , i f t h e system works p r o p e r l y , t h e r e s h o u l d 
be no need f o r t h e s e l f - a s s e r t i v e aspect o f 
i n d i v i d u a l i s m , s i n c e c l o s e r e l a t i o n s and 
a s s o c i a t e s , i n whatever arenas they o p e r a t e , 
s h o u l d be t a k i n g c a r e t o c o n s i d e r each o t h e r ' s 
i n t e r e s t s . ' (Hendry, 1987:205). 
I n a l l cases, i t i s necessary t o m a i n t a i n harmony 
w i t h i n t h e immediate group and w i t h a l l o t h e r s as w e l l . 
I t i s sometimes d i f f i c u l t t o know when a Japanese 
e x e c u t i v e means yes — he may d i s a g r e e but wishes t o 
m a i n t a i n v/a so he won't speak h o n e s t l y . There i s no 
room f o r b l u n t honesty i f i t w i l l upset someone i n a 
Japanese c o r p o r a t i o n . E n t e r t a i n i n g becomes one o f the 
few o u t l e t s f o r any s o r t o f c r i t i c i s m : d r i n k i n g a l l o w s 
p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s t o develop and i n e b r i a t i o n o f f e r s an 
excuse f o r a n y t h i n g t o o c r i t i c a l t h a t may be s a i d . As 
we s h a l l see, v^a has been c o n s i d e r e d t h e backbone o f 
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most managerial p r a c t i c e s which have l e d t o Japanese 
success. 
A seemingly obvious b u t g e n e r a l l y o v e r l o o k e d 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o Japanese success i s t h e work e t h i c o f 
t h e employees: t h e Japanese work hard. T h i s may be a 
r e s u l t o f t h e management p r a c t i c e s , as w i l l be seen 
s h o r t l y , b u t i t appears t h a t i t i s a l s o a c u l t u r a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c : p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s have found the 
Japanese t o have a h i g h l e v e l o f achievement m o t i v a t i o n 
and t o be a c h i e v e m e n t - o r i e n t e d ( M c C l e l l a n d , 1972; DeVos 
& Norbeck, 1961; C a u d i l l & DeVos, 1956). McClelland's 
s t u d y suggested t h a t 'people w i t h h i g h achievement 
m o t i v a t i o n work h a r d e r , l e a r n f a s t e r , and do t h e i r work 
b e s t f o r t h e sense o f achievement r a t h e r t h a n p u r e l y 
f o r economic m o t i v e , ' and concludes t h a t ' i t stands t o 
reason, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h i s achievement m o t i v a t i o n so 
permeated among t h e general p o p u l a t i o n i n Japan has 
c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e legendary hard work o f t h e Japanese 
worker and has made p o s s i b l e Japan's massive 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and economic development.' 
Ronald Dore (1973) has summarised t h e general 
d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e Japanese and t h e B r i t i s h i n a 
somewhat e x a g g e r a t e d b u t s t i l l e n l i g h t e n i n g manner: 
'1) The Japanese are l e s s e r i n d i v i d u a l i s t s , are 
more i n c l i n e d t o submerge t h e i r i d e n t i t y i n some 
l a r g e group t o which t h e y belong, and more l i k e l y 
t o be obsessed by a sense o f d u t y . 
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The B r i t i s h are more s e l f i s h , more i r r e s p o n s i b l e , 
more i n c l i n e d t o t e l l Jack t h a t they p e r s o n a l l y 
are r i g h t . 
2) The Japanese are l e s s s e l f - c o n f i d e n t and more 
n e u r o t i c l y p r eoccupied w i t h r e t a i n i n g t h e good 
o p i n i o n o f o t h e r s . 
The B r i t i s h a re more a p t t o be dogmatic and 
a g g r e s s i v e , being l e s s s e n s i t i v e t o t h e f e e l i n g s 
o f o t h e r s . 
3) The Japanese are more i n t r o v e r t e d . 
The B r i t i s h are l e s s h e s i t a n t about imposing t h e i r 
views and f e e l i n g s on o t h e r s . 
4) The Japanese are l e s s men o f p r i n c i p l e than t h e 
B r i t i s h . 
The B r i t i s h are l e s s w i l l i n g t o f o r g o t h e 
p l e a s u r e s o f s e l f - a s s e r t i o n i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f 
s o c i a l harmony. 
5) The Japanese are i m i t a t i v e . 
The B r i t i s h c o m p l a c e n t l y f a i l t o t a k e 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o l e a r n from o t h e r s . 
6) The Japanese are more a m b i t i o u s . 
The B r i t i s h , / a g a i n from t h e i r complacency, have 
l e s s concern w i t h s e l f - i m p r o v e m e n t . 
7) The Japanese are more submissive t o s u p e r i o r s . 
The B r i t i s h are more i n c l i n e d t o r e s e n t a u t h o r i t y 
by v i r t u e o f i t s very e x i s t e n c e and i r r e s p e c t i v e 
o f i t s f u n c t i o n a l n e c e s s i t y . 
8) The Japanese are more s l a v i s h l y d i l i g e n t . 
The B r i t i s h a re more a f r a i d o f hard work. 
9) The Japanese care l e s s about what happens 
o u t s i d e t h e i r own group, and have l e s s sense o f 
s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o c o r r e c t abuses i n t h e i r 
own s o c i e t y . 
The B r i t i s h are more g i v e n t o busybodying, l e s s 
w i l l i n g t o l i v e and l e t l i v e . 
10) The Japanese are more c h i l d i s h l y n a i v e . 
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The B r i t i s h are more s u s p i c i o u s and c y n i c a l , l e s s 
good humoured and c h e e r f u l . ' (Dore, 1973:297-298). 
4.2 The Common Ma n a g e r i a l P r a c t i c e s 
As t h e p o p u l a r i t y o f t h e n o t i o n o f Japanese 
management as an economic c u r e - a l l would suggest, t h e r e 
have been many a u t h o r s who have s t u d i e d Japanese 
businesses and have come up w i t h t h e i r l i s t o f common 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e l a r g e Japanese f i r m s (NB i t i s 
o n l y t h e l a r g e f i r m s t h a t are a b l e t o o f f e r most o f 
t h e s e ) . Dore (1973:264) argues t h a t Japanese companies 
c o n s i s t e n t l y employ ' l i f e t i m e employment, a s e n i o r i t y -
p l u s - m e r i t wage system, an i n t r a - e n t e r p r i s e career 
system, e n t e r p r i s e t r a i n i n g , e n t e r p r i s e u n i o n s , a h i g h 
l e v e l o f e n t e r p r i s e w e l f a r e , and t h e c a r e f u l n u r t u r i n g 
o f e n t e r p r i s e consciousness..,' I n h i s best s e l l e r 
Theory W i l l i a m Ouchi (1981) g i v e s h i s l i s t : l i f e t i m e 
employment, slow e v a l u a t i o n and p r o m o t i o n , non-
s p e c i a l i z e d c a r e e r p a t h s , i m p l i c i t c o n t r o l mechanisms, 
c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
and h o l i s t i c concern. Ouchi, as w e l l s h o u l d I , 
c l a r i f i e s h i s arguments by s t a t i n g t h a t 'no one 
o r g a n i s a t i o n w i l l c o n t a i n each and every c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
mentioned i n pure form. On t h e o t h e r hand, v i r t u a l l y 
a l l managers o f l a r g e e n t e r p r i s e s i n Japan seek t o 
a c h i e v e , as n e a r l y as p o s s i b l e , t hese u n d e r l y i n g 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . ' (1981:57). 
So these are some o f t h e common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 
But j u s t what do they e n t a i l ? A c l o s e r look a t t h e 
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p r a c t i c e s i n d i v i d u a l l y w i l l give a b e t t e r idea of what 
they o f f e r and how they have been h e l p f u l t o the 
Japanese success. 
4.3 L i f e t i m e EmplOYment 
'The most important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Japanese 
o r g a n i s a t i o n i s l i f e t i m e employment: l i f e t i m e 
employment, more than being a s i n g l e p o l i c y , i s the 
r u b r i c under which may fa c e t s of Japanese l i f e and work 
are i n t e g r a t e d . ' (Ouchi, 1981:17). 
The much t a l k e d about l i f e t i m e employment system 
works i n the f o l l o w i n g manner: the major f i r m s r e c r u i t 
once a year i n the sp r i n g and take on the employees, 
d i r e c t l y from the high schools or u n i v e r s i t i e s , who 
w i l l stay w i t h the f i r m u n t i l they r e t i r e ( g e n e r a l l y 
mandatorily a t 55). These employees are then 
considered p a r t of the f a m i l y and w i l l not be f i r e d 
unless they commit a c r i m i n a l offence. 
L i f e t i m e employment generates b e n e f i t s both f o r 
the employer and employee. The employee gains absolute 
j o b s e c u r i t y and knows t h a t even i f he makes a mistake 
or i s a f a i l u r e i n some aspect of h i s j o b , he w i l l 
s t i l l have a j o b . I t i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the 
company t o t r a i n him or f i n d an appropriate place i n 
the company where the employee can work t o h i s optimum. 
He thus, a t lower managerial l e v e l a t l e a s t , i s able t o 
i n i t i a t e new, bold ideas and engage i n experimentation 
which may very w e l l b e n e f i t the company as we l l as 
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himself. He also doesn't need t o compete w i t h h i s co-
workers t o keep h i s j o b so a closer r e l a t i o n s h i p and 
'happy cooperation' can r e s u l t . The harmony so prized 
i n the Japanese c u l t u r e i s also the r e s u l t of the 
workers' knowledge t h a t they w i l l be working w i t h the 
same people throughout t h e i r working l i v e s ; no 
antagonisms should be made as they w i l l not be 
f o r g o t t e n throughout one's working l i f e and s i m i l a r l y 
o b l i g a t i o n s should be b u i l t up f o r the same reason. 
The company b e n e f i t s as well since i t s o f f e r i n g of 
s e c u r i t y and commitment t o i t s workers r e s u l t s i n the 
workers' indebtedness and o b l i g a t i o n t o the company i n 
r e t u r n . This o b l i g a t i o n then leads t o ' l o y a l t y , 
enthusiasm and hard work' ( A l s t o n , 1986:258). The 
company's investment i n the employees means the 
employees' investment i n the company. This i s a 
powerful i n g r e d i e n t i n the Japanese success. Other 
advantages include a s t a b l e work f o r c e on which the 
company can count; employees who w i l l t h i n k on more of 
a long range basis i n the sense t h a t innovation w i l l be 
seen as helping themselves through helping the company 
( t h e i r ' f a m i l y ' ) succeed i n the f u t u r e ; the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of experienced workers who are able t o 
show the new worker what t o do which helps t o cut back 
on bureaucracy. 
The companies are also able t o implement a company 
bonus system when l i f e t i m e employment i s i n use (Ouchi, 
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1981). This system involves a bonus as p a r t of 
employees' compensation being paid t o the employees, 
approximately every 6 months, based on how the company 
has done i n t h a t period. I t i s on a group not an 
i n d i v i d u a l basis so t h a t the employees are motivated 
f u r t h e r t o b e n e f i t the company through cooperation 
r a t h e r than t o compete i n order t o help themselves. 
The f i r m also b e n e f i t s by having the a b i l i t y t o pay 
only small or no bonuses i n bad years thereby avoiding 
having t o lay o f f t h e i r experienced employees — t h i s 
i n t u r n , i s a t t r a c t i v e t o the employees and makes them 
f u r t h e r indebted. 
Despite the f a c t t h a t only a small proportion of 
workers are able t o take advantage of the system, i t 
permeates throughput the Japanese society (Alston, 
1986). Temporary workers also work hard as there i s 
the chance, a l b e i t small, t h a t they may be considered 
l o y a l and e n t h u s i a s t i c enough t o be recommended to 
receive i t as w e l l . This i s an added bonus f o r the 
company. 
4.4 S e n i o r i t v Based Payment Systems 
As we have seen so f a r , l o y a l t y t o the f i r m i s of 
optimum importance t o the Japanese and seems t o have 
f o s t e r e d employee commitment and production. Another 
way the Japanese gain t h i s l o y a l t y i s through a system 
of deferred rewards: nenkoh joretsu or s e n i o r i t y based 
payment system. When new graduates are h i r e d , they a l l 
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begin a t the same salary despite any d i f f e r e n c e s i n 
a b i l i t y , d e d i c a t i o n or motivation (Misawa, 1987). I t 
may not be f o r another 5 or 10 years t h a t they are 
evaluated, promoted, or given a pay r i s e higher than 
those who entered at the same time. Pay r i s e s come as 
a r e s u l t of s e n i o r i t y . 
Not only does t h i s system increase company l o y a l t y 
as the employees recognise t h a t they w i l l have t o stay 
( l i f e t i m e employment aside) w i t h the same company i f 
they are t o a t t a i n s i g n i f i c a n t s a l ary increases, but i t 
also i s said t o promote cooperation. 
Ouchi (1981) argues t h a t because workers are a l l 
paid the same and w i l l not be given pay r i s e s over 
others f o r q u i t e some time, i t i s not necessary t o 
engage i n 'corporate games'. For example, an employee 
w i l l not i n i t i a t e p r o j e c t s t h a t w i l l look good f o r 
himself i n the short term but won't be good f o r the 
company i n the long term"; an employee also w i l l not 
advance h i s own career at another's expense. 'While 
t h i s procedure seems p a i n f u l l y slow t o a s p i r i n g young 
managers i n Japanese f i r m s , i t promotes a very open 
a t t i t u d e towards cooperation, performance, and 
e v a l u a t i o n , since the system makes i t 
h i g h l y l i k e l y t h a t t r u e performance w i l l indeed come 
out i n the wash.' (Ouchi, 1981:26). 
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4.5 Company Union System 
Ninety per cent of Japanese labour unions are 
based on a company-by-company or g a n i s a t i o n (kigyohbetsu 
kumiai) which include only regular ( i . e . not temporary 
employees or workers of subcontractors) employees who 
are not i n supervisory p o s i t i o n s , and are independent 
and autonomous organizations. They are i n c l u s i v e i n 
t h a t they involve both blue c o l l a r and white c o l l a r 
workers, and union o f f i c e r s are elected only by the 
members. The employees are expected t o stay w i t h the 
company u n t i l they r e t i r e or are made redundant or 
leave v o l u n t a r i l y . I f they leave, they lose t h e i r 
union membership. Because a l l regular employees are 
both employees and union members i n the same company, 
the enterprise-unions generally look t o b e t t e r the 
p r o s p e r i t y of the company as t h i s i n t u r n improves 
working c o n d i t i o n s and employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Thus, 
there i s usually a cooperative a t t i t u d e toward 
management. As a r e s u l t , there have been r e l a t i v e l y 
few c o n f l i c t s between unions and management since the 
development of the enterprise-union system a f t e r World 
War I I . I f the sizes of the U.S. and Japan were 
c o n t r o l l e d , the U.S. i n d u s t r i a l sector i s seen t o lose 
10 times more hours through s t r i k e s (Richmond and 
Kahan, 1983). However, there are c o n f l i c t s a t times 
d e s p i t e the desire f o r harmony, but 'usually t h r e a t s t o 
s t r i k e or o f f e r s of low bonuses are enough t o f o r c e 
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management and labour t o s i t down together t o 
n e g o t i a t e . ' ( A l s t o n , 1986:63). Both p a r t i e s avoid 
being unreasonable and there i s a sense of f a i l u r e from 
a lack of harmony. Open c o n f r o n t a t i o n s are generally 
avoided as would be expected. The emphasis on wa has 
played a large r o l e i n s u r v i v i n g disputes t h a t would 
have a r i s e n during the Japanese period of 
modernisation. 
I n d u s t r i a l Disputes: Working Days Lost Per Thousand 
Employees I n A l l I n d u s t r i e s And Services 1977-1986 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
UK 450 410 1270 520 200 250 180 1280 300 90 
USA 260 270 230 230 190 100 190 90 70 120 
JAPAN 40 40 20 30 10 10 10 10 10 10 
From Emplgyment Gazette. June 1988, p.336. 
Another advantage of enterprise-unionism i s 
believed t o be t h a t ' i t r e f l e c t s the s i t u a t i o n i n each 
e n t e r p r i s e at the l e v e l of the f i r m , rather than any 
broader c r a f t or p o l i t i c a l issue.' (Kuwahara, 
1987:217). 
A disadvantage from the perspective of the union 
i s t h a t workers when newly employed, automatically 
acquire union membership and union dues are taken from 
t h e i r pay a u t o m a t i c a l l y as w e l l , so t h a t t h e i r 'union 
consciousness' i s not as strong as t h e i r 'enterprise 
consciousness'. (Kuwahara, 1987). 
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I t should be stressed t h a t e n t e r p r i s e unions, 
l i f e t i m e employment and the seni o r i t y - b a s e d payments 
system are very much mutually i n t e g r a t e d . 
'The personnel p r a c t i c e s i n e n t e r p r i s e s and the 
s e n i o r i t y - o r i e n t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s based 
upon the custom of l i f e t i m e employment system 
provide the economic and s o c i a l basis f o r the 
formation of the e n t e r p r i s e union. The 
c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h i s e n t e r p r i s e union i n t u r n 
preserves the management system based on s e n i o r i t y 
and l i f e t i m e employment system. Among the 
Japanese employers and workers, the so-called 
s e n i o r i t y - o r i e n t e d i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s or 
enterprise-based i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s are 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y acknowledged w i t h the above-
mentioned h y p o t h e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . This means 
t h a t these three f a c t o r s are unable t o e x i s t 
independently from each other, and a t the same 
time under the s i t u a t i o n i n which one of the three 
does not e x i s t , the other f a c t o r s are n a t u r a l l y 
bound t o change.' (Ono, 1971:5). 
For example, a c t i o n s or events t h a t may upset a Western 
union, e.g. automation which would make many jobs 
redundant, are accepted by the union because the 
existence of l i f e t i m e employment ensures t h a t i t w i l l 
b e n e f i t both the employees and the company. 
I t also then would f o l l o w t h a t the e n t e r p r i s e 
unions have been successful thus f a r since permanent 
employment has been possible. As the workforce ages, 
automation i s advanced, and more and more Japanese are 
reaching high l e v e l s of education, l i f e t i m e employment 
becomes more d i f f i c u l t t o o f f e r and i t ' s l i k e l y t h a t 
problems between the unions and management w i l l a r i s e 
when i t no longer can be. 
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4.6 C o l l e c t i v e D e c i s i o n - M a k i n o 
'The word ringi means o b t a i n i n g approval on a proposed 
matter through the v e r t i c a l , and sometimes h o r i z o n t a l , 
c i r c u l a t i o n of documents t o the concerned members i n 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n . As an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e procedure i t 
c o n s i s t s of 4 steps: proposal, c i r c u l a t i o n , approval 
and record.' (Sasaki, 1981:57). 
The Japanese method of decision-making i s another 
Japanese-specific c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . Rathier than being a 
predominantly top-down system w i t h one i n d i v i d u a l a t 
the top of the hierarchy passing down orders as i s 
t r a d i t i o n a l i n the West, the Japanese use a bottom-up 
method which i s e n t i r e l y p a r t i c i p a t i v e , i . e . a l l those 
who w i l l be a f f e c t e d by a decision (and o f t e n even 
those who w i l l not) play a r o l e i n the decision and 
have f r e e r e i g n t o c r i t i c i s e or suggest modifications 
of i t . 'The ringi system allows f o r c r i t i c i s m i n a 
c u l t u r a l system which emphasises conformity.' (Alston, 
1986:182). 
The process i s c a r r i e d through the steps included 
i n Mr. Sasaki's i n t r o d u c t o r y quote. I t begins with the 
w r i t t e n proposal i n the form of a document; t h i s i s 
c a l l e d a ringisho. The ringisho presents a problem and 
the p o ssible s o l u t i o n which i s then ' f i r s t submitted 
h o r i z o n t a l l y t o one's peers w i t h i n the middle 
management l e v e l s , w i t h i n one's department, and across 
d i v i s i o n a l and departmental l i n e s . ' ( A l s t o n , 1986:183). 
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I t i s generally w r i t t e n up by the middle management as 
they are the ones who w i l l have t o implement the plan 
i f i t i s accepted and they know the s i t u a t i o n the best. 
Everyone who w i l l be a f f e c t e d i s shown the proposal and 
they accept i t , r e j e c t i t , or suggest m o d i f i c a t i o n s . 
A f t e r any suggested m o d i f i c a t i o n s are put on the 
ringisho, i t must be shown again t o those who haven't 
yet seen the suggestions. At every l e v e l there are 
many general discussions. A f t e r the middle management 
have modified and accepted the document, i t i s seen by 
the top executives. I t i s r a r e l y r e j e c t e d i f i t has 
reached t h i s p o i n t . I t then goes t o the managing 
d i r e c t o r and i f accepted there, i t returns t o i t s 
o r i g i n where i t ' s implemented. 
Despite i t s time consuming nature, i f a decision 
i s made i n t h i s fashion there are many advantages. 
Kaufman (1970:1) argues t h a t there are 4 primary 
advantages: 'fewer aspects of the decision are 
overlooked; the trauma t h a t accompanies change i s 
reduced; p a r t i c i p a n t s f e e l committed t o implementing a 
d e c i s i o n they have helped t o formulate; and f a r bolder 
decisions can be made.' 
Because everyone was involved i n and gave input 
i n t o the d e c i s i o n , i t i s q u i c k l y implemented and 
accepted by a l l . Patchen (1970) has found t h a t when 
employees p a r t i c i p a t e i n the company's decision-making. 
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t h e i r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the company and i t s goals 
increases. 
Bolder decisions r e s u l t from the f a c t t h a t no one 
person w i l l have t o take the blame f o r i t s f a i l u r e . 
Middle and lower managers e s p e c i a l l y w i l l not take 
blame as t h i s r e s t s on the top management — decisions 
are made from the bottom up but punishment i s always i n 
the opposite d i r e c t i o n . 
The p a r t i c i p a n t s during t h i s process were also 
made aware of upcoming change and were able t o prepare 
themselves f o r i t . 
Furthermore, whether the proposal i s even t u a l l y 
implemented or not, there was s t i l l valuable 
communication across departments due t o the l a t e r a l 
sending. This i s e s p e c i a l l y useful f o r the newer, less 
experienced employees as they are able t o improve t h e i r 
i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s necessary f o r a top executive 
p o s i t i o n . Communication between managers and s t a f f or 
te c h n i c a l personnel also r e s u l t s i n t h e i r greater 
understanding of a l l aspects of the company which may 
at some stage be h e l p f u l i n avoiding problems i n those 
areas. This i s very much i n l i n e w i t h the Japanese 
sense of general management, rather than 
s p e c i a l i s a t i o n , as the i d e a l . 
4.7 Emphasis on the Group 
'The most important value d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the 
Japanese employee/employer from Americans i s the 
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Japanese emphasis on the importance of the group.' 
( A l s t o n , 1986:211). 
The question t h a t might a r i s e from the l a s t 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s why the workers work f o r no immediate 
reward based on t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n . Yes, 
they are l o y a l t o the f i r m as they r e a l i s e they w i l l 
have t o stay w i t h them, but even the Japanese need a 
reward or, perhaps more t o the p o i n t , a punishment t o 
allow them t o take on f u r t h e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and 
pressure ( i . e o f t e n the formal t i t l e of an employee and 
hi s actual r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s may not match as the work 
of a high ranking executive may be done by an u n t i t l e d 
but s k i l l e d j u n i o r ) . I n f a c t , the immediate rewards 
and sanctions are meted out by the group. 'The 
Japanese do not work hard f o r i t s own sake: few 
persons, even i n Japan, are t h a t a l t r u i s t i c . Japanese 
workers are motivated by the way they are rewarded t o 
be group-oriented and motivated workers.' ( A l s t o n , 
1986:39). 
Every employee i n a Japanese f i r m i s a member of a 
small, c l o s e l y k n i t working group and w i l l always work 
in such a way (Ouchi, 1981). This has proved very 
e f f e c t i v e . 
'American s o c i a l science research over the past 
few decades has demonstrated q u i t e convincingly 
t h a t our group memberships have more influence on 
our a t t i t u d e s , m o t i v a t i o n , and behaviour than does 
any other s o c i a l phenomenon. What we care most 
about i s what our peers t h i n k of us. A person who 
i s p a r t of a group whose members f e e l a close 
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k i n s h i p i s subject t o a very powerful influence. 
F a i l u r e t o adhere t o the norms of the group can 
b r i n g loss of group support, approval, and 
u l t i m a t e l y the group can throw the offender out of 
the membership. To someone who f e e l s c l o s e l y 
i n t e g r a t e d w i t h any small group, these are severe 
p e n a l t i e s . More than h i e r a r c h i c a l c o n t r o l , pay or 
promotion, i t i s our group memberships t h a t 
i n f l u e n c e behaviour.' (Ouchi, 1981:28-29). 
I n the Japanese f i r m there i s no i n d i v i d u a l f a i l u r e , 
only group f a i l u r e , and everyone works hard i n order t o 
not l e t down the group. 
J. Hendry i n her book Understanding Japanese 
Society (1987), r e l a t e s the work group t o the uchi 
group s i m i l a r t o t h a t f i r s t encountered i n 
kin d e r g a r t e n . (An uchi group i s the name given t o an 
'i n s i d e group', 'the word uchi i s used t o describe 
one's own company, school or other place of attachment 
and the other people who belong t o i t . I n conversation 
w i t h o u t s i d e r s , one i s expected t o use self-deprecatory 
speech forms not only f o r oneself, but also f o r a l l the 
other members of one's own i n s i d e group, however high 
ranking t h e i r p o s i t i o n . ' (Hendry, 1987:77)). Again i t 
i s e vident t h a t the group exhorts a great pressure on 
the workers, but she goes f u r t h e r t o p o i n t out t h a t 
t h i s p a r t of Japanese c u l t u r e begins i n e a r l y childhood 
and any other set up would probably be unacceptable. 
'...there i s considerable peer pressure t o comply 
w i t h the expectations of the wider group, and the 
p r i n c i p l e s of r e c i p r o c i t y and cooperation underlie 
much of the d a i l y i n t e r a c t i o n between colleagues. 
Members of the company are encouraged t o share 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t , and they are said t o take 
p r i d e i n being a small cog i n an important big 
wheel.' (Hendry, 1987:137). 
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4.8 N o n - S o e c i a l i s e d C a r e e r P a t h s and E x t e n s i v e T r a i n i n g 
'Japanese do not s p e c i a l i s e only i n a technical 
f i e l d ; they also s p e c i a l i s e i n an or g a n i s a t i o n i n 
le a r n i n g how t o make a s p e c i f i c , unique business 
operate as wel l as i t possibly can.' (Ouchi, 1981:33). 
The Japanese learn a wide v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t job 
f u n c t i o n s throughout t h e i r careers w i t h a c e r t a i n 
company. The length of stay at a given p o s i t i o n i s 
us u a l l y no longer than 3 years. They generally have no 
d e t a i l e d e x p e r t i s e i n any one aspect. Western 
managerial minds may consider t h i s a weakness, but i t 
has worked we l l f o r the Japanese as they are then able 
t o coordinate across f u n c t i o n s as a r e s u l t of t h i s 
p r a c t i c e . Furthermore, bearing i n mind t h a t the 
Japanese take a long term perspective, they r e a l i s e 
t h a t a t some stage they may be a coworker t o someone i n 
a d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n so t h a t there i s an in c e n t i v e t o 
cooperate w i t h everyone. 'When people spend t h e i r 
e n t i r e careers w i t h i n one s p e c i a l i t y , they tend t o 
develop sub goals devoted t o t h a t s p e c i a l i t y rather 
than t o the whole f i r m and they have neither the 
knowledge of the people nor of the problems t o enable 
them t o e f f e c t i v e l y help other s p e c i a l i s t s w i t h i n t h e i r 
own o r g a n i s a t i o n . ' (Ouchi, 1981:32). (This i s also an 
example of subcultures as discussed i n the previous 
c h a p t e r ) . 
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I t i s a common b e l i e f of the Japanese t h a t by the 
time an employee reaches top management l e v e l he should 
be a g e n e r a l i S t (Sasaki, 1981). The many human 
contacts gained though the j o b r o t a t i o n prove useful 
when, i n middle management p o s i t i o n s , they must make 
decisions i n the ringi process; 'the competence of 
Japanese middle managers t o be decision o r i g i n a t o r s i n 
the group-decision making system owes much t o the job 
r o t a t i o n system.' (Sasaki, 1981:37). 
Also gained from the j o b r o t a t i o n system i s a 
happy workforce as research by management scholars at 
MIT, Columbia U n i v e r s i t y and elsewhere has found. The 
research 'strongly suggests t h a t workers at a l l l e v e l s 
who c o n t i n u a l l y face new jobs w i l l be more v i t a l , more 
productive, and more s a t i s f i e d w i t h work than those who 
stay i n one j o b , even though changes i n j o b do not 
include a promotion but are e n t i r e l y l a t e r a l . ' (Ouchi, 
1981:32). 
A c o r r e l a t i o n of the j o b r o t a t i o n system i s 
extensive company t r a i n i n g . The Japanese are w i l l i n g 
and committed t o t r a i n i n g t h e i r employees u n l i k e 
Western companies who fe a r t h a t t h e i r employees w i l l be 
sought a f t e r and taken by other companies f o l l o w i n g 
t h e i r expensive and time-consuming e f f o r t s (Ouchi, 
1981). 
Such company changing, however, i s hig h l y uncommon 
i n Japan due t o the l i f e t i m e employment system, 
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s e n i o r i t y payment system ( s t a r t i n g a t a new company 
would mean dropping down t o the same ra t e as other 
e n t r a n t s ) , the 'fa m i l y ' and o b l i g a t o r y nature of the 
f i r m , and i n f a c t o f t e n t h i s extensive t r a i n i n g as 
w e l l : the employee i s t r a i n e d and developed t o 
s p e c i f i c a l l y f i t h i s own company so t h a t he i s less 
tempting t o other companies (Sasaki, 1981). 
4.9 Qu a l i t y C i r c l e s and Just-in-Time 
Not to be l e f t out are those p r a c t i c e s commonly 
found i n manufacturing f i r m s i n Japan: q u a l i t y c o n t r o l 
c i r c l e s and the j u s t - i n - t i m e method of inventory. 
The q u a l i t y c o n t r o l c i r c l e was introduced t o Japan 
by an American, Dr. W.R. Deming, a f t e r World War I I . 
I t was used more widely and was f u r t h e r developed i n 
Japan, however. 
I t c onsists of a group of employees, the number 
can range from 4 t o 12, but they are believed t o 
f u n c t i o n best w i t h 5 t o 8 members, who r e g u l a r l y meet 
v o l u n t a r i l y t o ' i d e n t i f y , analyze and f i n d s o l u t i o n s t o 
q u a l i t y problems and other issues i n t h e i r work 
environment.' (Pegels, 1984:145). Their goal i s t o 
increase p r o d u c t i v i t y and q u a l i t y and each member i s 
encouraged t o express h i s view on what can be done i n 
order t o do so; a l l ideas, no matter how f a r f e t c h e d , 
are l i s t e n e d t o and given c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The team then 
decides whether f u r t h e r study i s necessary. 
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The j u s t - i n - t i m e system of inventory i s today 
o f t e n considered the most c r i t i c a l aspect of the 
Japanese production system (Pegels, 1984). I n t h i s 
system, inventory l e v e l s are kept as low as conceivably 
possible by b r i n g i n g i n parts t o the place of assembly 
only when they are needed. By so doing, inventory i s 
almost non-existant. To decrease the w a i t i n g time f o r 
supplies i n an e f f o r t t o increase p r o d u c t i v i t y , 
supplies are d e l i v e r e d as o f t e n as necessary, sometimes 
even several times a day. The idea behind JIT i s t h a t 
lower i n v e n t o r i e s save money as less i n t e r e s t i s needed 
t o cover the cost of i d l e m a t e r i a l s . I t also reduces 
the amount of space t h a t i s needed f o r storage. 
4.10 Other Japanese Management Practices 
The large Japanese companies engage i n very 
s e l e c t i v e recruitment processes. Prospective employees 
not only must meet s t r i c t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s requirements 
but also must possess and present the c o r r e c t a t t i t u d e 
and ideas. This s e l e c t i v e procedure then enhances the 
l i k e l i h o o d of a workforce w i t h s i m i l a r goals and 
ideologies — as t h i s chapter and the chapter on 
corporate c u l t u r e has i n d i c a t e d , the Japanese believe 
t h a t such a homogeneity w i l l lead t o consensual 
decision-making, a congenial working atmosphere and 
greater worker commitment, teamwork and p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
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The f a c t t h a t t h e s e employees w i l l s t a y w i t h the 
company u n t i l r e t i r e m e n t o n l y r e e m p h a s i z e s t h e 
i m p o r t a n c e o f h i r i n g t h e r i g h t i n d i v i d u a l s . 
F i n a l l y , t h e J a p a n e s e a r e a l s o known f o r p r o v i d i n g 
i m p r e s s i v e company-based w e l f a r e schemes. 
4.11 P a t e r n a l i s t i c Employee Management 
The f a m i l y i s 'a model f o r company i n t e r a c t i o n , 
both f o r t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l l i n k s , and f o r t h e way the 
i n d i v i d u a l i s e x p e c t e d t o put t h e w i d e r u c h i group 
b e f o r e h i s own p e r s o n a l l i f e . ' (Hendry, 1987:138). The 
company becomes t h e employee's f a m i l y . As mentioned 
e a r l i e r , g r e a t l o y a l t y t o t h e f i r m i s b u i l t up i n a 
number o f ways, most p a r t i c u l a r l y t h rough l i f e t i m e 
employment. The f a m i l y atmosphere both r e s u l t s from 
and b u i l d s up t h i s l o y a l t y , ' i d e a l l y , employees develop 
w i t h i n s u c h a framework t h r o u g h o u t t h e i r working l i v e s , 
and s e e t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s a s c o i n c i d i n g w i t h t h o s e of 
t h e company.' (Hendry, 1987:138). 
W i t h i n a J a p a n e s e company, a r e l a t i o n s h i p b u i l d s 
up between t h e s u p e r i o r and t h e s u b o r d i n a t e . These a r e 
t h e p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s o f l o y a l t y and benevolence of 
t h e p a r e n t c h i l d model (oyabun/kobun). The s u p e r i o r 
becomes v e r y i n v o l v e d and c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e l i f e , even 
t h e o u t s i d e l i f e , of t h e s u b o r d i n a t e , e.g. he may g i v e 
t h e s u b o r d i n a t e l o a n s or a c t a s a go between a t a 
wedding. The employee i s t h e n o b l i g a t e d t o the 
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s u p e r i o r and must o f f e r him complete l o y a l t y and 
s u p p o r t whenever i t i s needed (Hendry, 1987). 
The f a m i l y atmosphere i s not j u s t a g u i s e t o f o o l 
e mployees i n t o g r e a t e r p r o d u c t i v i t y . The s u p e r i o r i s 
o f t e n a l m o s t a f a t h e r t o h i s s u b o r d i n a t e ; a s an extreme 
example, some f a m i l y companies have adopted a s sons 
employees who were b e t t e r q u a l i f i e d t o t a k e over t h e 
company upon t h e owner's de a t h than any o f h i s own 
s o n s , so t h a t t h e y would i n h e r i t i t and keep i t 
p r o s p e r i n g . 
The f a m i l y i d e a i s f u r t h e r s u p p o r t e d by t he 
payment s y s t e m : 
' R e l a t i v e l y low s a l a r i e s a s w e l l a s low i n t r a - f i r m 
s a l a r y d i f f e r e n t i a l s make i t e a s i e r f o r a Japanese 
e x e c u t i v e t o c l a i m t h a t a l l w o r k e r s a r e p a r t of a 
f a m i l y and s t i l l be b e l i e v a b l e . The Ja p a n e s e 
w o r k e r s can s e e f o r t h e m s e l v e s t h a t they s h a r e 
p r o f i t s i n common, and t h a t improving p r o d u c t i v i t y 
does not r e s u l t i n h i g h e r pay f o r e x e c u t i v e s 
o n l y . ' ( A l s t o n , 1986:200). 
4.12 C o n c l u s i o n 
' S o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n and c u l t u r a l v a l u e s t h a t 
s u p p o r t J a p a n ' s i n d u s t r i a l and economic complex 
m a n i f e s t many t r a i t s t h a t a r e d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e 
o f t h e West: t h e l o n g - s t a n d i n g h e r i t a g e of i n n e r 
a s c e t i c i s m and s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e t h a t h a s been t h e 
h a l l m a r k o f t h e J a p a n e s e worker, t h e employer 
employee r e l a t i o n s h i p a s r e v e a l e d i n l i f e t i m e 
employment p r a c t i c e s , a v e r t i c a l h i e r a r c h y i n 
human r e l a t i o n s , t h e s t r u c t u r e of Ja p a n e s e c i t i e s 
t h a t s t i l l r e f l e c t p r e - i n d u s t r i a l p a t t e r n s o f a 
f e d e r a t i o n o f independent neighbourhoods 
r e m i n i s c e n t of t h e f e u d a l p e r i o d , t h e h e r i t a g e of 
' f a m i l i s m , ' a s r e v e a l e d i n t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n of t h e 
Z a i b a t s u , t h a t has p l a y e d a p i v o t a l r o l e i n t h e 
development o f J a p a n ' s i n d u s t r i a l and f i n a n c i a l 
c o n g l o m e r a t e s , e t c ' ( F u s e , 1975:33). 
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Many o f t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s mentioned i n Mr. 
F u s e ' s s t a t e m e n t have been r e v e a l e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r . 
The J a p a n e s e have a c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e which has been 
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e i r management p r a c t i c e s , p r i m a r i l y 
t h e a s p e c t of wa, and has h e l p e d make Japan an economic 
g i a n t . T h e i r way of managing and forms of s t r a t e g y 
seem e x t r e m e l y w o r k a b l e and p r o d u c t i v e . For example, 
t h e s t r a t e g y f o r m a t i o n p o l i c y of C. I t o h Co., L t d . i s 
s a i d t o be a s f o l l o w s : 
'a) Develop a s t r a t e g y w i t h o b j e c t i v e s and form an 
o r g a n i s a t i o n t o a c c o m p l i s h them. At t h e same 
time, c o n s t r u c t c o n d i t i o n s which w i l l h e l p t h o s e 
who w i l l be put i n ch a r g e t o a c t t o t h e b e s t o f 
t h e i r a b i l i t y . 
b) Most i m p o r t a n t i s t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of human 
r e l a t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , complete teamwork s h o u l d be 
a t t a i n e d . 
c ) A c o n s e n s u s among and u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e 
r e l e v a n t members a r e e s s e n t i a l i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n 
t h e i r c o n s c i o u s p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
d) When an i d e a i s proposed, a d e c i s i o n on whether 
t o adopt i t o r n o t s h o u l d be made a s soon a s 
p o s s i b l e . 
e ) Once a p r o p o s a l i s adopted, t h o s e i n c h a r g e 
s h o u l d be backed up w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r y 
o r g a n i s a t i o n and f i n a n c i n g . 
f ) When a p r o j e c t i s s u c c e s s f u l , t h e i n i t i a t o r and 
th e p e r f o r m e r s s h o u l d be p r a i s e d and a r e c o r d 
s h o u l d be k e p t i n t h e m i n u t e s . 
g) When i t f a i l s , however, s a n c t i o n s a r e not t o be 
t a k e n a g a i n s t t h o s e who proposed and performed i t . 
A l l of t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y l i e s w i t h t h e top 
management who adopted i t . Though rewards may go 
down, s a n c t i o n s s h o u l d not.' (Quoted i n S a s a k i , 
1981:2). 
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White and T r e v o r ( 1 9 8 3 ) summarize what t h e 
i s 
b e l i e v e d t o be: 
advantage o f t h e J a p a n e s e employment p r a c t i c e s 
' I t c o n s i s t s o f a s t a b l e w o r k - f o r c e w i t h a h i g h 
l e v e l o f commitment t o t h e company: e x t r e m e l y 
c o o p e r a t i v e i n a c c e p t i n g change, e x t r e m e l y 
u n w i l l i n g t o e n t e r i n t o s t r i k e s o r o t h e r forms of 
c o n f l i c t , and g e n e r a l l y p u t t i n g t h e company's 
i n t e r e s t s l e v e l w i t h or even ahead o f i t s own. 
The outcome i s a h i g h and r i s i n g l e v e l o f 
p r o d u c t i v i t y , and an a l t o g e t h e r e a s i e r c l i m a t e i n 
which management can p l a n f o r changes i n p r o d u c t s 
and p r o c e s s e s . These r e s u l t s , i t i s argued, a r e 
produced by employment p r a c t i c e s which emphasize 
t h e commitment of t h e company t o i t s employees, 
which g i v e them s e c u r i t y , s t a t u s and m a t e r i a l 
b e n e f i t s , and which d e v e l o p t h e i r p o t e n t i a l i n a 
s y s t e m a t i c , long-term manner. Another f e a t u r e 
which i s o f t e n s t r e s s e d i s t h e way i n which group 
c o h e s i v e n e s s and c o o p e r a t i o n a r e f o s t e r e d , r a t h e r 
than i n d i v i d u a l i s m and p e r s o n a l i n i t i a t i v e . ' ( p . 
5 ) . 
S t i l l , even though a t f i r s t g l a n c e t h e J a p a n e s e 
employment s y s t e m a p p e a r s i m p e c c a b l e and t h u s t h e 
s i m p l e answer t o t h e West's economic m a l a i s e , i s i t 
t r u l y w i t h o u t any f a u l t s o r n e g a t i v e s ? The n e x t 
c h a p t e r w i l l examine t h o s e a s p e c t s and/or c o n c o m i t a n t s 
o f t h e s y s t e m which may be c o n s i d e r e d u n d e s i r a b l e i n 
t h e West, t h u s begging t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e West 
should adopt a l l o f t h e J a p a n e s e s y s t e m i f i t i s i n 
f a c t p o s s i b l e t o do s o . 
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CHAPTER 5 
JAPANESE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: PROBLEMS 
As was s e e n i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r , J a p a n e s e 
management has been e f f e c t i v e i n g a i n i n g l o y a l t y and 
t h e s u b s e q u e n t p r o d u c t i v i t y o f employees. T a k i n g t h e s e 
J a p a n e s e management p r a c t i c e s a s t h e y a r e i n t o Western 
c o u n t r i e s h a s been s e e n by some t o be a m a g i c a l c u r e -
a l l f o r what i s c o n s i d e r e d t h e West's r e l a t i v e economic 
d e c l i n e . I t s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d , however, t h a t 'we 
c a n look a t Japan and wonder i f w& c a n ' t a l s o l e a r n 
some l e s s o n s about what not t o do.' (Dore, 1984:24). 
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t what we would p r o b a b l y c o n s i d e r 
n e g a t i v e appendages o f t h e J a p a n e s e m a n a g e r i a l s y s t e m 
a r e r e c o g n i s e d b e f o r e t h e p r a c t i c e s a r e imported on a 
n o n - e d i t e d b a s i s . The goal o f t h i s c h a p t e r i s t o put 
f o r w a r d o b j e c t i v e l y some o f t h e c r i t i c i s m s which have 
been l e v e l l e d a t J a p a n e s e management by v a r i o u s 
a u t h o r s ; t h e 'complete s t o r y * , s o t o speak, i s 
n e c e s s a r y f o r c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s . 
5.1 The Dual Nature o f t h e Economv 
I t s h o u l d be c l e a r l y u n d e r s t o o d t h a t most or a l l 
o f t h e m a n a g e r i a l p r a c t i c e s r e l a t e d i n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r 
a r e o n l y i d e a l s . They a r e n o t p r e s e n t i n f a c t i n many 
f i r m s and a r e i n g e n e r a l o n l y implemented i n t h e l a r g e 
f i r m s and not a l w a y s w h o l l y i n t h o s e . L i f e t i m e 
employment, s u p p o s e d l y one of t h e g r e a t J a p a n e s e 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , i s o f f e r e d , i n a c t u a l i t y , t o o n l y a s m a l l 
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m i n o r i t y o f t h e J a p a n e s e work f o r c e . The l a r g e f i r m s 
who c a n o f f e r i t o n l y employ 1/3 o f t h e work f o r c e . 
35% of t h e p o p u l a t i o n work i n b u s i n e s s e s w i t h 50 
w o r k e r s o r l e s s ( B r i g g s , 1 9 8 8 ) . Not a l l employees of 
t h e l a r g e companies r e c e i v e i t e i t h e r so i t i s t h e 
e l i t e o f t h e l a r g e companies who p r o s p e r a t the expense 
o f t h o s e l e s s f o r t u n a t e . 
To f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r e v i o u s s t a t e m e n t , i t i s 
n e c e s s a r y t o r e c o g n i s e how t h e J a p a n e s e c o r p o r a t e 
s y s t e m works. B e f o r e t h e war, t h e major J a p a n e s e f i r m s 
were o r g a n i s e d i n t o a s m a l l number of groups. These 
groups were c a l l e d z a i b a t s u ( t h e development of which 
was d i s c u s s e d i n c h a p t e r 2 ) . Each group was composed 
o f 20 - 30 o f t h e s e b u s i n e s s f i r m s which were c l u s t e r e d 
around a p o w e r f u l bank. S u r r o u n d i n g each i n d i v i d u a l 
f i r m were s u p p l i e r companies ( t h e ' s a t e l l i t e s ' ) which 
s u p p l i e d o n l y t h e one p a r e n t company. I n o t h e r words, 
t h e r e e x i s t e d a b i l a t e r a l monopoly. The companies 
l e a r n e d t o c o o r d i n a t e p e r f e c t l y w i t h each o t h e r and 
p r o d u c t i v i t y was enhanced. A f t e r t h e war, t h e z a i b a t s u 
were l e g a l l y d i s s o l v e d but s t i l l t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
c o n t i n u e , due t o a l a r g e e x t e n t t o t h e companies' 
dependence on t h e ' c l o s e l y k n i t network of a l l i e d banks 
f o r t h e i r f i n a n c i n g . ' ( O u c h i , 1981:20). 
T h i s has r e s u l t e d i n a dual s t r u c t u r e i n t h e 
economy: 'a few b i g b u s i n e s s e s w i t h h i g h p r o d u c t i v i t y 
and h i g h wages and numerous s m a l l and medium companies 
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w i t h low p r o d u c t i v i t y and low wages c o e x i s t . The 
l a t t e r have been l e f t b e h i n d by t h e p r o g r e s s of t h e 
f o r m e r , and have had l e s s a d v a n t a g e s i n t h e way o f 
f i n a n c i a l s u p p l i e s and government a s s i s t a n c e . ' ( S a s a k i , 
1 9 8 1 : 2 0 ) . T h e r e i s a l s o a d u a l i t y i n c o n t r o l a s t h e 
s a t e l l i t e s must s u p p l y t h e b i g f i r m s c o n t i n u o u s l y and 
e x c l u s i v e l y and l a c k a s a y i n any matter a s a r e s u l t . 
They ' e x i s t l a r g e l y a t t h e p l e a s u r e and a t the mercy of 
t h e major f i r m s , and t h e y have l i t t l e hope of e v e r 
growing i n t o major c o m p e t i t o r s . ' ( O u c h i , 1981:25). 
They can grow, t o be f a i r , but o n l y i n new markets, and 
t h e y g e n e r a l l y c a n n o t o b t a i n import l i c e n c e s needed t o 
o b t a i n t h e n e c e s s a r y new machinery, p a r t s or i d e a s . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , 'the major f i r m s c o n t r a c t out t o them 
t h o s e s e r v i c e s most s u s c e p t i b l e t o f l u c t u a t i o n , w i t h 
t h e r e s u l t t h a t d u r i n g a r e c e s s i o n , t h e s e s m a l l f i r m s 
w i l l s h a r p l y c o n t r a c t o r go o u t of b u s i n e s s . ' ( O u c h i , 
1981:25). 
These major f i r m s which p r e v i o u s l y made up t h e 
Z a i b a t s u have a s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e 
l i f e t i m e employment s y s t e m . Those p r i v i l e g e d few who 
a r e o f f e r e d t h i s j o b s e c u r i t y a r e a l s o g i v e n h e l p upon 
t h e i r mandatory r e t i r e m e n t a t 55 and o f t e n a r e g i v e n a 
p a r t - t i m e j o b a t a s a t e l l i t e company. T h i s makes 
t h i n g s even more d i f f i c u l t f o r t h o s e working f o r t h e 
s a t e l l i t e companies a s t h e r e i s then no room f o r them 
f o r promotion. A l s o , once t h e y ' r e 55, they o f t e n have 
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no p l a c e t o go. 'The p r a c t i c e o f l i f e t i m e employment 
u n t i l age 55 had c o n s i d e r a b l e m e r i t when i t was 
e s t a b l i s h e d a f t e r t h e war. At t h a t p o i n t , l i f e 
e x p e c t a n c y f o r t h e a v e r a g e male was o n l y 55. Now t h a t 
p e o p l e a r e l i v i n g l o n g e r , t h e s y s t e m has i t s drawbacks. 
J a p a n s t i l l h as not found a way t o s u p p o r t and house 
i t s a g i n g p o p u l a t i o n . ' ( H a r p e r , 1988:45). A 
p o s s i b i l i t y a t t h e moment, however, i s a p r o p o s a l 
announced by t he M i n i s t r y of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade and 
I n d u s t r y ( M I T I ) t o b u i l d ' s i l v e r communities' abroad, 
s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , Canada, A u s t r a l i a and 
New Z e a l a n d . 
'The i d e a was t o e x p o r t J a p a n ' s e x p l o d i n g " s i l v e r " 
p o p u l a t i o n — t h o s e o v e r 65 — t o a s e r i e s of 
J a p a n e s e - s t y l e l e i s u r e communities i n c o u n t r i e s 
t h a t met 3 c r i t e r i a : good m e d i c a l c a r e , p o l i t i c a l 
s t a b i l i t y and a h i g h c o n c e n t r a t i o n of Japanese 
r e s t a u r a n t s . The meagre yen-based p e n s i o n s of 
s i l v e r - h a i r e d J a p a n e s e who r e t i r e d t o t h e U.S. 
would c o n v e r t i n t o so many d o l l a r s t h a t t h e y ' d 
l i v e o u t t h e i r days l i k e k i n g s . By pumping t h e i r 
p e n s i o n f u n d s through t h e American economy, t h e 
r e t i r e e s would be improving A m e r i c a ' s c u r r e n t 
a c c o u n t d e f i c i t . ' ( B u r n s t e i n , 1990:49). 
Such extreme measures a r e needed due t o t h e poor 
w e l f a r e s y s t e m . Unemployment f i g u r e s a r e low due t o the 
f a c t t h a t many pe o p l e who a r e c o n s i d e r e d employed o n l y 
h e l p out t h e i r f a m i l y b u s i n e s s and need o n l y t o work 
more th a n an hour t o r e c e i v e employed s t a t u s . Some s e e 
t h i s a s a ' d i s i n c e n t i v e f o r adequate development of 
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y s e r v i c e s . ' (Hendry, 1987:142). Hendry 
f u r t h e r remarks t h a t a l t h o u g h a n a t i o n a l s o c i a l 
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s e c u r i t y s y s t e m e x i s t s i n Japan, and i t has been 
c o n t i n u a l l y d e v e l o p i n g i t s s e r v i c e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e 
post-wa r p e r i o d o f economic e x p a n s i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
s i n c e 1973, i n some r e s p e c t s i t s t i l l o p e r a t e s r a t h e r 
a s a l a s t r e s o r t when a l l e l s e f a i l s . ' And 'one of t h e 
problems has been t h a t a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f p u b l i c and 
p r i v a t e schemes a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r s o c i a l i n s u r a n c e , 
h e a l t h c o v e r a g e and p e n s i o n p l a n s , so t h a t 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has been c o m p l i c a t e d and sometimes 
d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e most needy b e n e f i c i a r i e s t o 
u n d e r s t a n d . ' (Hendry, 1987:145). 
F u r t h e r m o r e , l i f e t i m e employment i s p o s s i b l e o n l y 
through t h e e x i s t e n c e of a 'temporary' l a b o u r f o r c e . 
T h e s e w o r k e r s , p r i m a r i l y made up o f women, s e r v e a s a 
b u f f e r f o r t h e male, permanently employed w o r k e r s by 
b e i n g l a i d o f f i n t i m e s of t r o u b l e and a t w i l l . 
Moreover, t h e y r e c e i v e no f r i n g e b e n e f i t s , a r e not 
r e c o g n i s e d a s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f u n i o n s o r 
management and must perform t h e l e a s t l i k a b l e t a s k s 
w i t h o u t hope o f advancement ( A l s t o n , 1 9 8 6 ) . 
5.2 D i s c r i m i n a t i o n Towards Women 
As mentioned i n t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n , i t i s 
p r i m a r i l y women who a r e t h e temporary w o r k e r s who a r e 
so p o o r l y t r e a t e d . 
'Japanese women, a l t h o u g h p r o t e c t e d by q u i t e 
advanced l e g i s l a t i o n , e n t e r t h e l a b o u r market 
under m a s s i v e h a n d i c a p s . They a r e s o g r e a t t h a t 
i t i s no e x a g g e r a t i o n t o s a y t h a t w h i l e most women 
a t one time or an o t h e r i n t h e i r l i v e s h o l d down a 
Job, i t i s s t i l l e x c e e d i n g l y r a r e f o r a woman t o 
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p u r s u e a career o u t s i d e t h e home. I t i s o n l y 
s l i g h t l y l e s s r a r e f o r a woman t o f i n d a rewa r d i n g 
or c h a l l e n g i n g j o b , and f o r t h e work t h e y do, they 
r e c e i v e somewhat l e s s t h a n 60 p e r c e n t of a man's 
income...' ( S m i t h , 1987:14). 
Women who may have t h e same q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a s men a r e 
s t i l l e x p e c t e d t o r e t i r e upon m a r r i a g e . Furthermore, 
t h e y w i l l n ot r e c e i v e promotion i f t h e y f a i l t o f i n d a 
husband w i t h i n a s u i t a b l e t i m e . Even t e a c h e r s a r e 
h i r e d on a y e a r l y b a s i s and can be f i r e d w i t h o u t n o t i c e 
( B r i g g s , 1988). Work i s c o n s i d e r e d 'not an a l t e r n a t i v e 
t o housemaking; i t i s an e x t e n s i o n of t h e dom e s t i c 
r o l e . ' ( S m i t h , 1987:15). The s u p p l e m e n t a l income i s 
good f o r t h e f a m i l y but t h e work must be done c l o s e t o 
home. 
The equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s law p a s s e d i n A p r i l 1986 
s t a t e s t h a t i t ' w i l l o b l i g e c o r p o r a t i o n s t o work 
a c t i v e l y t o g i v e e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o both s e x e s i n 
r e c r u i t i n g , h i r i n g , j o b a s s i g n m e n t s and promotion, and 
to e l i m i n a t e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n by gender i n some a s p e c t s 
of j o b t r a i n i n g and w e l f a r e b e n e f i t s , a s w e l l a s i n 
compulsory r e t i r e m e n t age, terms o f s e v e r a n c e and 
d i s m i s s a l . ' (Hendry, 1987:135). Y e t t h e r e i s s t i l l t h e 
problem o f ch a n g i n g long h e l d b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s . 
The M i n i s t r y o f Labour, through i t s Bureau of Women and 
Minor s , t r i e s t o e n f o r c e t h e law and has been 
s u c c e s s f u l t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t s t a r t i n g s a l a r i e s a r e t h e 
same. Much d i v e r g e n c e f o l l o w s , however, a s t h e 
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n e n k o - s e i d o ( a g e - s e n i o r i t y s y s t e m ) a p p l i e s o n l y t o men. 
The r e a s o n s f o r t h i s g i v e n by e m p l o y e r s a r e a s f o l l o w s : 
'1. Women have l e s s p h y s i c a l s t r e n g t h , l e s s 
i n t e l l i g e n c e and l e s s commitment t o work. 
2. M a r r i e d women c a r r y t h e burden o f housework, and 
t h e r e f o r e have l e s s e n e r g y t o devo t e t o t h e i r j o b s . 
3. Women's s h o r t w orking l i f e makes i t uneconomical f o r 
e m p l o y e r s t o i n v e s t i n t h e i r t r a i n i n g . 
4. C o l l e g e g r a d u a t e s a r e t h e w o r s t r i s k because they 
e n t e r t h e f i r m a t about 22 and l e a v e i t i n 3 or 4 y e a r s 
t o g e t m a r r i e d . 
5. S i n c e women a r e not t r a i n e d , t h e y cannot r i s e i n t h e 
wage s c a l e by t a k i n g on more demanding t a s k s . ' ( S m i t h , 
1 9 8 7 : 1 6 - 1 7 ) . 
I n a d d i t i o n , women a r e g e n e r a l l y h i r e d f o r r e a s o n s 
o t h e r t h a n a b i l i t y o r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . The p r e f e r e n c e 
i s g i v e n t o t h o s e who a r e ' s l i g h t l y o r n a m e n t a l ' . For 
example, 
' I n a r e c e n t l y u n c o v e r e d p e r s o n n e l department 
memorandum, a major J a p a n e s e f i r m was found t o 
recommend a g a i n s t h i r i n g s e v e r a l c a t e g o r i e s o f 
fe m a l e a p p l i c a n t s . The long l i s t , which s p e a k s 
volumes f o r an a t t i t u d e s t i l l v e r y p r e v a l e n t i n 
t h e w h i t e c o l l a r and s e r v i c e s e c t o r s , i n c l u d e s t h e 
f o l l o w i n g : Be wary o f young women who wear 
g l a s s e s , a r e v e r y s h o r t , speak i n loud v o i c e s , 
have been d i v o r c e d o r a r e d a u g h t e r s o f c o l l e g e 
p r o f e s s o r s . ' ( S m i t h , 1 987:17). 
T h i s o b v i o u s l y i s not a c o u n t r y f o r a m b i t i o u s and 
t a l e n t e d women and i t seems t h a t Japan i s w a s t i n g a 
v a l u a b l e r e s o u r c e : h a l f i t s p o p u l a t i o n . 
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5.3 J a p a n e s e C o n f o r m i t y 
J a p a n e s e j u n i o r managers a r e d e d i c a t e d f o l l o w e r s 
o f t h e c o n c e p t o f Jyoi-katatsu: t h e w i l l of t h e 
s u p e r i o r , though u n s t a t e d , s h o u l d be understood, 
f o l l o w e d u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y and s h o u l d appear t o be the 
j u n i o r manager's own o p i n i o n o r i d e a . A l l t h i s i s 
t h o u g h t t o m a i n t a i n wa: d i s a g r e e i n g w i t h a s u p e r i o r 
o b v i o u s l y would be d i s r u p t i v e . The problem, then, 
o c c u r s when t h e s u p e r i o r has made a f a u l t y d e c i s i o n or 
proposed a poor p l a n : t h e s u b o r d i n a t e must d e c i d e 
between p l e a s i n g h i s r e s p e c t e d s u p e r i o r or r e j e c t i n g 
h i s poor judgment. The s u b o r d i n a t e w i l l a l m o s t a l w a y s 
do what s u p p o r t s wa even i f t h i s a c t i o n may have 
d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t s on h i s f i r m . ' T h i s tendency i n 
J a p a n toward c o n f o r m i t y does not a l w a y s r e s u l t i n 
i n c r e a s e d e f f i c i e n c y . B e c a u s e c o n f o r m i t y t o t h e group 
i s s o i m p o r t a n t , employees i d e a l l y p l a c e t h e i r own 
needs second t o t h e company's even when i t ' s n e i t h e r 
n e c e s s a r y nor u s e f u l . ' ( A l s t o n , 1986:157). T h i s i s one 
o f t h e b i g g e s t problems f o r t h e r i n g i d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g 
s y s t e m : 'A r i n g i s h o i n t h i s c o n t e x t r e i n f o r c e s e x i s t i n g 
b i a s e s r a t h e r t h a n i n i t i a t e s change.' ( A l s t o n , 
1 9 8 6 : 1 9 0 ) . T h i s r e s u l t s i n a 'snowball e f f e c t p r e s s i n g 
f o r c o n f o r m i t y a s more and more o f f i c i a l s a c c e p t a 
r i n g i s h o . The more a r i n g i s h o i s a c c e p t e d , t h e h a r d e r 
i t becomes t o c r i t i c i s e o r r e j e c t i t , s i n c e doing so 
g i v e s one t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t one i s not a team p l a y e r . 
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To s i g n may be e a s i e r than t o c r i t i c i s e . C r i t i c s of 
t h e r i n g i s y s t e m c a l l i t a s y s t e m o f c o l l e c t i v e 
i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ' ( A l s t o n , 1986:190). 
A p a r t from implementing poor p r a c t i c e s i n o r d e r t o 
m a i n t a i n t^a, a n o t h e r n e g a t i v e consequence o f Japanese 
c o n f o r m i t y i s t h e l a c k of i n n o v a t i o n and 
e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n : c l e a r l y i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s . ' T h e i r 
c u l t u r e does not encourage b r e a k i n g away, and i t does 
n o t promote t h e rugged i n d i v i d u a l i t y t h a t i s u s u a l l y an 
i n t e g r a l p a r t of e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l a c t i v i t y . ' (Harper, 
1 988:45). A l s o , a r i n g i s h o i s u s e f u l f o r a v o i d i n g 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and r i s k t a k i n g ; t h i s can be done by 
d i s t r i b u t i n g a t r i v i a l r i n g i s h o t h a t t h e manager t h i n k s 
i s . t o o c o n t r o v e r s i a l t o t a k e i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
f o r , i . e . 'he p a s s e s t h e buck.' ( A l s t o n , 1986). 
'Some pe o p l e b e l i e v e t h a t J a p a n e s e management 
works not b e c a u se o f good i d e a s but because anyone who 
f a i l s t o conform f a c e s t h e h o r r o r of b e i n g f i r e d and 
s o c i a l l y o s t r a c i s e d . B eing f i r e d i s t h e e q u i v a l e n t of 
c a p i t a l punishment i n most J a p a n e s e t r a d i t i o n a l 
c i r c l e s . ' ( H a r p e r , 1988:49). 
5.4 L o v a l t v C o n f l i c t s 
As was s e e n i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r , t h e Japanese 
Managers a r e c o n s t a n t l y b u i l d i n g up t h e l o y a l t y o f 
t h e i r employees i n o r d e r t o i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i v i t y . I t 
s h o u l d be c l e a r t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e have a s t r o n g s e n s e 
o f o b l i g a t i o n and duty and must a l w a y s repay f a v o u r s . 
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T h i s l o y a l t y i n s t i n c t , e.g. t h e ' e n t r a n c e t i e ' , i s 
supposed t o I n c r e a s e c o o p e r a t i o n and r e d u c e r e d t a p e 
t h r o u g h f u r t h e r e d i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l communication, but 
t h e r e a r e problems: ' t h i s e n t r a n c e c l a s s t i e e n c o u r a g e s 
w o r k e r s t o become more l o y a l t o some tha n t o o t h e r s . 
You c a n ' t t r u s t e v e r y o n e e q u a l l y . They too may be more 
l o y a l t o t h e i r former c l a s s m a t e s t h a n t o you.' ( A l s t o n , 
1 9 8 6 : 3 6 ) . The J a p a n e s e s o c i e t y i s composed o f a s e r i e s 
o f c o n n e c t e d groups and each p e r s o n b e l o n g s t o a number 
of groups, e a c h of which demands a c e r t a i n amount of 
l o y a l t y . T h e r e may be c o n f l i c t s and c o m p e t i t i o n 
between work teams a s a r e s u l t which may not be 
c o n d u c i v e t o t h e company's o v e r a l l c o o p e r a t i v e i d e a l 
and may even be h a r m f u l . 
5.5 Lack o f a S e p a r a t e Personal/Home L i f e 
L a r g e J a p a n e s e companies u s u a l l y p r o v i d e many 
s e r v i c e s and b e n e f i t s f o r employees i n c l u d i n g p e n s i o n s , 
h e a l t h c a r e , bonuses, accommodation, s p o r t s f a c i l i t i e s , 
hobby c l u b s , and v a c a t i o n s i t e s , ' I n r e t u r n f o r a l l 
t h i s , employees a r e e x p e c t e d t o work hard and o f t e n 
l a t e , t o t a k e few h o l i d a y s , and t o spend much of t h e i r 
l e i s u r e t i m e w i t h c o l l e a g u e s , d r i n k i n g i n t h e l o c a l 
b a r s , p l a y i n g s p o r t s t o g e t h e r , o r going on o f f i c e t r i p s 
and o u t i n g s w i t h them.' (Hendry, 1987:137). I n o t h e r 
words, t o r e c e i v e t h e s e b e n e f i t s , t h e J a p a n e s e 
employees must g i v e up t h e i d e a of any s o r t o f l i f e 
o t h e r t h a n t h a t which i s d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e i r 
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company. The r e a s o n i n g i s c l e a r : ' — J a p a n e s e 
e x e c u t i v e s assume i t i s their t a s k t o a t t e n d t o much 
more of t h e whole o f t h e p e r s o n , and not l e a v e s o much 
t o o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s ( s u c h a s government, f a m i l y or 
r e l i g i o u s o n e s ) . And t h e y b e l i e v e i t i s o n l y when t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l s ' needs a r e w e l l met w i t h i n t h e s u b c u l t u r e 
o f a c o r p o r a t i o n t h a t t h e y can l a r g e l y be f r e e d f o r 
p r o d u c t i v e work t h a t i s i n l a r g e r p a r t o u t s t a n d i n g . ' 
( P a s c a l s and Athos, 1 9 8 1 : 1 3 2 ) . I n t h e end, whatever 
t h e r e a s o n , 'company l o y a l t y i s more i m p o r t a n t t h a n any 
o t h e r s , even t h o s e based on a w o r k e r ' s f a m i l y t i e s . ' 
( A l s t o n , 1986:43). 
The d i s a d v a n t a g e s f o r t h e employee (and even more 
s o f o r h i s f a m i l y ) a r e o b v i o u s . S. Kamata's book about 
l i f e w i t h t h e T o y o t a Company i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t i t i s 
' v i t a l f o r w o r k e r s t o show t h e r i g h t " a t t i t u d e " by 
w o r k i n g e v e n i n g s and weekends, and t a k i n g l e s s t h a n 
t h e i r a l l o t t e d h o l i d a y e n t i t l e m e n t s ; j u s t a s i t i s 
i m p o r t a n t t o marry a t t h e r i g h t t i m e and t o t h e r i g h t 
woman.' ( B r i g g s , 1 9 8 8 : 2 5 ) . We i n t h e West g e n e r a l l y 
p u t more of an e m p h a s i s on a l i f e a p a r t from work and 
would p r o b a b l y have t r o u b l e a c c e p t i n g t h i s extreme 
o b l i g a t i o n . From an e m p l o y e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , however, 
i t l o o k s l i k e a s u r e f i r e way o f i n c r e a s i n g 
p r o d u c t i v i t y and t h e e v e r - b u s y J a p a n e s e o f f i c e s and 
l a t e working employees seems t o p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e o f 
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t h i s v iew. However, t h i s i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t h e c a s e : 
'No one d a r e s t o appear a s i f he's n o t c o m p l e t e l y 
l o y a l t o t h e group. T h i s c a n r e s u l t i n a f a c a d e 
o f l o o k i n g busy when t h e r e i s i n f a c t l i t t l e t o 
do. J a p a n e s e o f f i c e w o r k e r s o f t e n s t a y l a t e i n 
t h e i r o f f i c e , even i f t h i s means e x t e n d i n g t h e 
work day w i t h o u t e x t r a pay. T h i s p r a c t i c e would 
be e x p e c t e d t o i n c r e a s e t h e work b e i n g done. But 
work p r o d u c t i v i t y does not n e c e s s a r i l y i n c r e a s e . ' 
( A l s t o n , 1986:157). 
To be s u c c i n c t , A l s t o n goes on t o s a y t h a t 'At l e a s t 
some o f t h e busy-seeming atmosphere i n a Japanese 
o f f i c e i s pure sham.' ( 1 9 8 6 : 1 5 8 ) . 
5.6 The E d u c a t i o n Svstem 
J a p a n ' s e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m i s i n t h e o r y a 
m e r i t o c r a c y : a l l c h i l d r e n have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o go t o 
t h e s c h o o l which i s r e f l e c t i v e o f t h e i r a b i l i t y and 
h a r d work. F o r t h e 6 y e a r s o f p r i m a r y and 3 y e a r s of 
m i d d l e s c h o o l s i t i s com p u l s o r y f o r a l l s t u d e n t s t o 
a t t e n d and i t i s g e n e r a l l y e g a l i t a r i a n . F o l l o w i n g 
t h e s e y e a r s , s t u d e n t s a r e a d m i t t e d t o an a p p r o p r i a t e 
h i g h s c h o o l based on an e x a m i n a t i o n r e s u l t . I n o r d e r 
t o do w e l l on t h i s exam, a s t u d e n t , from a v e r y e a r l y 
age, must work long and h a r d a t r o t e memorisation. I t 
i s e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t t o g e t i n t o t h e b e s t h i g h 
s c h o o l s a s t h e n i t i s l i k e l y t h a t a b e t t e r r e s u l t w i l l 
come on t h e u n i v e r s i t y exams. To a t t e n d one of t h e 
p r e s t i g i o u s u n i v e r s i t i e s i s a s u r e t i c k e t t o a 
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successful career since the best companies only r e c r u i t 
from these top schools. 
On the surface, i t does appear t o be q u i t e f a i r 
and i t seems t h a t anyone can succeed i f they have the 
a b i l i t y . However, i t i s much more class r e l a t e d than 
the Japanese are wont t o consider. Rohlen's (1983) 
ant h r o p o l o g i c a l study of Japanese high schools 
demonstrated a correspondence between socio-economic 
circumstances and the high school attended. He 
administered questionnaires t o second-year students i n 
each of the f i v e schools he studied, and the r e s u l t s 
showed c l e a r c o r r e l a t i o n s between the p r e s t i g e of the 
school and the education of the parents, the f a c i l i t i e s 
a t the c h i l d r e n ' s homes f o r study, and the general 
s t a b i l i t y of t h e i r f a m i l i e s . Furthermore, the use of 
the abundant p r i v a t e t u t o r i a l schools (Juku) w i t h 
attendance beginning a t an e a r l y age, sometimes even 
before they go t o school, t h a t take place 3 or 4 times 
a week cannot be afforded by a l l . I t i s these less 
w e l l o f f c h i l d r e n who are a t a d e f i n i t e disadvantage. 
The 'escalator system' i s what i s most sought a f t e r i n 
Tokyo; i t involves the top u n i v e r s i t i e s and t h e i r 
attachments t o schools from a l l l e v e l s . Getting i n at 
the bottom bodes we l l f o r success i n g e t t i n g i n t o the 
best u n i v e r s i t i e s and t h e r e f o r e g e t t i n g the best 
careers. As a r e s u l t , there i s immense pressure even 
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t o a t tend the r i g h t kindergarten. Juku f o r 1, 2 and 3 
year olds have been established as a r e s u l t . 
As a r e s u l t of t h i s system, the Japanese are 
extremely w e l l educated and i l l i t e r a c y i n Japan i s 
v i r t u a l l y nonexistent. But i s t h i s a t the expense of 
the students' childhood? And i n a sense, i t seems t h a t 
i t i s the w e a l t h i e r f a m i l i e s who w i l l c o n t i n u a l l y 
succeed and get the more prized careers despite the 
supposed f a i r n e s s of the system. 
Other c r i t i c i s m s have been l e v e l l e d at the 
Japanese educational system. I t i s argued t h a t there 
i s a s t r i c t loss of i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ideas and 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n and a tendency towards rigorous 
s o c i a l i s a t i o n . Rohlen's 
'overwhelming image of high school classes i s one 
of boredom — of c h i l d r e n s i t t i n g s t i l l and 
l i s t e n i n g t p t h e i r teacher, of accumulating f a c t s 
but having l i t t l e o p p o rtunity t o discuss them, of 
having views, but not needing t o express them, of 
possibly resenting the a u t h o r i t y of teachers, but 
of l e a r n i n g not t o challenge i t (p.246).' (Hendry, 
1987:97). 
Al s t o n has s i m i l a r views: 
'There i s , i n the educational system, no support 
f o r i n d i v i d u a l i t y . Students are not encouraged t o 
develop a strong sense of i n d i v i d u a l i t y . While of 
high q u a l i t y , Japanese education i s based on 
already-established guide-lines determining what a 
student should l e a r n . I n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
of t o p i c s and speculations are not welcomed. The 
Japanese c h i l d learns very e a r l y t o conform 
i n t e l l e c t u a l l y as w e l l as s o c i a l l y . ' ( A l s t o n , 
1986:205). 
Rohlen has found the high rates of school violence 
noted f r e q u e n t l y i n f o r e i g n press t o be mainly i n the 
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vocational rather than academic schools. This appears 
t o be a r e s u l t of these students' loss of purpose or 
sense of f a i l u r e . I t seems there i s no place i n the 
Japanese system f o r those students who have less than 
superior i n t e l l i g e n c e . 
5.7 s t r e s s and S u i c i d e 
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y the educational system as 
described i n the l a s t s e c t i o n has been a source of 
considerable s t r e s s f o r the students involved. Those 
who are not as b r i g h t , as we saw, appear t o need a 
release of t h e i r shame and lack of purpose and f i n d i t 
i n violence and b u l l y i n g o f t e n times. Those who are 
b r i g h t don't necessarily have i t easy e i t h e r . The 
pressure on them i s enormous and the work load 
extremely strenuous e s p e c i a l l y f o r people so young. 
K.V. Ujimoto despribes Vogel's 1965 f i n d i n g s : 
'No s i n g l e event, w i t h the possible exception of 
marriage, determines the course of a young man's 
l i f e as much as entrance examinations, and 
nothing, i n c l u d i n g marriage, requires as many 
years of planning and hard work and [Vogel] notes 
t h a t the intense concentration of pressure i n t o 
one period of l i f e undoubtedly accounts f o r the 
f a c t t h a t the s u i c i d e r a t e i s high f o r those i n 
t h e i r teens and e a r l y 20's.' (Ujimoto, 1975:80). 
Shi ken Jigoku i s the name given t o t h i s process and 
t r a n s l a t e s as 'examination h e l l ' . Ujimoto goes on t o 
discuss a report i n the Japan Times (1974:10) i n which 
various surveys conducted i n 1973 'indicated t h a t 
cramming f o r school entrance examinations accounted f o r 
the high rate of s u i c i d e by teenagers. The extreme 
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s t r e s s s i t u a t i o n occurs because of the emphasis placed 
on the achievement t e s t s i n order t o determine one's 
f u t u r e , whether i t be employment or advancement t o the 
next rung of the educational ladder.' (1975:80). 
This pressure i s r e l i e v e d f o r four years a t 
u n i v e r s i t y but once employment i s begun the pressure 
begins again: 
'[Japanese] Absenteeism [ a t work] i s usually low, 
but when i t does occur i t i s o f t e n a t t r i b u t e d t o 
st r e s s : a 1985 M i n i s t r y of Labour survey showed 
t h a t , of a l l workers absent f o r more than one 
week, 47 per cent were s u f f e r i n g from s t r e s s -
r e l a t e d i l l n e s s . S t i l l worse i s the incidence of 
su i c i d e r e s u l t i n g from pressure a t work: a recent 
newspaper [The Guardian, Tuesday August 18th, 
1987] a r t i c l e revealed t h a t s u i c i d e accounted f o r 
three times as many deaths as road accidents l a s t 
year — a p a r t i c u l a r l y bad year because of 
"endaka"; the sharp a p p r e c i a t i o n of the yen.' 
(Briggs, 1988:26). 
As previously explained, there i s a great deal of 
emphasis placed on membership i n a group, and there 
e x i s t s a 'currency of indebtedness' whereby i t ' s 
extremely important t o remember others' c o n t r i b u t i o n s ; 
i t i s an ' i m p l i c i t r a ther than e x p l i c i t understanding 
between colleagues.' ( B r i g g s , 1988:27). Briggs argues 
t h a t there i s a 'Japanese sense of duty' which a r i s e s 
out of t h e i r '"shame c u l t u r e " i n which each worker has 
a fundamental duty (termed giri), not only t o keep h i s 
own r e p u t a t i o n f o r good work spotle s s , but also t o 
match e x a c t l y the c o n t r i b u t i o n made by other members of 
a work team.' (1988:27). This matching i s extremely 
d i f f i c u l t and the pressure t h a t r e s u l t s i s great. 
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5.8 C o n c l u s i o n 
I t seems evident i n conclusion t h a t these magical 
managerial p r a c t i c e s of the Japanese may have some 
concomitants which are not so a t t r a c t i v e . Ronald Dore 
sums up t h i s p o s i t i o n p e r f e c t l y : 
' I t seems t o me t h a t Japan i s very much ahead of 
us i n some trends t h a t we see p r e t t y u n i v e r s a l l y 
i n our advanced s o c i e t i e s . Examples include the 
trend toward technocracy — f o r bureaucrats t o 
become much more important; and the trend toward a 
kind of dual s t r u c t u r e i n s o c i e t y , d i v i d i n g those 
who are i n the b i g org a n i s a t i o n s and i n r e l a t i v e l y 
p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n s i n so c i e t y as a consequence 
and those who are i n , as the Americans have now 
come t o c a l l i t , "the secondary labour market", 
the people who are shut out of the b i g 
org a n i s a t i o n s and l i v e much less secure and much 
less a f f l u e n t l i v e s i n the lower parts of society. 
That kind of d i v i s i o n I t h i n k has gone f u r t h e r i n 
Japan, and i t ' s the way we're going. And, t h i r d , 
the tendency t o develop m e r i t o c r a t i c systems of 
s e l e c t i o n — f o r people's p o s i t i o n i n so c i e t y , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e i r chance of being i n the 
organised a f f l u e n t sector rather than i n the other 
sector, q u a l i f y i n g f u n c t i o n s of the educational 
system... 
'In s h o r t I t h i n k we should look at Japan as a 
well-developed example of what some of my f r i e n d s 
c a l l kanri shakai — administered s o c i e t y , which 
sums up many of these f e a t u r e s — and ask 
ourselves i f t h i s i s r e a l l y the kind of society we 
want t o l i v e i n and i f we can't t h i n k of 
a l t e r n a t i v e ways o f g e t t i n g some of the b e n e f i t s 
of the new technology without what seem t o be some 
of the disadvantages.' (Dore, 1984:24). 
I n l i g h t o f these negative aspects o f the system, 
the question of whether the West should, i f i t i s 
po s s i b l e , adopt Japanese p r a c t i c e s a r i s e s . I s i t 
possible t o adopt the p o s i t i v e s w i thout the negatives? 
The primary arguments on t h i s t o p i c w i l l be presented 
i n f u l l i n chapter 7, but f i r s t the next chapter w i l l 
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examine what has and hasn't been t r a n s f e r r e d by the 
Japanese i n t o t h e i r s u b s i d i a r i e s i n the West t o see i f 
any answers can be found i n t h e i r examples. 
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CHAPTER 6 
JAPANESE MANAGEMENT IN WESTERN SUBSIDIARIES 
6.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The Japanese, w i t h t h e i r booming economy and what 
are g e n e r a l l y considered s u p e r l a t i v e management 
techniques, i n t e n t on improving t h e i r economy s t i l l 
f u r t h e r , have come t o the West. They are widely 
prevalent already and t h e i r presence w i l l only increase 
i n the 1990s as more companies seek t o enjoy Western 
markets. 
This i n f l u x of Japanese business i s p r e d i c t e d t o 
be very b e n e f i c i a l t o the slowing economies of B r i t a i n 
and the U.S.. Professor Douglas McWilliams, c h i e f 
economic adviser t o the Confederation of B r i t i s h 
I n d u s t r y , has suggested t h a t w i t h i n 20 years, 15 per 
cent of B r i t a i n ' s i n d u s t r i a l output could be produced 
by Japanese companies, and the Nomura Research 
I n s t i t u t e has estimated t h a t the trade balance could be 
improved by more than £13 b i l l i o n by the year 2000 
(Bowen, 1990). 
I t i s also proposed t h a t Japanese investment w i l l 
make an impact on the West i n another way, again f o r 
the West's b e n e f i t . As 'super managers' they can show 
the West what they're doing wrong (Bowen, 1990). This 
i s not a unanimously accepted idea, however: James 
Flanigan o f the Los Angeles Times maintains t h a t the 
Japanese have been given 'an o v e r - i n f l a t e d r e p u t a t i o n 
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earned i n a hothouse work environment d i f f e r e n t from 
anywhere else.' (Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1988). 
Japanese authors as well have some doubts about whether 
t h e i r managerial system i s e f f e c t i v e outside Japan: 
'Japan's d i s t i n c t i v e managerial system, which was 
nurtured i n the home environment and proved e f f e c t i v e 
i n t h a t s e t t i n g , i s an important f a c t o r i n h i b i t i n g the 
growth of Japanese m u l t i n a t i o n a l e n t e r p r i s e s . Unlike 
the areas of st r a t e g y and s t r u c t u r e , there appears t o 
be l i t t l e l i k e l i h o o d of convergence w i t h the American 
system i n managerial p r a c t i c e s . ' (Yoshino, 1976:161-
162). 
Despite these p e s s i m i s t i c a s s e r t i o n s , Japanese 
s u b s i d i a r i e s i n the West have brought w i t h them t h e i r 
techniques, a l b e i t i n varying degrees. Sethi e t a l . ' s 
a n a l y s i s (1984) suggests t h a t Japanese s u b s i d i a r i e s can 
be d i v i d e d i n t o 4 groups 'based on t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s and 
t a c t i c s i n applying JABMAS [ t h e Japanese Business and 
Management System] t o t h e i r U.S. operations.' They are 
as f o l l o w s : 
1. Type A — The I m p e r i a l i s t Approach — These 
companies d u p l i c a t e the Japanese system of 
or g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and decision-making processes, 
i . e . JABMAS i s applied i n t a c t . 'The s u r v i v a l of the 
s a t e l l i t e organism depends on keeping i n close touch 
w i t h the parent body and, above a l l , maintaining the 
values of the corporate c u l t u r e , which are considered 
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s u p e r i o r t o those of the e x t e r n a l environment and are 
a t the core of the s u r v i v a l of the system.' (p.183). 
The 'clone' i s imbued w i t h the parent company's values 
so t h a t they w i l l react p r e d i c t a b l y and as the parent 
company would. The r e s u l t of t h i s approach i s very 
i n s u l a r managers as t h e i r only concern i s w i t h the 
parent company and not w i t h the s u b s i d i a r y . 
Adding t o the i n s u l a r i t y i s the maintenance of 2 
classes of employees, i . e . the l o c a l s v. the 
e x p a t r i a t e s , the l a t t e r r e c e i v i n g greater b e n e f i t s . 
Furthermore, the a p p l i c a t i o n of Japanese management, 
wh i l e h i g h l y s e l e c t i v e , i s ' u n i l a t e r a l l y determined by 
the company wit h o u t regard t o l o c a l employees' needs, 
preferences, or even e q u i t y w i t h Japanese employees 
w i t h i n the business u n i t . ' (p.184). 
These companies are among the most tr a d i t i o n - b o u n d 
i n Japan. The s u b s i d i a r i e s focus p r i m a r i l y on Japan, 
w i t h t h e i r i n t e r e s t s l y i n g w i t h Japan as a n a t i o n . The 
overseas operations are an i n t e g r a l p a r t of Japan's 
f o r e i g n economic p o l i c y only. This i n t e r n a l 
communication w i t h the home o f f i c e i s combined w i t h the 
idea t h a t f o r e i g n e r s lack the c u l t u r a l values t h a t make 
JABMAS unique and e f f e c t i v e so t h a t i t comes as no 
s u r p r i s e t h a t 'Japanese companies i n general, and 
t r a d i n g companies i n p a r t i c u l a r [e.g. Sumitomo, M i t s u i , 
and C. I t o h ] , do not f o l l o w benevolent labour p r a c t i c e s 
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i n t h e i r overseas operations, e s p e c i a l l y as they r e l a t e 
t o host-country c i t i z e n s . ' (p.184). 
2. Type B — The Enclave Approach — The companies 
which f o l l o w t h i s second approach p r e f e r t o set up i n 
small towns i n r u r a l environments w i t h s t a b l e and 
homogeneous communities and where unions are almost 
nonexistent. The l o c a l s may be suspicious of outsiders 
but w i l l not i n t e r f e r e i f they are not a f f e c t e d 
themselves. These companies, then, f i n d 'a niche i n 
the ext e r n a l environment t h a t minimizes c o n f l i c t 
between the organism and the environment.' Like the A 
type, they apply the Japanese system i n t a c t but d i f f e r 
i n t h a t they are able t o i n t e g r a t e the l o c a l s more 
since they occupy low l e v e l p o s i t i o n s and 'do not see 
the company as a ladder f o r upward m o b i l i t y and a long 
term career; and are i n c l i n e d t o mind t h e i r own 
business as long as they are paid the going wages and 
are l e f t alone.' (p.186). 
The Japanese management believes t h a t employees' 
sense of belonging leads t o greater q u a l i t y and 
e f f i c i e n c y so they pay considerable a t t e n t i o n t o 
employee s e l e c t i o n , i n d o c t r i n a t i o n i n the corporate 
c u l t u r e and philosophy, and t r a i n i n g . I n a l l ways, 
they t r y t o f a c i l i t a t e the l o c a l community's 
acceptance. An example of a Type B company i s Kikkoman 
i n Walworth, Wisconsin i n the U.S. 
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3. Type C — The Domestication Approach — 
Companies of t h i s type ' c a l l f o r the use of a modified 
form of Japanese management p r a c t i c e s where the type of 
p r a c t i c e and the i n t e n s i t y of i t s use are both 
moderated t o meet exter n a l and i n t e r n a l environmental 
c o n d i t i o n s . ' (p.188). 
The approach i s used i f one or more of the 
fo11owi ng cond i t i ons ex i s t . 
' 1 . The Japanese companies entered i n t o j o i n t ventures 
or took over already established ... companies. There 
i s the existence of a corporate c u l t u r e t h a t cannot be 
e a s i l y dislodged, and workers are a l l i e d w i t h strong 
i n d u s t r y unions. 
2. The Japanese company i s well known, large i n size 
and h i g h l y v i s i b l e , and has established operations i n 
geographic l o c a t i o n s w i t h a t r a d i t i o n of strong trade 
unionism and t h e r e f o r e an a n t i p a t e r n a l ism bias. 
3. The Japanese company operates i n markets where the 
demand s t r u c t u r e i s q u i t e competitive. The company's 
market edge may be marginal or vulnerable t o f a c t o r s 
o u t s i d e i t s contr;ol. I t would not r i s k i n s t i t u t i n g 
management of o p e r a t i o n a l systems t h a t may cause 
disharmony among i t s workers. 
4. The Japanese company i s engaged i n the production of 
high-technology products where s k i l l e d workers and 
s c i e n t i s t s may be i n short supply. Given the American 
s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l environment, the American workers are 
l i k e l y t o be s e l f - m o t i v a t e d , h i g h l y mobile, and may 
p r e f e r higher c u r r e n t wages and performance-based 
compensation.' (p.188). 
The r a t i o n a l e i s ' s t r a t e g i c adaptation.' There i s 
an open system of communication, an attempt t o adapt t o 
the e x t e r n a l environment, and Japanese techniques are 
ad hoc and low key and may even be Westernized and 
given l o c a l f l a v o u r . These companies are generally i n 
the high tech i n d u s t r i e s , operate i n t i g h t labour 
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markets, need h i g h l y s k i l l e d people, and don't s t r i c t l y 
adhere t o JABMAS i n Japan. Examples are Matsushita, 
Sanyo, Sharp and Sony, but there i s some v a r i a t i o n i n 
a p p l i c a t i o n among the companies: those w i t h less 
e x t e r n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e introduced more Japanese 
management techniques. 
New companies of t h i s type c a r e f u l l y screen 
employees and look f o r a d a p t a b i l i t y t o company 
philosophy and those less i n c l i n e d t o u n i o n i z a t i o n . 
A l l companies of t h i s type t r y t o avoid l a y o f f s as t h i s 
could lead t o u n i o n i z a t i o n , and provide extensive 
t r a i n i n g . 
4. Type D — The A c c u l t u r a t i o n Approach — here 
again there i s an attempt t o keep and apply JABMAS 
i n t a c t but these f i r m s , p r i m a r i l y manufacturing, have 
the j o b of absorbing the l o c a l c u l t u r e i n t o t h e i r 
t r a n s f e r r e d c u l t u r e . This approach " c a l l s f o r c r e a t i n g 
a new corporate c u l t u r e where both Japanese and 
American workers w i l l share a common set of values and 
outlook towards work, o r g a n i z a t i o n , and the 
c o r p o r a t i o n . " ( p.193). To do t h i s "A painstaking 
i n d o c t r i n a t i o n of the American workforce i s required i n 
order t o imbue i t w i t h the thought processes and ha b i t s 
of Japanese workers, which are considered a necessary 
p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r the successful i n t r o d u c t i o n of 
Japanese Management p r a c t i c e s . " ( p.193). 
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A l l D Companies undertake s i m i l a r a c t i v i t i e s : 
' 1 . Employees are c a r e f u l l y selected and screened t o 
ensure t h a t workers h i r e d w i l l have a p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e 
towards the Japanese Management system, i n c l u d i n g an 
aversion t o outside unionism, a w i l l i n g n e s s t o l e a r n , a 
capacity f o r obedience and d i s c i p l i n e , and acceptance 
of the philosophy of p l a c i n g group welfare over 
i n d i v i d u a l welfare i n the b e l i e f t h a t what serves the 
group best serves the i n d i v i d u a l . 
2. To the extent p o s s i b l e , workers who have had no 
p r i o r experience are p r e f e r r e d . This i s done t o avoid 
the h i r i n g of workers who may have developed unhealthy 
work h a b i t s , have belonged t o unions, and may be 
a n t a g o n i s t i c toward the new employer. This t a c t i c also 
has the e f f e c t of d i s c r i m i n a t i n g against workers f o r 
union membership, and also workers who are older and 
more experienced. 
3. Workers are given extensive t r a i n i n g not only i n j o b 
r e l a t e d s k i l l s , but also i n corporate h i s t o r y , 
f o l k l o r e , c u l t u r e , and t r a d i t i o n s . 
4. Any manufacturing operation i s preceded by a long 
period of c a r e f u l planning and painstaking a t t e n t i o n t o 
every d e t a i l of the human and technological aspects of 
the operation. 
5. A selected number of workers i s sent t o the parent 
company i n Japan, where they l i v e and work i n the 
parent company's p l a n t s side-by-side w i t h the Japanese 
workers. On t h e i r r e t u r n , the " i n s t r u c t o r workers" are 
expected t o t r a i n other workers i n the Japanese way of 
doing t h i n g s . These workers are accorded a higher 
s t a t u s i n the p l a n t hierarchy through the use of 
d i f f e r e n t colour uniforms or i d e n t i t y caps and badges. 
6. Not only do the Japanese companies b r i n g i n t h e i r 
management philosophy, they also b r i n g i n ' i n t a c t ' 
t h e i r manufacturing processes.' (p.193-194). 
The next s e c t i o n , w i t h these d i v i s i o n s i n mind, 
w i l l discuss i n general the transference and adaptation 
of Japanese management techniques and look at s p e c i f i c 
f i r m s t o provide more i n f o r m a t i v e i l l u s t r a t i o n s of what 
i s being p r a c t i s e d . 
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6.2 J a p a n e s e Management i n B r i t i s h and Ame r i c a n 
S u b s i d i a r i e s 
As Sethi's d i v i s i o n s imply, there i s v a r i a t i o n 
w i t h i n the Western s u b s i d i a r i e s i n regards t o how much 
of the Japanese managerial system i s t r a n s f e r r e d or 
adapted. The Japan External Trade Organization's 
o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s showed t h a t 60% of 57 Japanese 
f i r m s i n the West and East Coast of the U.S. u t i l i s e d 
some form of Japanese management p r a c t i c e s i n 1983 
(Matsuura, 1984). A c l o s e r look a t the s u b s i d i a r i e s 
w i l l e x t r a p o l a t e f u r t h e r . 
Malcolm Trevor, on h i s own (1983) and w i t h Michael 
White under the funding of ICERD (1983), has looked at 
those f i r m s which f a l l i n t o the Type A category, 
s p e c i f i c a l l y 2 banks and 1 t r a d i n g company, a l l i n the 
C i t y . At Bank A, one quarter of the s t a f f were 
Japanese e x p a t r i a t e s ; a t Bank B, only 15 per cent were 
e x p a t r i a t e s ( t h i s i s lower than the average which i s 
between Bank A and the Trading Company suggesting t h a t 
there i s more v a r i a t i o n i n the management of Japanese 
s u b s i d i a r i e s than has been p r e v i o u s l y suggested); and 
43 per cent were e x p a t r i a t e s a t Trading Company C. 
Very few (7 per cent) B r i t i s h managers were sent t o 
Japan f o r f e a r they would not stay long w i t h the 
company, and thus the time and money spent sending them 
to Japan would be wasted. A dual personnel system was 
found i n which e x p a t r i a t e s and l o c a l s t a f f are given 
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separate c o n d i t i o n s of s e r v i c e . The e x p a t r i a t e s ' 
careers are i n Japan and they are placed i n B r i t a i n f o r 
only a temporary period, u s u a l l y 4-5 years. They are 
thus more concerned about t h e i r appraisal from Japan as 
i t i s the head o f f i c e t h a t w i l l decide the course of 
t h e i r f u t u r e s . 
I t was als o found t h a t the r i n g i decision-making 
process was u t i l i s e d i n the C i t y f o r major branch 
decisions but they were c a r r i e d out i n Japanese and 
excluded the l o c a l managers and s t a f f . They used open 
o f f i c e plans t o increase communication, consensus, 
team-work, and c o l l e c t i v i s m while a t the same time 
ma i n t a i n i n g close t i e s w i t h the home o f f i c e and 
excluding the l o c a l s ; a l l o w i n g l o c a l s t a f f more 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s considered r i s k y as any e r r o r would 
endanger the e x p a t r i a t e s ' f u t u r e i n Japan. 
Bank A, i t was found, put an emphasis on a t t i t u d e 
i n r e c r u i t m e n t as i s t y p i c a l i n Japan wh i l e Bank B took 
a more B r i t i s h approach i n response t o high j o b 
m o b i l i t y i n B r i t a i n ; i . e . s k i l l s take precedence as the 
employees probably won't stay long. As i s common i n 
Japan, the C i t y f i r m s created broad, unclear j o b 
d e s c r i p t i o n s and d e f i n i t i o n s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . S t a f f 
i n the C i t y f i r m s when interviewed i n d i c a t e d t h a t the 
working p r a c t i c e s i n the Japanese s u b s i d i a r i e s were 
unusual compared w i t h t h e i r previous experiences and 
expectations. They noted t h a t the Japanese put more 
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emphasis on a t t e n t i o n t o d e t a i l s than they f e l t 
necessary although, as White and Trevor p o i n t out, even 
s i n g l e f i g u r e e r r o r s can be devastating f o r these f i r m s 
d e a l i n g i n large sums of money. Also, t h i s s t r i c t 
a t t e n t i o n ' i s believed by Japanese management t o 
c o n t r i b u t e t o work d i s c i p l i n e and the q u a l i t y of 
performance, whether i n Japan or B r i t a i n . ' (p.115). 
The t r a i n i n g i n these f i r m s , furthermore, i s minimal i n 
comparison t o t h a t seen i n Japan, again due t o labour 
m o b i l i t y . 
I n s h o r t , 'The business procedures i n the C i t y 
f i r m s as f a r as we could judge, followed Japanese 
p r a c t i c e . ' (White and Trevor, 1983:111). This comment 
must be q u a l i f i e d , however: 'although the C i t y f i r m s 
may be very "Japanese" i n t h e i r working p r a c t i c e s and 
as regards t h e i r ,expatriate personnel, there has not 
been the same attempt as i n manufacturing t o 
communicate "Japanese" p r i n c i p l e s t o local s t a f f and t o 
inco r p o r a t e them i n t o the same system.* (White and 
Trevor, 1983:96). This f i t s very well i n t o Sethi's 
model. 
According t o Sethi e t a l . , the Type C companies 
are much more i n c l i n e d t o adapt the Japanese system t o 
f i t the e x t e r n a l environment. John Bevan, pu b l i c 
r e l a t i o n s manager a t Sony i n Bridgend, South Wales, ' i s 
quick t o emphasize t h a t Sony learned from local 
c u l t u r e , and d i d not simply impose i t s own p r a c t i c e s 
122 
and t r a d i t i o n s when i t f i r s t a r r i v e d a t Bridgend i n 
1973.' (Student I n i t i a t i v e , 1989:33). The Liaison 
o f f i c e r f o r the 30 Japanese s t a f f a t Bridgend, Kazushi 
Ambe, has a s i m i l a r view: ' I t i s almost by chance t h a t 
Sony i s a Japanese company, although we do have some 
t r a d i t i o n a l customs. The Sony way i s f o r much more 
involvement and a l l other f a c t o r s come out of t h a t . 
Everybody must behave as i f they are responsible f o r a 
p a r t i c u l a r matter.' (Student I n i t i a t i v e , 1989:33). 
L i f e t i m e employment i s n ' t given a t Sony but i t i s 
stressed t h a t l a y o f f s are used only as a l a s t r e s o r t . 
Also stressed at Sony i s employee t r a i n i n g , 
communication between the management, the foreman, and 
the workers, and t i d i n e s s i n and around the workplace 
(Pegels, 1984). 
At Sanyo, another Type C company, team-work i s 
seen as the key element i n p r o d u c t i v i t y w i t h management 
responsible f o r m o t i v a t i o n ; there i s a narrowed salary 
gap between a l l l e v e l s of employees; and they r e c r u i t 
those w i t h a higher l e v e l of education, e s p e c i a l l y 
among the younger employees so t h a t everyone i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y middle class which i s hoped t o lead t o high 
morale and p r o d u c t i v i t y (Pegels, 1984). 
A t h i r d Type C company i s Matsushita. Here they 
do attempt t o t r a n s f e r the business philosophy (Kono, 
1984). While the p r a c t i c e s t h a t appear i n s u b s i d i a r i e s 
i n other Asian c o u n t r i e s such as a display of the 
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•seven s p i r i t s ' or the s i n g i n g of company songs are not 
found i n the UK branch, there are signs which read 
'cleanliness and t i d i n e s s produce q u a l i t y ' everywhere 
around the p l a n t ; there i s an emphasis on the idea t h a t 
p r o f i t i s the r e s u l t of s e r v i c e t o the s o c i e t y ; morning 
meetings are held; and on Wednesday mornings, a l l 
members of the p l a n t meet together. V. Scott, i n a 
speech d e l i v e r e d at the K n o x v i l l e Forum i n Tennessee, 
st a t e d : 'We run our o r g a n i z a t i o n as an American 
company. But our operations are deeply i n t e r t w i n e d 
w i t h those i n Japan. Day by day, we continue t o learn 
from each other, adapt t o each other, and f i n d b e t t e r 
ways t o run our business together.' ( S c o t t , 1988:23). 
Practices not t y p i c a l of those found i n Japan have been 
employed, however, i n c l u d i n g r e p l a c i n g most of the 
former top management personnel because they would not 
a d j u s t t o or accept the Japanese approach and 'due t o 
the operating losses i n the e a r l y years, coupled w i t h 
the recession, i t had t o t r i m the s i z e of both 
management and the workforce. The company closed 
p l a n t s i n Pontiac, I l l i n o i s , and i n Toronto, Canada, 
reducing the workforce from 6,000 t o 2,000.' (Sethi e t 
a l . , 1984:191). S t i l l , i t i s more common t o f i n d 
Japanese-like p r a c t i c e s being employed. According t o 
Ms. Scott, there i s now a p o l i c y of no l a y o f f s or 
l a y o f f s only as a l a s t r e s o r t ; an absence of s t a t u s 
b a r r i e r s ; openness w i t h a l l employees on the c u r r e n t 
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s t a t e of business; and 'sincere concern' by the 
management f o r a l l employees. 
F i n a l l y , a f o u r t h Type C company i s YKK, the Zip 
manufacturers. The management found they were not able 
t o adapt Japanese p r a c t i c e s e n t i r e l y so created a 
mixture. F i r s t , they evaluate employees twice a year 
and r e c o g n i t i o n i s based on performance. Secondly, i f 
production cutbacks are necessary, a l 1 employees' 
wages, from general manager down, are cut 
p r o p o r t i o n a l l y . And t h i r d , l a y o f f s are only the r e s u l t 
of extreme production cutbacks. (Pegels, 1984). 
The most notable c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Nissan, a Type 
D company, i s the team-work and commitment of the 
production l i n e . Stephen Wood v i s i t e d the Washington 
p l a n t i n 1987 and commented: 'throughout a long, hard 
day, they remained good tempered, even happy. I was 
astonished...and repeatedly asked Mike and Mick about 
i t . They shrugged t h e i r shoulders a l o t , and smiled, 
when pressed, they explained t h a t everyone i n the team 
had t o help each other out, i f they d i d n ' t f i x a 
problem one of t h e i r teammates would have t o — but I 
d i d n ' t get the impression t h a t they had ever given the 
matter any serious thought. " I t ' s team-work, i s n ' t i t , " 
s a id Mick, s m i l i n g and shrugging.' (p.145). 
An Independent i n v e s t i g a t i o n also found unusually 
high l e v e l s of commitment a t the.Washington p l a n t . 
125 
'The most impressive element a t Nissan i s not 
immediately v i s i b l e . The people, who were a l l 
c a r e f u l l y selected from a vast pool of appli c a n t s , 
r e a l l y do appear t o be committed. Adam Wilmott, 
senior supervisor i n the new press shop, i s a 
young Welshman who shows an enthusiasm t h a t Ford 
or Rover would give t h e i r eye-teeth f o r . "We got 
the d i e change down from 50 minutes a year ago t o 
2.97 minutes," he says. " I t was absolutely 
superb." A f a s t d i e change i s c r u c i a l t o a j u s t -
i n - t i m e o p e r a t i o n : i t means t h a t a great v a r i e t y 
of panels can be made i n low runs without l o s i n g 
valuable manufacturing time. But t o achieve such 
speed requires m i l i t a r y p r e c i s i o n and enormous 
commitment and Nissan has i t . ' (Bowen, 1990:12). 
As touched on i n the above quote, recruitment i s 
s e l e c t i v e and as there are many app l i c a n t s t o choose 
from due t o the high unemployment i n the Washington 
area, they are t o l d of the d i f f i c u l t and boring nature 
of the work so t h a t only the most committed are h i r e d . 
The B r i t i s h management s i t i n open plan o f f i c e s 
and a f u r t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e i r recruitment 
p o l i c y stresses the u n i t y and team-work of the p l a n t : 
'The su p e r v i s o r s , each of whom i s responsible 
( w i t h h i s deputy, the team leader) f o r the 20-odd 
s t a f f on h i s s e c t i o n of the l i n e , t a l k about the 
importance of t h e i r r o l e i n h i r i n g t h e i r own 
s t a f f . They r a t h e r than the personnel department, 
make the decisions. This unusual and hig h l y 
e f f e c t i v e approach creates a s o l i d bond between 
the supervisor and h i s team, based on l o y a l t y and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; the team members have a commitment 
t o the man f o r whom they work day-to-day, because 
he h i r e d them, and the supervisor has a 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o them, and t o the company. "He 
h i r e d them, so he w i l l make damn sure they 
succeed," says John Cushnagan.' (Woods, 1987:144). 
What's s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h i s example i s t h a t t h i s method 
of o b t a i n i n g l o y a l t y approaches t h a t found i n Japan — 
as we've seen there are many bonds of l o y a l t y between 
the supervisor and employee which increase commitment. 
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Ken Khi Pang and Nick O l i v e r (1988) c a r r i e d out 
research work on Japanese manufacturing s u b s i d i a r i e s i n 
the UK. Data was gathered from eleven of them. The 
o b j e c t of the study was t o f i n d out how widely 
'Japanese' methods are used i n UK manufacturing 
s u b s i d i a r i e s . They chose s i x pr a c t i c e s commonly 
considered 'Japanese': l i f e t i m e employment, s e n i o r i t y 
based payment systems, t r a i n i n g and education, company-
based welfare schemes, e n t e r p r i s e unionism, and q u a l i t y 
c i r c l e s and production methods. 
I t was found t h a t there was no formal, contractual 
guarantee of l i f e t i m e employment but there was an 
informal commitment t o avoiding l a y o f f s g i v i n g 
employees a sense of high employment s e c u r i t y . Labour 
turnover and j o b m o b i l i t y i s s i m i l a r t o other B r i t i s h 
manufacturers. 
There was l i t t l e evidence of anything s i m i l a r t o 
sen i o r i t y - b a s e d payment systems. Only one reported pay 
increasing a u t o m a t i c a l l y w i t h length of service, but 
t h a t involved a h i g h l y i n d i v i d u a l i s e d payments system. 
There i s l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e from the B r i t i s h system and 
the most important c r i t e r i o n f o r promotion i s 
performance fo l l o w e d by q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . The wage 
scales also were determined i n the B r i t i s h model: 
n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h the trade u n i o n ( s ) , surveys of 
i n d u s t r y and area wage rat e s . 
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There appears t o be a strong emphasis on t r a i n i n g 
a t a l l l e v e l s . The resources devoted t o t r a i n i n g are 
s t r i k i n g as i s the time devoted t o induction 
programmes. 
None of the company based welfare b e n e f i t s were 
out of the o r d i n a r y : 9 o f f e r e d pension schemes, 7 
provided s i c k pay, 7 l e i s u r e f a c i l i t i e s , and 2 o f f e r e d 
medical b e n e f i t ; '7 reported t h a t these b e n e f i t s were 
enjoyed by a l l grades of employees w i t h the exception 
of one a f f i l i a t e i n which p r i v a t e medical care was 
o f f e r e d t o management only.' (p.18). 
As f o r unions, i t has been suggested t h a t i n order 
f o r Japanese production methods such as JIT t o work, 
s t a b l e unions are necessary. Of the 11 studied, four 
are non-union, s i x are single-union and only one (an 
a c q u i s i t i o n ) i s m u l t i - u n i o n . Although no company had 
anything t h a t could be termed an e n t e r p r i s e or company-
based union, none (a p a r t from the a c q u i s i t i o n ) conform 
t o the B r i t i s h model of multi-unionism e i t h e r . 
Q u a l i t y c i r c l e s were found i n some form i n 8 of 
the 11, 'although most of these said t h a t the scope of 
t h e i r c i r c l e s was considerably more r e s t r i c t e d than 
would be the case i n Japan. The reasons t o which t h i s 
was a t t r i b u t e d included the lack of budgets t o 
implement formal q u a l i t y c i r c l e s , a lack of s u i t a b l e 
c i r c l e leaders, the absence of s p e c i a l i s t teams t o 
implement c i r c l e suggestions q u i c k l y and the lack of 
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team s p i r i t ( f o r example a reluctance on the p a r t of 
engineers t o spend time developing suggestions from 
u n s k i l l e d employees).' (p.19). Except f o r one, a l l the 
companies had q u a l i t y c o n t r o l schemes of various types, 
suggestion scheme, c o n s u l t a t i v e meeting e t c . Four 
p r a c t i s e d JIT or versions of i t . 
The o v e r a l l p i c t u r e i s more one of adaptation of 
Japanese methods t o f i t the B r i t i s h environment than 
s t r a i g h t transference; but even t h i s adaptation i s of 
only a few of the 'Japanese-style' management prac t i c e s 
w i t h the others simply remaining B r i t i s h . This i s true 
i n the U.S. as w e l l ; f o r example, America also has a 
r e l a t i v e l y strong and a c t i v e labour movement and the 
Japanese have had t o react: companies w i t h unions have 
had t o modify work r u l e s , and f i r m s w i t h o u t them o f t e n 
o f f e r bonuses and other in c e n t i v e s t o keep unions out. 
Furthermore, a survey conducted by Nanshi Matsuura 
(1984) i n the U.S. found t h a t the overwhelming m a j o r i t y 
of U.S. workers (note t h a t t h i s included banks and a 
t r a d i n g company as we l l as manufacturing companies) 
pr e f e r wages and promotion based on a b i l i t y and 
performance. Thus, one can only conclude t h a t the 
Nenko system would be d i f f i c u l t t o implement i n the 
West. 
White and Trevor (1983) argue more emphatically 
t h a t on the whole i t does not appear t h a t those 
employment p r a c t i c e s generally considered 
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c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of large companies i n Japan were found 
i n Western s u b s i d i a r i e s a t a l l : 
'There was no e x p l i c i t system of l i f e t i m e 
employment; no company unions; no seniority-based 
payments system; no e s p e c i a l l y elaborate p r o v i s i o n 
of w e l f a r e or f r i n g e b e n e f i t s ; no schemes of 
l i f e l o n g t r a i n i n g ; no group decision-making 
processes i n v o l v i n g employees. These negative 
conclusions applied equally t o the manufacturing 
p l a n t s and the f i n a n c i a l companies i n the C i t y ... 
some of the f a c t o r s which would be l i k e l y t o 
i n h i b i t Japanese companies from i n t r o d u c i n g such 
p r a c t i c e s ... include the more a c t i v e labour 
markets i n B r i t a i n , w i t h greater i n d i v i d u a l 
m o b i l i t y permitted and even encouraged; the 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l obstacles, e s p e c i a l l y represented by 
B r i t i s h t rade unions and i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
t r a d i t i o n s ; and the high cost of departing from 
the p r a c t i c e of competitors i n the host market i n 
such matters as pay and b e n e f i t s . ' (White and 
Trevor, 1983:124). 
This i s n ' t t o say, however, t h a t Japanese s u b s i d i a r i e s 
operate j u s t l i k e Western companies, e s p e c i a l l y i n 
terms of personnel matters. 'The p o i n t i s , however, 
t h a t the e x t e n t of t h a t development so f a r has been 
very modest. The keynote of Japanese personnel 
management i n B r i t a i n has been a piecemeal pragmatism 
rat h e r than any attempt t o introduce a comprehensive 
Japanese system of employment.' (White and Trevor, 
1983:124). 
The manufacturing s u b s i d i a r i e s have been more 
successful a t t r a n s f e r r i n g Japanese ideology, 
commitment and some p r a c t i c e s than those s u b s i d i a r i e s 
i n the white c o l l a r i n d u s t r i e s . Examples of workers' 
team-work, commitment and subsequent p r o d u c t i v i t y i n 
manufacturing f i r m s l i k e Nissan are both abundant and 
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impressive i n the l i t e r a t u r e on Japanese s u b s i d i a r i e s . 
This i s thought t o be the r e s u l t of a d i f f e r e n c e i n 
expectations between blue c o l l a r workers and white 
c o l l a r workers — the Japanese system i s i n general 
considered an improvement over t h a t found i n B r i t i s h or 
American f a c t o r i e s where employee commitment and 
m o t i v a t i o n i s n o t o r i o u s l y low, but i n the white c o l l a r 
sector there i s l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e . C o n f l i c t s of 
i n t e r e s t s between Japanese e x p a t r i a t e s and white c o l l a r 
workers are also greater (these s h a l l be discussed 
f u r t h e r i n s e c t i o n 6.4) and play a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e . 
I n a l l the types of companies, though, as we've 
seen, m o d i f i c a t i o n s of the Japanese system i n varying 
degrees are necessary i n a Western environment. Said 
John Q. Anderson, a management consultant w i t h McKinsey 
and Co.: ' I don't t h i n k the Japanese have i l l u s i o n s 
t h a t they can change American Business c u l t u r e . Most 
take i t f o r granted they w i l l have t o mostly be 
adaptive t o the U.S. approach.' (Los Angeles Times, 
Jul y 10, 1988). 
6.3 Japanese Reactions t o Japanese Management i n 
Western S u b s i d i a r i e s 
Apart from the obvious economic b e n e f i t s derived 
from p l a c i n g s u b s i d i a r i e s i n the West, have the 
Japanese been happy w i t h t h e i r Western workers? Very 
few p o s i t i v e statements can be found regarding Japanese 
opi n i o n of t h e i r Western employees. A spokesman f o r 
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Kikkoman i n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h Fortune magazine said he 
thought the American workers produced higher q u a l i t y 
than the Japanese. This i s a somewhat rare statement, 
however. 
More common are harsh comments on Western workers' 
incompetence and ruthlessness. P r o d u c t i v i t y of western 
workers i s s a i d t o be low. Kosuke Ikebuchi, manager of 
the General Motors-Toyota p l a n t i n C a l i f o r n i a f o r 
almost 3 years, s a i d t h a t although p r o d u c t i v i t y i s 
double t h a t a t the GM p l a n t , i t i s s t i l l 30% lower than 
the Japanese p l a n t s (Los Angeles Times, July 11, 1988). 
Nissan's f a c t o r y i n Tennessee b u i l t trucks instead of 
passenger cars because, as the president, Takashi 
I s h i h a r a , s t a t e d i n 1981, there were fewer parts t o a 
t r u c k and thus fewer chances f o r the American workers 
t o make mistakes ,in the production. Matsuura w r i t e s , 
'Most Japanese executives f e e l t h a t American workers 
are much less s k i l l f u l w i t h hand and less dextrous than 
t h e i r Japanese counterparts. U.S. workers tend t o be 
much less concerned w i t h accuracy of work than the 
Japanese. They are much less i n s i s t e n t on 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s than Japanese workers are.' (1984). 
Because of t h i s , 'Japanese executives have indicated 
t h a t q u a l i t y c o n t r o l cannot be delegated t o American 
employees, w h i l e most other management fu n c t i o n s can 
be.' (Matsuura, 1984). S i m i l a r l y , a study of 
M i t s u b i s h i I n t e r n a t i o n a l Corporation by the Research 
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I n s t i t u t e a t St. John's U n i v e r s i t y i n the U.S. found 
t h a t many Japanese believed Americans could not handle 
leadership p o s i t i o n s (Los Angeles Times, July 10, 
1988). One reason they a t t r i b u t e t o poor management i s 
the f a c t t h a t u n q u a l i f i e d people get jobs i n the e f f o r t 
t o promote women and m i n o r i t i e s . I n regard t o t h i s , 
the Japanese f a u l t the West f o r t a k i n g e g a l i t a r i a n i s m 
'too f a r ' . Ikebushi of the GM-Toyota p l a n t said t h a t 
Americans and Japanese 'have a d i f f e r e n t concept of 
what c o n s t i t u t e s f a i r n e s s and e q u a l i t y . Americans are 
too s e n s i t i v e about f a i r n e s s . ' (Los Angeles Times, July 
11, 1988). 
A second major Japanese d i s l i k e of Western workers 
i s what the Japanese believe t o be a lack of l o y a l t y t o 
the f i r m — something h i g h l y prized w i t h i n Japan as was 
seen i n previous chapters. B r i t a i n s and Americans are 
seen as r u t h l e s s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c mercenaries regardless 
of p o s i t i o n . They are w i l l i n g t o increase s k i l l s and 
knowledge but only i f i t w i l l b e n e f i t themselves ~ 
sometimes knowledge i s even guarded as a means t o 
beating competitors, i . e . other managers hoping t o get 
t o the top. This d r i v e f o r personal advantage takes 
form most r e a d i l y i n the high j o b m o b i l i t y i n the U.S. 
and B r i t a i n . The Japanese f e e l they cannot give the 
necessary t r a i n i n g t h a t i s given i n Japan t o Westerners 
because they've had too many workers leave the f i r m and 
take these s k i l l s w i t h them. In Matsuura's study, when 
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asked ' i f you found a company t h a t o f f e r s more of what 
you want, what would you do (percentage)?' 45X answered 
' I would move t o the new company', only 5X answered ' I 
would stay w i t h the present company', 37.5% said they'd 
t r y t o improve the co n d i t i o n s i n the present company 
and 15.5X d i d n ' t know what they'd do. From t h i s i t 
appears the Japanese are c o r r e c t i n t h e i r assumptions 
and w i l l have t o work t o keep employees happy. 
The Japanese are also amazed by Westerners' 
emphasis on monetary reward and b e n e f i t s over 
r e c o g n i t i o n or praise and without p u t t i n g the company 
f i r s t . They have d i f f i c u l t y r e t a i n i n g graduates 
because of t h e i r expectations of career path promotion. 
This lack of l o y a l t y i s seen i n a p a r t i c u l a r l y bad 
l i g h t f o r an underlying reason: 'Loyalty i s not only an 
e t h i c a l concept, although i t i s so o f t e n described i n 
t h i s way; i t has p r a c t i c a l foundations, e s p e c i a l l y i n 
Japanese s o c i e t y w i t h i t s exclusive and competing 
groups. Managers believe t h a t maximum cooperative 
e f f o r t w i t h i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n cannot be achieved i f i t s 
members do not f e e l sure of each other and i f they 
cannot be mobilised i n p u r s u i t of a common, as opposed 
to an i n d i v i d u a l , goal.' (White and Trevor, 1983:106-
107). 
S i m i l a r l y , the Japanese o f t e n believe t h a t 
Westerners are unable t o work as p a r t of a team, they 
t h i n k of work as l i m i t e d t o t h e i r own assignment, and 
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they ignore problems t h a t occur outside t h e i r areas. 
'Americans don't have the same concept t h a t Japanese 
do.' said Takeshi Koshio, general manager of the 
t r a d i n g company Marubeni Corporation f o r 3 years (Los 
Angeles Times, July 11, 1988). 
The Japanese are extremely wary of labour disputes 
and multi-unionism: '...Multi-union representation, and 
a r e s u l t a n t d i f f i c u l t y i n f l e x i b i l i t y and labour 
u t i l i s a t i o n , problems of demarcation and the complexity 
of m u l t i - u n i o n bargaining are deeply worrying and seen 
by Japanese management as impediments t o productive 
performance improvement.' (Pang and O l i v e r , 1988:19). 
Further complaints include high absenteeism, 
reluctance t o confess and learn from mistakes, and too 
much s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . 
6.4 Western R e a c t i o n s t o J a p a n e s e Management i n 
S u b s i d i a r i e s 
Matsuura's 1984 survey of 100 sample employees 
from s u b s i d i a r i e s i n the U.S., i n c l u d i n g those from 
manufacturing, high tech i n d u s t r y , banks and t r a d i n g 
companies asked 'Everything considered are you happy 
w i t h your c u r r e n t j o b (percentage)?' The responses 
were: Very happy — 32.4X; more or less happy — 61.8X; 
ne u t r a l — 5.9X; very unhappy — 0; and not happy — 0. 
I t appears t h a t most employees are happy w i t h the 
employment. A more i n d i v i d u a l response i s provided by 
2 employees a t the Nissan f a c t o r y i n Washington: 'Over 
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lunch Mike [Nelson] and Mick [ F a l w e l l ] t o l d me how much 
they had enjoyed working a t Nissan — not so much 
because the jobs were more i n t e r e s t i n g than t h e i r 
previous ones (Mike had been a charge-hand i n a 
f u r n i t u r e f a c t o r y , Mick had worked on a toy production 
l i n e ) but because they l i k e d the atmosphere, the sense 
of t e a m - s p i r i t , and the extent t o which they were 
respected by t h e i r s u p e r i o r s , and because the pay i s n ' t 
bad — i t averages about £8,000 per annum f o r 
production l i n e s t a f f . ' (Wood, 1987:151). 
The Japanese emphasis on consideration of 
employees i s also impressive t o l o c a l s t a f f . 
I n t e r v i e w s of C i t y workers by White and Trevor (1983) 
found t h a t l o c a l s were pleased w i t h t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
w i t h t h e i r employers: Q: 'Does the f i r m have good 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h i t s employees?' The percentage 
answering yes were: Bank A — 100X, Bank B — 85X, and 
Trading Company — 83* (p.120). 
S t i l l , a l l i s not p e r f e c t i n the s u b s i d i a r i e s . 
Like the Japanese, the Western workers too have t h e i r 
complaints. Theirs focus on the dual personnel system 
and t h e i r lack of i n c l u s i o n i n the running of the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
Sethi e t a l . (1984) argue t h a t one problem w i t h 
the a p p l i c a t i o n o f Japanese management a r i s e s from the 
i n s u l a r i t y of the Japanese e x p a t r i a t e managers; they 
exclude o u t s i d e r s and those whose views d i f f e r from 
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t h e i r views w i t h i n t h e i r company or c u l t u r e . They 
remain u n f a m i l i a r w i t h the p r a c t i c e s and conditions i n 
the new t e r r i t o r y . They stay i n close contact w i t h the 
home o f f i c e and consult them f o r even t r i v i a l 
d e c i s i o n s , thereby t o t a l l y excluding the l o c a l s from 
the decision-making processs. Confounding t h i s i s the 
Japanese preconception t h a t Westerners are motivated 
e x c l u s i v e l y by monetary i n c e n t i v e so they give high 
t i t l e s and l o t s of money, 'but what they miss i s t h a t 
Americans [Westerners] are also motivated by 
i n c l u s i o n , ' argues C l i f f o r d Clarke, president and chief 
executive of I R I I n t e r n a t i o n a l , a c r o s s - c u l t u r a l 
management cons u l t a n t f i r m (Los Angeles Times, July 10, 
1988). Increasing the problem s t i l l f u r t h e r i s the 
f a c t , as has been mentioned above, t h a t e x p a t r i a t e s 
g e n e r a l l y only stay i n the overseas company f o r a short 
time (3-5 years) and w i t h t h e i r long term careers seen 
as being i n Japan, they are more concerned w i t h t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h the parent company than w i t h t h e i r 
s u b s i d i a r i e s . While i n the overseas f i r m they o f t e n 
cut themselves o f f completely from l o c a l s and make 
f r i e n d s only w i t h t h e i r colleagues. The l o c a l s often 
f e e l snubbed when they are not included i n the a f t e r 
hours s o c i a l i z i n g which i s so important i n e s t a b l i s h i n g 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s and i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the Japanese 
system. Those e x p a t r i a t e s t h a t do pick up the local 
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c u l t u r e are o s t r a c i s e d and c a l l e d d e r i s i v e l y an L.A. 
boke or a New York boke (Z)o/ce=fool). 
This i n s u l a r i t y , along w i t h the Japanese 
conceptions of Western workers as incompetents, has led 
t o an even more widely held complaint: lack of 
o p p o r t u n i t y f o r promotion. The Japanese have argued 
t h a t top management p o s i t i o n s should be f i l l e d by 
Japanese. 
The argument t h a t ' i t i s r e l a t i v e l y d i f f i c u l t t o 
promote indigenous people i n production-centre 
s u b s i d i a r i e s because new c o n f i d e n t i a l techniques are 
being t r a n s f e r r e d a l l the time' (Kono, 1984:180) may be 
reasonable i n some cases but obviously not f o r a l l 
p o s i t i o n s i n a l l s u b s i d i a r i e s . They also maintain t h a t 
'close i n t e r p e r s o n a l and c u l t u r a l t i e s on top 
management l e v e l s are e s s e n t i a l i n Japanese f i r m s . ' 
(Matsuura, 1984). Probably the reason which i s most 
d i f f i c u l t t o accept f o r excluding Westerners from the 
top i s t h a t of racism. Many employers have argued t h a t 
the Japanese are biased against f o r e i g n e r s , i . e . non-
Japanese. T. Kono (1984) argues t h a t the key t o 
s u b s i d i a r y success, apart from the technological 
s t r e n g t h of the parent company, i s the ' t r a n s f e r of 
Japanese management s t y l e t o the subsidiary by way of 
the Japanese managers sta t i o n e d a t the s u b s i d i a r y . The 
author found t h a t when the management of the subsidiary 
i s delegated t o the l o c a l managers of the host country 
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from the beginning ( not i n l a t e r years), the operation 
f a i l s . . . I t i s necessary t o t r a n s p l a n t the philosophy of 
management and t o p r a c t i s e the s t y l e of Japanese 
management; a mixture of hard d i s c i p l i n e and warm 
treatment.' (Kono, 1984:56). He goes on t o add smugly 
t h a t 'When there are d i f f e r e n c e s i n management s k i l l s 
between two companies or between two c o u n t r i e s , the 
senior company or managers from the country w i t h 
superior management s k i l l should have greater 
c o n t r o l . ' ( p . 1 6 3 ) . 
Whatever the reasons, the r e s u l t s are the same: 
the Japanese managers monopolize the key p o s i t i o n s and 
the companies do not promote l o c a l people. For 
example, a t M i t s u b i s h i I n t e r n a t i o n a l Corporation, 
'Americans head j u s t two of the f i r m ' s 41 d i v i s i o n s , 
and one i s a general counsel, a s t a f f p o s i t i o n 
t y p i c a l l y reserved f o r a l o c a l i n a m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . The corporate secretary i s an American, 
but American employees say i t i s u n r e a l i s t i c t o aspire 
t o a vic e presidency or beyond. Even the Americans on 
MIC's board have second class s t a t u s : They don't get t o 
vote.' (Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1988). 
T. Kono again o f f e r s h i s i n s i g h t i n t o when and why 
th e r e are Japanese or l o c a l s i n the management 
p o s i t i o n s : 
' 1 . The president, the p l a n t manager and managers of 
a l l departments are Japanese. This type i s used by 
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newly e s t a b l i s h e d companies or by production 
e f f i c i e n c y - o r i e n t e d companies. 
2. The p l a n t manager and the managers of the finance 
department and technology department are Japanese. 
There i s a large Japanese tec h n o l o g i c a l s t a f f i n the 
technology department. This type i s seen i n 
technology-intensive product companies. 
3. The p l a n t manger and the finance department manager 
are Japanese, and other Japanese have p o s i t i o n s as 
a s s i s t a n t s t o heads of departments. This type i s found 
i n long e s t a b l i s h e d s u b s i d i a r i e s . ' (p.165). 
The Japanese w i l l have t o take n o t i c e of 
Westerners' d e s i r e f o r advancement. I n many cases, 
Japanese s u b s i d i a r i e s lose the best q u a l i f i e d of the 
Western workers who move on t o the top i n another 
company while r e t a i n i n g the less q u a l i f i e d and 
ambitious. Yet, though no Westerner should ever expect 
t o take c o n t r o l of a Tokyo-based company, some changes 
at l e a s t appear t o be t a k i n g place. For example, 
Bridgestone USA, a Japanese owned t y r e maker, named an 
American president i n 1988. 
S i m i l a r t o the f i r s t two complaints and touched on 
i n an e a r l i e r s e c t i o n , the b e n e f i t s o f f e r e d t o the 
e x p a t r i a t e s are greater than those o f f e r e d t o the 
l o c a l s . Lawsuits have been brought on these charges i n 
America. Following from t h i s i s the extreme dismay the 
l o c a l s f e e l when what they believe has been o f f e r e d t o 
them, i . e . l i f e t i m e employment, t u r n s out not t o be; 
l a w s u i t s have again r e s u l t e d . One such s u i t was f i l e d 
against the Kyocera I n t e r n a t i o n a l chip c a p a c i t a t o r 
p l a n t i n San Diego, C a l i f o r n i a . The 131 workers 
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i n v o l v e d i n the s u i t claim t h a t they were t o l d t h a t i n 
r e t u r n f o r s a c r i f i c i n g f o r the f i r m by accepting any 
j o b , no matter how menial, they would be given l i f e t i m e 
employment. 18 months l a t e r , however, the pl a n t shut 
down w i t h o u t n o t i c e . They claim t h a t the p l a n t 
reopened the f o l l o w i n g day s t a f f e d w i t h new, lower paid 
employees. O f f i c i a l s deny the a l l e g a t i o n s . (Los 
Angeles Times, July 11, 1988). 
Other complaints include the absence of d i r e c t 
feedback and regular performance evaluations. Many 
Westerners cl a i m t h a t they're never sure where they 
stand. Others, p a r t i c u l a r l y white c o l l a r workers, 
complain about mountains of paperwork and a t t e n t i o n t o 
what they consider t r i v i a l d e t a i l s . 
6.5 F u r t h e r problems 
T. Kiuchi (1,985) argues t h a t 'Japanese 
co r p o r a t i o n s have a major problem i n e f f i c i e n t l y 
employing f o r e i g n e r s i n t h a t i t i s very d i f f i c u l t t o 
i n t e g r a t e them i n t o the t r a d i t i o n a l management 
s t r u c t u r e . ' (p.128). There are i n f a c t many c u l t u r a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s which have caused f u r t h e r c o n f l i c t and 
problems i n the Japanese owned s u b s i d i a r i e s . These 
problems stem not necessarily from the Westerners' 
i n a b i l i t y t o perform under the Japanese managerial 
system, but from the problems the e x p a t r i a t e s and the 
l o c a l s have i n dealing w i t h each other, o f t e n neither 
understands or accepts the other's c u l t u r e . 
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The f i r s t problem arises out of the language 
b a r r i e r . Few Japanese speak English and even fewer 
B r i t o n s or Americans speak Japanese. Most faxes and 
t e l e x e s are received i n Japanese and meetings too are 
o f t e n held i n Japanese leading t o the f u r t h e r exclusion 
o f l o c a l s from the decision-making process and from 
involvement i n the goings on i n the f i r m i n general. 
White and Trevor (1983) argue t h a t 'the c o n f l i c t of 
i n t e r e s t i n v o l v i n g the exclusion of l o c a l s t a f f from 
more than l i m i t e d decision making and substantive 
a u t h o r i t y , i s the more i n t r a c t a b l e problem and ...as 
long as t h i s remains the case, communication w i l l be 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . This s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s the 
fundamental explanation f o r Japanese management's 
" d e v i a t i o n " from i t s home p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s . ' 
(p.179). The language b a r r i e r f u r t h e r separates the 
l o c a l s and e x p a t r i a t e s and hampers communication and 
understanding. 
Further problems a r i s e from d i f f e r i n g ideas of 
leadership s t y l e . Westerners expect the top leadership 
t o make a l l decisions, e s p e c i a l l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l ones. 
The Japanese, on the other hand, are used t o shared 
values and goals across the orga n i z a t i o n so t h a t the 
manager doesn't have t o be involved i n i n t e r - d i v i s i o n a l 
d i s p u t e s , e t c . and i s able t o leave i t t o the middle 
management. 'American subordinates t e s t t h e i r c h i e f 
executive's a b i l i t y t o lead, t o d e c i s i v e l y resolve 
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problems, and t o seize o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Unfortunately, 
most Japanese c h i e f executives f a i l t h i s t e s t . ' 
(Tsurumi, 1978:57). For example, i f there i s a dispute 
between two American managers, the Japanese managers 
w i l l j u s t l i s t e n and assume t h e y ' l l work i t out 
themselves and don't attempt t o solve i t . The 
Americans then t h i n k the Japanese are in d e c i s i v e and 
incompetent and t r y t o b u i l d up the power of t h e i r 
department without a t the same time accepting greater 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r performance. This behaviour i s 
a t t r i b u t e d by Japanese managers, i n t u r n , t o the 
incompetence of American managers.' (Tsurumi, 1978:57). 
The c u l t u r e s also have d i f f e r e n t conceptions of 
work. Westerners separate work and l e i s u r e , while the 
Japanese combine the two and work i s seen as a l l 
important. The Japanese stay l a t e a t the o f f i c e and 
spend most weekends and evenings s o c i a l i z i n g w i t h 
business colleagues thereby engaging i n informal 
communication and e s t a b l i s h i n g important r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
The i n s u l a r Japanese generally exclude the Westerners 
from t h i s s o c i a l i z i n g which i s damaging t o the 
Westerners* career prospects. A senior manager at 
Tanaka s t a t e d 'The values of a manager depend on how 
many r e l a t i o n s h i p s he has b u i l t up during h i s years i n 
the company.' — i t i s d i f f i c u l t f o r Westerners t o 
b u i l d up these r e l a t i o n s h i p s as they are excluded from 
the o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o do so. Further, Westerners 
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believe i n r e t u r n i n g home t o t h e i r f a m i l i e s a f t e r work 
and ' f o r l o c a l s t a f f , overtime can be a way of 
increasing earnings, w h i l e f o r Japanese i t can be used 
as a gauge of l o c a l employees' " l o y a l t y " t o the f i r m or 
seriousness about the j o b . ' (White and Trevor, 
1983:118). This d i f f e r e n c e i n understanding again 
leads t o misconceptions by the two groups. 
There are also d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g from a 
c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s : the Japanese are c u l t u r a l l y 
c o l l e c t i v i s t i c w h i l e Westerners are i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c . A 
department manager at Tanaka said of the Japanese: 
'The l i f e t i m e philosophy continues even w i t h the 
young. Therefore each i n d i v i d u a l belongs t o 
someone or something, such as parents, f a m i l y , 
place, p r e f e c t u r e or o r g a n i z a t i o n . We tend t o 
s t i c k t o r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h the f a m i l y , o l d school 
f r i e n d s , teachers e t c . We can't be i n d i v i d u a l s 
l i k e you. These are not cool f r i e n d s h i p s . We 
t r u s t and r e l y on each other. I t h i n k of my 
community or f a m i l y , parents, company or group, 
before speaking t o o u t s i d e r s and I w i l l stop 
speaking out i f i t may harm my group, even i f I 
know i t i s t r u e . ' (Trevor, 1983:174). 
As touched on i n the previous s e c t i o n . White and Trevor 
(1983) found t h a t communication was b e t t e r w i t h blue 
c o l l a r workers r a t h e r than white c o l l a r workers and 
Western managers r e s u l t i n g from a d i f f e r e n c e i n 
i n t e r e s t s : 'the i n d i v i d u a l i s m and careerism o f B r i t i s h 
managers and white c o l l a r employees lead t o a 
divergence of outlook and considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s i n 
communication. The j o b m o b i l i t y of w h i t e - c o l l a r and 
managerial s t a f f makes i t d i f f i c u l t f o r Japanese 
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management t o c o n t r o l them as i t would be able t o i n 
Japan; consequently i t has no precedent i n the home 
so c i e t y t h a t would help i t t o f i n d more e f f e c t i v e means 
of communication.' (p.179). 
S i m i l a r l y , the Japanese believe i n informal 
o r g a n i z a t i o n i n which 'interdepartmental c o n s u l t a t i o n 
and n e g o t i a t i o n i s understood t o be everyone's 
concern.' (Tsurumi, 1978:109). The Westerners, on the 
other hand, b e l i e v e i n a formal o r g a n i z a t i o n i n which 
'the o r g a n i z a t i o n c h a r t o u t l i n e s the boundary of each 
manager's a u t h o r i t y and i d e n t i f i e s who should resolve 
interdepartmental disputes a t each echelon of the 
hi e r a r c h y . ' (Tsurumi, 1978:110). 
The Japanese, used t o a male, homogenous 
workforce, are o f t e n accused of racism and sexism. The 
Japanese b e l i e v e t h e i r homogeneity i s a primary f a c t o r 
i n t h e i r economic success and the d i v e r s i t y of the 
Western workers i s seen as a hindrance. I n the US, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has 
i n v e s t i g a t e d many claims on these matters. I n March 
1988, the Honda p l a n t i n M a r y s v i l l e , Ohio was found t o 
be d i s c r i m i n a t o r y and agreed t o pay $6 m i l l i o n t o 377 
female and black employees as a r e s u l t of past 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n h i r i n g and promotion (Los Angeles 
Times, July 11, 1988). I n 1987, Sumitomo Corp. of 
America agreed t o pay $2.6 m i l l i o n and i n s t i t u t e broad 
employment reforms i n s e t t l i n g a f e d e r a l l a w s u i t t h a t 
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accused them of favo u r i n g American males and any 
Japanese over females. I t took 12 years t o resolve and 
generated a Supreme Court r u l i n g t h a t c i v i l r i g h t s laws 
apply t o US s u b s i d i a r i e s of f o r e i g n companies (Los 
Angeles Times, July 11, 1988). 
The Japanese also avoid c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n order t o 
maintain wa so i n many cases c o n f l i c t s remain 
unresolved. 
Nearly a l l the problems here are based on lack of 
communication, t r u s t , and understanding. Both cu l t u r e s 
have preconceived ideas on the way thi n g s should be 
done and n e i t h e r attempts t o understand the others or 
e x p l a i n t h e i r own. Again, these problems are more 
those of white c o l l a r workers and managers whose 
contac t w i t h Japanese e x p a t r i a t e s and desire f o r 
i n c l u s i o n i s gre a t e s t . 
For smooth and e f f e c t i v e running of t h e i r 
s u b s i d i a r i e s , Japanese e x p a t r i a t e s w i l l have t o take 
some steps t o a l l e v i a t e these problems. Tsurumi (1978) 
has suggested greater c o n s u l t a t i o n of Westerners and 
more Japanese i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h Westerners ( a t Sony, f o r 
example, Japanese e x p a t r i a t e s are discouraged from 
l i v i n g close together t o avoid the emergence of a 
'Japanese ghe t t o ' ) as t h i s would h o p e f u l l y lead t o 
greater understanding and t r u s t . M i t s u b i s h i i s 
a c t u a l l y t a k i n g some steps towards greater 
understanding. A handful o f Americans are spending 
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two-year s t i n t s i n Japan, working side-by-side w i t h key 
contacts i n the company. For a decade, too, the f i r m 
has held weeklong r e t r e a t s a t a New York r e s o r t where 
Americans and Japanese work together on simulated 
business p r o j e c t s i n an e f f o r t t o f o s t e r closer 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s (Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1988). 
S t i l l , there i s a high turnover due mainly t o lack of 
o p p o r t u n i t y f o r promotion and i n c l u s i o n i n decision-
making so perhaps these are where the real changes w i l l 
have t o take place. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The number of Japanese s u b s i d i a r i e s i n B r i t a i n and 
the US continues t o grow. Some obvious advantages f o r 
the Japanese, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r manufacturers, include 
e a s i e r access t o raw m a t e r i a l s , close pr o x i m i t y t o a 
la r g e r e t a i l market, support from l o c a l and s t a t e 
governments and few environmental problems and 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . Most s u b s i d i a r i e s so f a r have generally 
been successful and surveys show t h a t Western employees 
f o r the moment are r e l a t i v e l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e i r 
employment c o n d i t i o n s (Matsuura, 1984). S t i l l , some 
serious problems loom t h r e a t e n i n g l y : the West f o r 
example simply won't accept s e n i o r i t y based payment 
systems, and beyond the Japanese managerial system loom 
even l a r g e r problems of c u l t u r a l misunderstanding. 
At f i r s t glance, i t appears t h a t the best way t o 
determine whether or not Japanese management techniques 
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can be t r a n s f e r r e d t o the West i s t o look a t what has 
taken place i n the Japanese s u b s i d i a r i e s i n Western 
companies. The problem w i t h t h i s method, however, i s 
t h a t i t i s not possible t o determine whether i t i s the 
techniques themselves or the influence of the Japanese 
e x p a t r i a t e s which has determined the success or f a i l u r e 
of these s u b s i d i a r i e s , i . e . there are outside f a c t o r s 
which confuse the r e s u l t s . The question, then, i s 
whether the managerial system could be t r a n s f e r r e d t o 
the West or a t l e a s t adapted t o f i t Western systems by 
Western managers. Without the i n t e r f e r e n c e of Japanese 
e x p a t r i a t e s and t h e i r c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s could the 
Westerners improve t h e i r own managerial systems through 
copying Japanese techniques? This w i l l be the subject 
of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE TRANSFERABILITY OF THE JAPANESE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
7.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n . 
The Japanese continue t o grow and prosper 
economically w h i l e many Western c o u n t r i e s d e c l i n e : many 
would argue, then, t h a t the West can and should adopt 
the Japanese system and then they too w i l l succeed. 
S t i l l others argue, however, t h a t the techniques and 
pr a c t i c e s c e n t r a l t o the Japanese success are 
i n t r i n s i c a l l y c u l t u r a l l y bound and any attempt t o 
implement them i n the West would be met by employee 
resentment and u l t i m a t e f a i l u r e . 
For the past decade or so these have been the two 
dominant p o s i t i o n s held on the matter of Japanese 
t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y : culture-boundness versus easy 
adoption. An understanding of the issues i s useful and 
necessary f o r developing a stance on t h i s debated but 
important s u b j e c t . 
F i r s t l y , one subject t h a t needs t o be taken i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n when asking whether the Japanese system 
can be transported t o the West i s whether the system i s 
a c t u a l l y acceptable or w i l l remain i n t a c t i n Japan 
i t s e l f or i f there w i l l be changes. I f there are 
impending changes then perhaps t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y i s not 
des i r a b l e anyway or a t l e a s t not i n f u l l . This chapter 
w i l l seek t o examine what changes may take place and 
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the s i g n i f i c a n c e they w i l l have on the managerial 
system i n Japan. 
7.2 Changes i n Japan. 
As has been shown, since the end of World War I I a 
c e r t a i n economic system has developed i n Japan, the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of which are considered c e n t r a l t o the 
success of Japan's economy even though those 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are found only i n about one t h i r d of 
the businesses i n Japan, t y p i c a l l y the large, e l i t e 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and i n varying degrees even i n these. 
S t i l l , i t i s these t h a t have been deemed the p o t e n t i a l 
saviours f o r Western i n d u s t r y . 
But are these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s t a b l e even i n the 
few businesses i n which they e x i s t ? Sethi e t a l . 
(1984) have o f f e r e d what they argue are the main 
f a c t o r s accounting f o r change i n Japan: f i r s t , 'the 
slow-down i n Japan's economic growth and the r e s u l t i n g 
c o n s t r a i n t on corporate expansion, which has exposed 
corporate i n e f f i c i e n c i e s i n terms of an excessive 
labour f o r c e , a cumbersome decision-making process, and 
lack of innovativeness i n generating new products and 
ideas.'; second, 'Japan can no longer compete on the 
basis of production e f f i c i e n c i e s alone; i t i s f a c i n g 
severe competition from other low-cost producers l i k e 
South Korea and Taiwan. I t must t h e r e f o r e compete i n 
the area of high technology, which i s associated w i t h a 
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high degree of r i s k and u n c e r t a i n t y , c o n d i t i o n s f o r 
which JABMAS i s i U s u i ted i n i t s t r a d i t i o n a l form.'; 
and t h i r d , 'the Japanese people are themselves 
changing, and new generations are less apt t o respond 
t o t r a d i t i o n a l i n c e n t i v e s and t o conform r i g i d l y t o 
t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l norms.' (p.231). How i s Japan 
developing now a f t e r years of success? What changes 
can be found? What w i l l r e s u l t from the changes? 
As mentioned p r e v i o u s l y , the population i n Japan 
i s ageing r a p i d l y . This i s a s i g n i f i c a n t problem i n 
Japan f o r two c e n t r a l reasons. F i r s t of a l l , while the 
young are p o s i t i v e savers the e l d e r l y are negative 
ones; i f there i s a higher r a t i o of young t o ol d the 
country has a much greater a b i l i t y t o save. This i s 
important because 'the amount of money saved by a 
n a t i o n determines the amount a v a i l a b l e f o r investment 
purposes i n housing and p u b l i c c o n s t r u c t i o n , but 
e s p e c i a l l y f o r p l a n t and equipment expansion and 
modernization.' (Pegels, 1984:183). Japan's saving 
r a t e has been one of the highest i n the world which has 
r e s u l t e d i n extensive investments i n modern production 
technology. As Japan's population ages, however, there 
w i l l be a convergence w i t h other developed countries 
and less modernization i n Japan. The Japanese can 
reassure themselves w i t h the f a c t t h a t most other 
competing c o u n t r i e s w i l l have an increasing e l d e r l y 
f r a c t i o n but f o r a l l , i n c l u d i n g the Japanese, 'the 
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r e s u l t s w i l l be slower rates of growth i n average net 
disposable incomes as more and more of n a t i o n a l income 
w i l l be devoted t o medical care and retirement income 
f o r the e l d e r l y . ' (Pegels, 1984:184). 
A second problem emerges i n terms of basic 
p r a c t i c e s c e n t r a l t o the Japanese managerial system as 
a whole: l i f e t i m e employment and seniority-based 
payment systems. As the population ages the company 
hierarchy becomes bloated i n the middle as there's no 
place f o r the younger employees t o go. One option i s 
e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t . This was v o l u n t a r i l y accepted during 
bad times i n the past, as i t was seen as necessary and 
only temporary, but now i t i s d i s r u p t i n g the employer-
worker r e l a t i o n s h i p s so pri z e d i n Japan as the 
retirements become more coerced and the option of i n t e r 
and intra-company t r a n s f e r s becomes impossible. To 
keep l i f e t i m e employment i n t a c t some companies promote 
ageing employees t o 'undefined p o s i t i o n s and newly 
es t a b l i s h e d ranks.' (Sethi e t a l . , 1984:235). The 
incapable managers are given s i d e l i n e p o s i t i o n s without 
s p e c i f i c j o b r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . They are c a l l e d 
madoqiwa-2oku. meaning 'those who s i t along windows.' 
They are ge n e r a l l y 40-50 years o l d and haven't and 
never w i l l make i t t o top management p o s i t i o n s . This 
s i d e l i n i n g maintains l i f e t i m e employment and allows the 
more q u a l i f i e d i n d i v i d u a l s t o get t o the top, but i t 
also causes f r i c t i o n i n the Japanese system: 
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competition breaks out between those w i t h i n the same 
age group which weakens the bonds of primary groups and 
s t r a i n s working r e l a t i o n s h i p s between primary and 
secondary groups. Favouritism becomes an issue as 
w e l l : because Japanese are group o r i e n t e d workers i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o o b j e c t i v e l y know who i s doing what. 
The r e s u l t , then, i s t h a t more and more large 
companies are d r i f t i n g from seniority-based promotions 
and wages t o ones r e l a t i n g d i r e c t l y t o i n d i v i d u a l 
performance (Sethi e t a l , 1984; Sakaiya, 1986). 
The ageing population i s not the only t h r e a t t o 
these two c e n t r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Japanese system; 
new c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l trends are also playing 
t h e i r p a r t s . I n the 1970's there was a t r e n d of 
formalism and bureaucratic c o n t r o l of s o c i e t y (Sakaiya, 
1986). I t was an era of rapid growth and p r i c e and 
consumption s t a b i l i t y w i t h mass consumption being seen 
as a v i r t u e . The 1980's, however, was the era of the 
' c u l t u r e of ideas', a decade of 'short production runs 
of a wide v a r i e t y of products. The value of a product 
and the knowledge i t embodies i s no longer s t a b l e , and 
may even be ephemeral.' (Sakaiya, 1986:168). Companies 
make fashionable products leading t o r a p i d growth and 
they are answering the needs of a c u l t u r e . The 
possible r e s u l t ? : 'This emerging phase of Japanese 
c u l t u r e w i l l , I b e l i e v e , s i g n a l the end of the . 
p r e f e r e n t i a l treatment given s a l a r i e d workers. The era 
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of r a p i d economic growth was one o f b u r e a u c r a t i c - s t y l e 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a b i l i t y ; the new era w i l l be one of 
en t r e p r e n e u r i a l acumen.' (Sakaiya, 1986:168). 
Substance and r e s u l t s r ather than e f f o r t w i l l be what 
matters so s e n i o r i t y based promotion and l i f e t i m e 
employment cannot continue. 
S i m i l a r l y , as the 80s and 90s look t o be the era 
of knowledge i n t e n s i v e products, a g i a n t service sector 
and a f l o u r i s h i n g high technology i n f o r m a t i o n i n d u s t r y , 
more small companies are a r i s i n g . This has led t o a 
move t o more white c o l l a r workers than blue c o l l a r , and 
i n Japanese business today, there are two types of 
i n d u s t r i e s , c l e a r l y d i v i d e d : the t r a d i t i o n a l and the 
newer ones. The two have d i f f e r e n c e s i n management 
s t y l e and o p e r a t i n g environment: e.g. the t r a d i t i o n a l 
companies r e c r u i t only recent graduates from the top 
u n i v e r s i t i e s , w hile the newer i n d u s t r i e s , because of a 
labour shortage, h i r e those w i t h previous work 
experience. 'And while growth i s slug g i s h i n 
t r a d i t i o n a l businesses, i t i s not unusual t o hear of 
new-style companies doubling i n s i z e every year.' 
(Shimada, 1986:189). Another d i f f e r e n c e i s i n the use 
of women. As we've seen, i n t r a d i t i o n a l companies, 
women are seldom promoted and gienerally t r e a t e d as 
second class c i t i z e n s . At the newer companies, 
however, women can be found i n key planning and 
management posts. Also, the formal t r a i n i n g found i n 
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the t r a d i t i o n a l companies i s replaced i n the busy new 
s t y l e companies w i t h l e a r n i n g by doing. 'The 
d i f f e r e n c e s between the 2 s t y l e s of business represent 
more than a simple c o n t r a s t between i n d u s t r i a l 
c a t e g o r i e s . They i n f a c t mark what can be seen as a 
h i s t o r i c a l t u r n i n g p o i n t f o r the world of Japanese 
i n d u s t r y . ' (Shimada, 1986:190). A r e s u l t of t h i s new 
era, as one might imagine, i s greater j o b m o b i l i t y as 
these companies h i r e o u t s i d e , b e t t e r q u a l i f i e d 
employees. Talented engineers and middle management, 
o f t e n w i t h no place t o go i n the t r a d i t i o n a l companies, 
are f i n d i n g these new companies t o be the l u c r a t i v e 
answer. L i f e t i m e employment a t the t r a d i t i o n a l 
companies i s based on i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s b u i l t 
up by keeping o u t s i d e r s out and being very i n s u l a r . I n 
the present high tech environment, however, even 
t r a d i t i o n a l companies are f i n d i n g t h a t they are unable 
t o t r a i n and develop employees i n t h i s f i e l d and are 
needing t o c a l l i n outside experts. This o f t e n leads 
t o the l a y i n g o f f of more temporary employees and more 
e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t s i n order t o make room f o r these new 
a d d i t i o n s . This could prove t o have a very great 
impact on Japanese i n d u s t r y : much of i t s success has 
been based on employee l o y a l t y and d i l i g e n c e . As lay 
o f f s increase, employees w i l l l i k e l y f e e l betrayed 
w h i l e the ones who remain w i l l r e a l i z e t h a t i t ' s no 
longer ' t h e i r company' and they may be l a i d o f f when 
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necessary. This c e r t a i n l y w i l l adversely a f f e c t 
employee l o y a l t y and d e d i c a t i o n . 
Another important p r a c t i c e which d i s t i n g u i s h e s the 
Japanese system from those of the West, consensus 
decision-making, al s o looks set t o face some obstacles. 
The main v i r t u e of consensus decision-making i s t h a t i t 
involves everyone who w i l l be a f f e c t e d by the decision 
so t h a t implementation i s smooth and a l l f e e l included. 
But, new e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s are making t h i s more of a 
hindrance than a help. Sethi e t a l . (1984) argue t h a t 
t h e r e are 3 main drawbacks of the system: 
[ 1 . ] 'The r a p i d r a t e of technological growth and 
change introduces new r i s k s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s , 
c a l l i n g f o r d i f f e r e n t types of inputs i n t o the 
decision-making process, ones t h a t do not f i t the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . I n f a c t , the most 
important s k i l l s necessary t o evaluate r i s k s may 
not even be a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n the organization. 
[ 2 . ] 'The nature of markets, competition, and lead 
times f o r making decisions i s becoming 
i n c r e a s i n g l y s h o r t e r , r e q u i r i n g f a s t r e a c t i o n 
t i mes. 
[ 3 . ] 'The need t o p r o t e c t a l l those involved 
creates a bias toward r i s k avoidance.' (p.236). 
Companies w i t h great exposure t o high technology, 
l i k e Sony, are breaking away and modifying t h e i r 
decision-making procedures and the trend i s 
a c c e l e r a t i n g (Moroi, 1986; Sethi e t a l . , 1984). Some 
companies are s i d e l i n i n g more managers so have less 
people t o c o n s u l t , w h i l e others get senior managers 
working more c l o s e l y w i t h low and middle management so 
t h a t they t h i n k l i k e the top. Obvious problems a r i s e 
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from these p r a c t i c e s : exclusion and 'a reduction i n the 
time span and more d i r e c t involvement by top management 
lead t o d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among the lower ranks, who 
consider t h e i r i n i t i a t i v e and expertise not adequately 
appreciated by the company. Thus the system acquires 
more and more of the Western-style top-down decision-
making, which the corporate c u l t u r e i s not equipped t o 
handle. The r e s u l t i s a l i e n a t i o n and erosion of 
employee l o y a l t y . ' (Sethi e t a l . , 1984:237). 
Company unions are also f a c i n g d i s r u p t i o n s . 
Company unions have been possible i n Japan because 
employers have always been able t o look a f t e r the 
i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r employees w i t h the a i d of the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of l i f e t i m e employment, consensus 
decision-making, and the sharing of company p r o f i t s . 
But problems have .arisen. 
When automation f i r s t came on the scene, i t was 
seen as p o s i t i v e as i t improved the wealth of the 
company which would i n t u r n increase the wealth of the 
employees. But now i t i s in c r e a s i n g l y being seen as a 
t h r e a t t o the s i z e of the workforce w i t h the r e s u l t 
being unemployment. Also, older workers' s k i l l s are 
becoming obsolete so t h a t they are o f t e n reassigned and 
must work under younger t e c h n i c a l l y s k i l l e d employees. 
This d i s r u p t s the seniority-based r e l a t i o n s h i p s c e n t r a l 
t o Japanese c u l t u r e . The young are also higher paid i f 
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t e c h n i c a l l y s k i l l e d , leading t o an increasing d i s p a r i t y 
i n wages. 
These changes are leading t o changes i n unions' 
ways of t h i n k i n g about management needs and p u t t i n g 
waves i n t o t h e i r formerly smooth s a i l i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
Concrete examples of t h i s change of thought are as 
f o l l o w s : 
'The General Council of Trade Unions of Japan has 
launched a campaign t o spread work by reducing the 
average working week from 5.5 days t o 5 days. 
Unions have won agreements aimed at p r o t e c t i n g the 
jobs of o l d e r workers. These include provisions 
f o r t r a i n i n g i n new s k i l l s , p r o t e c t i o n against j o b 
or wage downgrading, and sharing the p r o d u c t i v i t y 
b e n e f i t s of new technology. 
To save the jobs of older workers, unions are also 
demanding an increase i n the c u r r e n t mandatory 
retirement age of 55 years. They have already won 
t h i s concession from some major t r a d i n g houses, 
and from s t e e l and e l e c t r i c appliance makers. 
To help o f f s e t the e f f e c t of these measures on new 
r e c r u i t s , Japan's Council of Metalworkers' Union 
and other labour groups have begun a nationwide 
campaign t o persuade employees t o spread the work 
by t a k i n g a l l the paid vacation time they earn 
each year. 
E f f o r t s are also under way t o cut the growth of 
p a r t - t i m e j o b s . ' (Sethi a t a l . , 1984:238). 
I f they don't succeed the unions w i l l become more 
m i l i t a n t ; 'to the extent t h a t they do succeed, they 
w i l l d i s s i p a t e some of the savings i n wage costs 
generated by the companies through automation. They 
w i l l also adversely a f f e c t Japan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c ompetitive p o s i t i o n and p o t e n t i a l l y h u rt i t s exports 
and domestic employment.' (Sethi e t a l , 1984:239). 
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As seen i n chapter 3, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l changes 
are also t a k i n g place i n Japan as the young begin t o 
p r e f e r more f r e e time and as i n d i v i d u a l i s m grows. 
Touched on previously i n t h i s chapter i s the changing 
r o l e of women i n Japanese business. Though generally 
s t i l l d i s c r i m i n a t e d against, they are becoming more 
common i n the workforce. C o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r s include 
the spread of higher education f o r women, the 
increasing weight of the se r v i c e sector, and changing 
values. Women a t present are becoming more and more 
d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e i r places i n ind u s t r y so t h a t they 
may'press f o r f u r t h e r advances f o r themselves. And 
chapter 2 discussed how previous causes f o r Japan's 
success are changing. 
One f u r t h e r problem the Japanese may soon be 
f a c i n g i s the education o f the workforce. The problem 
i n Japan i s not one of a poorly educated workforce but 
of a too well educated one. Those e n t e r i n g the labour 
f o r c e have probably completed high school or both high 
school and u n i v e r s i t y ( n e a r l y a l l Japanese f i n i s h high 
school and nearly 60% go on t o u n i v e r s i t y (Pegels, 
1984)). The present workers i n general have only 
f i n i s h e d middle school a t 15 so t h a t the new entrants 
are b e t t e r educated but o f t e n lower paid because of the 
s e n i o r i t y system: sometimes only two f i f t h s of the 
ol d e r workers' pay. This new f o r c e , then, i s against 
any suggestion of r a i s i n g the retir e m e n t age t o allow 
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the aging workforce a source of f i n a n c i a l s e c u r i t y , 
instead they hope t o lower i t t o allow room f o r t h e i r 
own promotions. Another problem r e s u l t i n g from the 
high l e v e l of education i s t h a t now there are nearly no 
students who f i n i s h a t middle school — these were the 
people t r a d i t i o n a l l y employed i n blue c o l l a r jobs 
because of t h e i r low educational attainment. But now 
ther e are r e l a t i v e l y few i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l i n g t o do 
these jobs. This has been accounted f o r so f a r through 
the use of automation and r o b o t i z a t i o n and the increase 
i n white c o l l a r workers i n the ser v i c e i n d u s t r i e s . 
F i n a l l y , the m a j o r i t y of males e n t e r i n g the workforce 
now have a u n i v e r s i t y degree. This t r a d i t i o n a l l y means 
a managerial p o s i t i o n but soon there may not be enough 
of these p o s i t i o n s t o go around and ev e n t u a l l y many 
w i l l have t o be s a t i s f i e d w i t h those jobs previously 
held by high school graduates. (Pegels, 1984). 
Ken Moroi (1986) summarizes what a r e / w i l l be the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the new Japanese management s t y l e : 
C o n v e n t i o n a l and New J a p a n e s e Management S t v l e s 
C o n v e n t i o n a l S t v l e New S t v l e 
Strategy Operations O r i e n t a t i o n Strategy 
O r i e n t a t i o n 
I n t e r n a l accumulation Use of external 
resources 
P u r s u i t of main business D i v e r s i f i c a t i o n 
A p p l i c a t i o n s research Basic research 
P r i o r i t y on e f f i c i e n c y P r i o r i t y on 
innovation 
Organization Pyramidal hierarchy Horizontal 
network 
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C e n t r a l i z a t i o n 
Large headquarters 
Stable bureaucratic 
s t r u c t u r e 
Behaviour Incremental 
Mode 
Dece n t r a l i z a t i o n 
Smal 1 
headquarters 
mobi1e 
innovative 
s t r u c t u r e 
Bottom-up decision making Top-down 
decision 
making 
Powerful 
Research and 
Development 
d i v i s i o n s 
L i f e t i m e 
employment 
Meritocracy 
Modified Total 
Q u a l i t y 
Control 
Redefined 
Enterprise 
union 
In-house 
t r a i n i n g 
Generous 
welfare 
spending 
Heterogeneous 
workforce * 
Tolerance of 
Ind i v i d u a l i s m * 
Loyalty t o 
company * 
Respect f o r 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y * 
Innovative 
leaders 
Entrepreneurial 
Powerful production 
d i v i s i o n s 
Systems L i f e t i m e employment 
and Customs 
S e n i o r i t y system 
Total q u a l i t y c o n t r o l 
E n t e r p r i s e union 
In-house t r a i n i n g 
Generous welfare spending 
Human Homogeneous work forc e 
Resources 
Groupism 
Loya l t y t o company 
E g a l i t a r i a n i s m 
Evangelical leaders 
* Expected: more women managers, a higher degree of job 
m o b i l i t y , and more h i r i n g of non-Japanese employees, 
(p.187). 
The question, then, would be whether the West 
should adopt the successful p r a c t i c e s of the Japanese 
i f these p r a c t i c e s are having t o be modified i n Japan 
i t s e l f . Should the new or t r a d i t i o n a l methods be 
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adopted? Are some p r a c t i c e s more e a s i l y t r a n s f e r a b l e 
than others? Does t a k i n g one p r a c t i c e without the 
others break up the interdependency and d i s r u p t the 
whole system? A l l these questions must be addressed. 
7.3 O p i n i o n s on T r a n s f e r a b i l i t y 
Scholars and p r o f e s s i o n a l s have looked at and 
expressed t h e i r opinions on the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
t r a n s f e r r i n g Japanese s t y l e management t o the West. 
Their research w i l l be looked at here. 
As sta t e d e a r l i e r , the primary argument against 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of t r a n s f e r r i n g Japanese management t o 
the West i s centred around the idea of c u l t u r e -
boundness. These opponents maintain t h a t the Japanese 
system i s only possible i n Japan because of the unique 
c u l t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Japanese people which 
have been embedded i n the p r a c t i c e s of the system. 
One such c u l t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c w i t h deep 
h i s t o r i c a l roots which i s inherent i n the maintenance 
of the Japanese management system i s c o l l e c t i v i s m : 
'Many of the unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of JABMAS stem 
from, and receive s o c i e t a l support from, t h i s 
c o l l e c t i v i s t i c o r i e n t a t i o n . ' (Sethi e t a l , 1984:243). 
Because Westerners are s t r i c t l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , i t i s 
believed, they w i l l not accept the groupism inherent i n 
the system, the paternal approach i s seen as 'an 
encroachment on t h e i r privacy and a denial of t h e i r 
i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . ' (Sethi e t a l , 1984:244). 
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This c o l l e c t i v e n e s s vs i n d i v i d u a l i s m stance i s the 
most common argument against the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y based on the culture-bound theory. 
Others, p r i m a r i l y Japanese authors, put forward the 
argument t h a t Japanese success has arisen from the 
f r u g a l i t y and strong work e t h i c of the Japanese t h a t i s 
not found i n and cannot be i n s t a l l e d i n t o the Western 
psyche. Kunio (1986) i s one such author. His view i s 
as f o l l o w s : f i r s t , the Japanese work more hours, take 
fewer holidays, and are more concerned w i t h t h e i r work. 
Second, i n 1960 the Japanese saved 18X of t h e i r 
household income even though per c a p i t a income was low; 
t h i s f i g u r e i s much higher than t h a t i n the West 
i n d i c a t i n g t o Kunio the f r u g a l i t y of the Japanese. And 
t h i r d , the Japanese have a high degree of ascetism. 
Other c u l t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s such as l o y a l t y , 
homogeneity, respect f o r s e n i o r i t y and hierarchy and 
emphasis on maintaining wa (harmony) are also said t o 
be c e n t r a l t o the Japanese system but not found i n 
Western c u l t u r e s ; t h i s thereby renders the transference 
of the system impossible. 'Japanese f i r m s i n Japan 
operate w i t h a h i g h l y i n d u s t r i o u s and homogeneous work 
f o r c e , cooperative unions, c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s between 
business and government, e t c . While these f a c t o r s 
might y i e l d higher p r o d u c t i v i t y i n Japan, they are 
l a r g e l y t i e d t o the Japanese c u l t u r e and presumably not 
t r a n s f e r a b l e t o t h e i r operations abroad.' (Johnson, 
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1977:31). The culture-bound hypothesis i s q u i t e 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , simple, and held by a wide v a r i e t y of 
authors and business personnel. 
Some opponents s t r e s s t h a t the system i s not 
possible i n the West w i t h o u t the support of MITI (see 
chapter 2) and s t i l l others maintain t h a t t o adopt only 
p a r t s or b i t s of the Japanese system i s t o dismantle i t 
and render i t useless as a whole. 
The problems w i t h the hypothesis a r i s e when one 
considers the arguments of the proponents of 
t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y , Pegels (1984) argues p o i n t - b l a n k l y 
t h a t 'students of management p r a c t i c e s i n Japanese 
f i r m s have known f o r q u i t e some time t h a t the concept 
of Japanese management i s t r a n s f e r a b l e t o other 
c o u n t r i e s and c u l t u r e s and i s p r a c t i s e d i n e f f e c t by a 
number o f Western f i r m s . ' (p.137). S i m i l a r views are 
held by the authors of the popular books Theorv Z 
(Ouchi, 1981), I n Search of E x c e l l e n c e (Peters and 
Waterman, 1982) and The A r t of J a p a n e s e Management 
(Pascals and Athos, 1981), i . e . t h a t many American 
companies already p r a c t i s e Japanese techniques and many 
even have s i m i l a r corporate c u l t u r e s . Mercer, a former 
manager a t IBM, argues t h a t IBM operates under 
'the same management philosophies and techniques 
t h a t have made the Japanese so successful. A 
study of how IBM operates i t s philosophies w i l l , 
t h e r e f o r e , also d e r i v e the lessons t h a t so many 
have t r i e d t o deduce from the Japanese; and these 
lessons are " w r i t t e n " i n a c u l t u r a l context which 
i s more understandable (and i s not confused by 
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i r r e l e v a n t Zen a c c r e t i o n s ) . I n a d d i t i o n , i t s 
p r a c t i c e s as developed by Tom Watson J r . ( a f t e r 
the time t h a t MITI probably made the Japanese 
copy), go bevond the Japanese examples t o begin t o 
form the " c u l t u r e s " needed t o handle the c e l l u l a r 
organic o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e s i n c r e a s i n g l y 
demanded by the i n f o r m a t i o n r e v o l u t i o n . ' (p.236). 
Not a l l authors believe transference t o be t h a t 
simple or p o s s i b l e on such a great scale although they 
are not opponents of the p o s s i b i l i t y a l t o g e t h e r e i t h e r . 
These authors take a more piecemeal, 'adopt what w i l l 
work i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e or business' approach. 
'Generally speaking, most aspects of the Japanese 
personnel management system took shape a f t e r the war as 
a r e s u l t of r a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g r a t h e r than of the unique 
c u l t u r e of Japan, so t o a great extent they are 
t r a n s f e r a b l e t o other c o u n t r i e s . The systems of 
successful US companies and UK companies have many 
s i m i l a r i t i e s . Any system t h a t o r i g i n a t e s i n the core 
of the c u l t u r e , however, i s not t r a n s f e r a b l e . ' (Kono, 
1989:177). What Kono maintains i s not t r a n s f e r a b l e i s 
as f o l l o w s : 1. A strong i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the company 
as i s found i n Japan i s not possible i n i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c 
c o u n t r i e s . Thus, l i f e t i m e commitment and long overtime 
hours do not t r a n s f e r . 2. Ambiguous job t i t l e s are not 
t r a n s f e r a b l e and c l e a r l y s t a t e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are 
necessary — ' I t i s necessary t o o u t l i n e the a u t h o r i t y 
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y because the sense of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
i s not high and t h e r e are also d i f f e r e n c e s of 
c a p a b i l i t y between i n d i v i d u a l workers.' (p.177). 
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3. S e n i o r i t y based promotion i s not t r a n s f e r a b l e . On 
the other hand, Kono believes the f o l l o w i n g t o be 
t r a n s f e r a b l e : 
( i ) 'Systems t h a t are congruent w i t h the value of 
the s o c i e t y . One union i n one company i s 
advantageous both t o the workforce and t o the 
company ... Also, many o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r promotion 
and wage increase, s t a b i l i t y of employment, and 
other systems t h a t respect human r i g h t s are 
t r a n s f e r r e d . 
( i i ) Systems t h a t are r e l a t e d t o c o n f l i c t i n g 
values. The class system and e g a l i t a r i a n i s m are 
c o n f l i c t i n g values, and both are s t i l l i n 
existence. Equal treatment can be t r a n s f e r r e d and 
can be supported by a m a j o r i t y of the workforce. 
For example, no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between blue 
c o l l a r and white c o l l a r workers i n the wearing of 
uniforms. 
( i i i ) Unclear a s p i r a t i o n l e v e l s . A system of 
working i n one large room, or one w i t h a frequent 
change of j o b s , i s t r a n s f e r a b l e , because the 
a s p i r a t i o n l e v e l s on these matters are not 
cl e a r . ' ( p . 1 7 7 ) . 
White and Trevor (1983) believe i n the piecemeal 
approach t o a c e r t a i n extent as they maintain t h a t so 
much o f Japanese e x p e r t i s e 'consists i n q u i t e s p e c i f i c 
d e t a i l s r a t h e r than i n complex or abs t r a c t knowledge.' 
(p.134). However, they also believe t h a t 'the d e t a i l s 
of Japanese management are consis t e n t and mutually 
s u p p o r t i v e , l i k e the mesh of a net.'(p.134) — some 
w i l l lose e f f e c t i v e n e s s i f i s o l a t e d . They, t h e r e f o r e , 
propose t h a t the West 
'must analyse and evaluate t h e i r own systems as a 
whole, and then perhaps adapt d e t a i l s of the 
Japanese approach wherever these c o n t r i b u t e t o an 
o v e r a l l advantage. And they cannot expect t o 
achieve a s u b s t a n t i a l o v e r a l l advantage u n t i l they 
have made a wide range of innovations and 
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adaptations, probably over a period of several 
years. A f t e r a l l , i t required about twenty years 
of p e r s i s t e n t e f f o r t on the p a r t of Japanese f i r m s 
before t h e i r manufacturing advantage became 
apparent.' (p.134-5). 
They o f f e r f u r t h e r warnings f o r those wishing t o 
t r a n s f e r : 'In s h o r t , there seems t o be some deeply 
rooted aspects of B r i t i s h [ i . e . Western] management 
methods which are d i f f i c u l t e i t h e r t o "unlearn" or t o 
r e c o n c i l e w i t h Japanese-style systems.' (p.136); t h i s 
appears t o be an issue p a r t i c u l a r l y when discussing 
managers who don't, f o r example, believe i n involvement 
w i t h t h e i r workers but i n a s o r t of e l i t i s m . S t i l l , 
the authors s t r e s s t h a t there i s no c e r t a i n t y on t h i s 
s ubject and t h a t i t ' s only p o s t u l a t i o n and believe t h a t 
'Better understanding of d i f f e r e n c e s i n behaviour 
between Japanese and B r i t i s h managers could prove t o be 
the key t o e f f e c t i v e t r a n s f e r of Japanese production 
systems.' (p. 136).' 
S t i l l other authors maintain t h a t t h i s piecemeal 
approach i s n ' t enough. They maintain t h a t Japan 
adopted Chinese p r a c t i c e s i n the 7th and 11th centuries 
and Western p r a c t i c e s i n the 19th and 20th c e n t u r i e s by 
studying the e n t i r e c u l t u r e , not the s p e c i f i c p a r t s . 
They believe the West should do the same rather than 
looking only a t s p e c i f i c management techniques 
(Yamazaki, 1985). Yamazaki postulates t h a t Japan was 
able t o e a s i l y adopt f o r e i g n c u l t u r e and p r a c t i c e s i n 
t h e i r pre-modern mode because they were i s o l a t e d enough 
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not t o worry about invasions so were secure enough t o 
accept f o r e i g n ideas; they were also not strong enough 
t o conquer others and f o r c e t h e i r ideology on these 
peoples so d i d n ' t need t o s o l i d i f y t h e i r own c u l t u r e or 
ideology. A l l c o u n t r i e s today are i n a s i m i l a r s t a t e 
so t h a t they can accept f o r e i g n t a s t e s w i t h o u t anxiety 
and dispense w i t h a homogeneous c u l t u r e : 'Any country 
can now accept some of the Japanese lessons i f i t 
wishes t o do so.' (Yamazaki, 1985:39). The p o i n t , 
though, i s t h a t the c u l t u r e i t s e l f can and must be 
changed: 'To change i n s t i t u t i o n s or p r a c t i c e s , i t i s 
necessary i n most cases t o change the a t t i t u d e s of the 
people involved. And u s u a l l y t h i s change i n a t t i t u d e s 
i s of more l a s t i n g importance than any s p e c i f i c change 
i n p r a c t i c e s . ' (Thurow, 1985:39). 
The most common argument against the culture-bound 
theory i s the use of the actual h i s t o r y of the Japanese 
system. F i r s t , t h a t Japan was able t o adopt what 
management p r a c t i c e s they believed most worthwhile from 
the US and Europe i n the 15 years f o l l o w i n g World War 
I I , begs the question o f why the West cannot now do the 
same. Second, the r e s u l t s of t h e i r e f f o r t deny the 
importance of c u l t u r e : 
' I n t e r e s t i n g l y , one c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the century 
long e f f o r t of the Japanese t o catch up w i t h the 
West was i t s e l f a c o n v i c t i o n not t o overestimate 
the importance of the c u l t u r a l "binding" of 
Western method. The hope of the promoters of the 
M e i j i r e s t o r a t i o n and t h e i r successors was t h a t 
successful business and i n d u s t r i a l methods and 
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s t r a t e g i e s could indeed be de-coup1ed from 
" c u l t u r e " , f o r i f i t could not be, a t h e n - i n f e r i o r 
Japan was condemned t o lag p e r p e t u a l l y behind the 
obviously superior West. The slogan was, "Western 
methods, Japanese s p i r i t . " E v i d e n t l y the 
combination worked.' (L.G.Franco, 1983:3). 
Other f a c t o r s already touched on should also be 
taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . As we've seen, there are 
environmental f a c t o r s w i t h a d i r e c t e f f e c t on the 
Japanese managerial system: 
'Stable economic growth, dual s t r u c t u r e s of 
i n d u s t r i e s and the labour market, r a p i d and f a r -
reaching t e c h n o l o g i c a l innovations led by 
advancement of m i c r o - e l e c t r o n i c s , aging of the 
p o p u l a t i o n , s t r u c t u r a l changes i n the labour 
market caused by s h i f t i n g t o a service economy, 
and more women a t work — are changing forces of 
Japanese s t y l e human resource management. On the 
other hand, such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Japanese 
s o c i e t y as homogeneity, weak class-consciousness, 
and group-oriented c u l t u r e work f o r maintaining 
the system as i t i s . But changes of s o c i a l , 
c u l t u r a l , and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s which w i l l be 
brought out by an " a f f l u e n t s o c i e t y " , w i l l also 
more or less a f f e c t the t r a d i t i o n a l value system 
and work e t h i c . I n a d d i t i o n , 
" i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n " of Japanese companies may 
have some impact on the homogeneous and "groupist" 
m e n t a l i t y of the Japanese.' ( I s h i d a , 1986:103). 
I s i t s e n s i b l e t o attempt t o t r a n s f e r a system t h a t may 
not be t h a t system f o r much longer even where i t has 
been successful? I f any of those p r a c t i c e s or 
techniques g e n e r a l l y considered 'Japanese' are changed 
i n Japan, should the West attempt t o adopt them? Sethi 
e t a l . (1984) provide t h e i r argument: 
'Japanese s o c i e t y i s undergoing a gradual 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n whose pace i s l i k e l y t o accelerate. 
Change i s being brought about as a consequence of 
i n t e r n a l pressures as groups seek t o broaden t h e i r 
share of the economic pie and as people's 
expectations change i n response t o new r e a l i t i e s . 
There are also external pressures as the Japanese 
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are exposed t o new r e a l i t i e s and value systems and 
are forced t o examine t h e i r own w i t h i n a broader 
p e r s p e c t i v e . Moreover, as other nations develop 
new s t r a t e g i e s t o respond t o the Japanese 
challenge, the Japanese must modify cu r r e n t 
responses t o meet an a l t e r e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
environment.' (p.230). 
Because of t h i s , they go on t o argue t h a t ' I f these 
changes w i l l a l t e r JABMAS i n some fundamental ways, i t 
would be sheer f o l l y f o r us t o t r y t o become more l i k e 
the Japanese wh i l e they are t r y i n g very hard t o become 
d i f f e r e n t from what they are.' (p.230). 
Of obvious value i n determining what i s or i s n ' t 
t r a n s f e r a b l e i s t o look a t what has been successful i n 
Japanese s u b s i d i a r i e s i n B r i t a i n and the US (see 
Chapter 6 ) . 
Ueki's ( i n Kono, 1985) survey on the t r a n s f e r of 
Japanese management s t y l e s t o s u b s i d i a r i e s i n B r a z i l 
found t h a t those companies who t r a n s f e r r e d Japanese 
management p r a c t i c e s performed b e t t e r . Not a l l methods 
were t r a n s f e r r e d , however. 'For example, over-high 
expectations of devotion t o the o r g a n i z a t i o n , large 
group conferences, unclear r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , suggestion 
systems, and expectations of long term service from 
h i g h l y s k i l l e d employees do not work w e l l . The 
t r a n s f e r was thus h i g h l y s e l e c t i v e . He found t h a t 
t r a i n i n g and communication was important as a means of 
making the t r a n s f e r acceptable t o the l o c a l people. 
Ueki's f i n d i n g t h a t the s e l e c t i v e t r a n s f e r of Japanese 
170 
management s k i l l s i s e f f e c t i v e f o r b e t t e r performance 
coincides w i t h our own.' (p.178). 
Ishida's (1986) survey of eighteen Japanese 
managers a t s u b s i d i a r i e s i n the United States found the 
f o l l o w i n g : Elements which cannot be taken as 
p a r t i c u l a r l y Japanese: c l a s s - e g a l i t a r i a n i s m ; elements 
which can be achieved: community o r i e n t a t i o n , 
employment s e c u r i t y ; elements which can be more or less 
achieved: i n f o r m a t i o n sharing, f l e x i b l e j o b behaviour; 
elements which are l e a s t achieved: groupism, low 
turnover; and elements which are adapted t o the loc a l 
c u l t u r e : s e n i o r i t y wages and s e n i o r i t y promotion. 
S i m i l a r l y t o White and Trevor, Ishida also notes t h a t 
' I t can be surmised t h a t Japanese s t y l e human resource 
management, whi6h has a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t r e a t i n g 
employees on a s i n g l e basis approach, tends t o be well 
accepted by workers on lower echelons and t o be faced 
w i t h a l o t of problems i n dealing w i t h upper-echelon 
employees.' (p.116). F i n a l l y , he provides a chart 
which 'shows a modified model of Japanese s t y l e human 
resource management t h a t r e s u l t s from the f i n d i n g s of 
the surveys and i s considered t o be t r a n s f e r a b l e t o 
Japanese f i r m s operating i n d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l 
environments.' (p.117): 
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7.4 Conclusion 
S t i l l , these studies of Japanese s u b s i d i a r i e s 
don't a c t u a l l y provide a d e f i n i t i v e answer as t o 
whether Japanese management i s t r a n s f e r a b l e . As seen 
i n Chapter 6, the problems t h a t have a r i s e n i n the 
white c o l l a r sector because of the c u l t u r a l 
misunderstandings between the Japanese e x p a t r i a t e s and 
the B r i t i s h and American workers, e s p e c i a l l y managers, 
put the matter of t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y out of perspective: 
i t becomes not simply a matter of t r a n s f e r r i n g these 
p r a c t i c e s but a l s o of dealing w i t h f o r e i g n management. 
The question of whether the West can adopt these 
p r a c t i c e s remains unanswered. 
F i r s t , each su b s i d i a r y has taken a unique approach 
and each s u b s i d i a r y has had i t s own successes and 
f a i l u r e s . The st u d i e s on various s u b s i d i a r i e s by a 
wide v a r i e t y of authors provide a p l e t h o r a of d i f f e r e n t 
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r e s u l t s — some say they haven't found the practices 
considered Japanese a t a l l (White and Trevor, 1983) 
wh i l e others claim t h a t a t l e a s t some are found (e.g. 
Bowman and Caison, 1986, Ouchi, 1981). Because of t h i s 
v a r i a b i l i t y i n r e s u l t s a s i n g l e p o s i t i o n cannot be 
derived. 
Secondly, there are p r i m a r i l y three hypotheses as 
t o whether or not Japanese management i s t r a n s f e r a b l e : 
1. The c u l t u r e bound hypothesis which argues t h a t the 
system i s so enmeshed i n the c u l t u r a l conditions of the 
Japanese people t h a t i t cannot possibly be t r a n s f e r r e d 
t o the d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t West. 2. The piecemeal 
approach which maintains t h a t those practices which are 
the most productive and w i l l be adaptable can be 
t r a n s f e r r e d — weight i s given t o t h i s argument by the 
h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y of the Japanese adopting i n t h i s 
f a s h i o n from the West f o l l o w i n g World War I I . 3. The 
a l l or nothing approach which i n s i s t s t h a t a l l the 
pa r t s are i n t e r t w i n e d and inseparable so t h a t the 
system no longer i s productive i f one pa r t i s missing 
and i f the c u l t u r e i t has developed i n i s ignored. 
None of these, however, can be proven even by 
looking a t Japanese s u b s i d i a r i e s . I believe t h i s i s 
because the subject of the West lea r n i n g from Japan i s 
so complex i n terms of what Japan has done t o achieve 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the world economy. I t i s not clear 
whether i t i s simply the employment practices which are 
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a t the heart of t h i s success — many other f a c t o r s may 
have been involved. 
The next chapter w i l l present other possible 
causes f o r the impressive success of the Japanese 
economy which have been postulated i n order t o present 
a more i n c l u s i v e account of what i s a t issue. 
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CHAPTER 8 
OTHER FACTORS IN JAPAN'S SUCCESS 
As Japan's economic success has come more and more 
i n t o the s p o t l i g h t i n the past decade or so, much of 
the l i t e r a t u r e on the subject has d e a l t w i t h how the 
West can learn from the Japanese example. As a r e s u l t 
of t h i s l i n e of a n a l y s i s , such issues as corporate 
c u l t u r e and management p r a c t i c e s considered unique t o 
Japan came t o the f o r e f r o n t as the areas which could 
provide the answers: since these areas are possibly 
t r a n s f e r a b l e , the West could t h e o r e t i c a l l y engage i n 
the same p r a c t i c e s and i n t h a t way regain t h e i r 
economic impetus. 
The problem w i t h t h i s l i n e of reasoning i s t h a t i t 
ignores the many other f a c t o r s which may have 
c o n t r i b u t e d t o Japan's success. By so doing, i t 
provides only a s i m p l i s t i c answer which i s u n l i k e l y t o 
provide an end t o the West's r e l a t i v e economic decline. 
This chapter w i l l provide a b r i e f discussion of 
these other f a c t o r s which have been postulated t o have 
played a r o l e i n Japan's impressive development i n 
order t o put i n t o context the r o l e of Japanese 
management p r a c t i c e s . 
F i r s t , Prof. M. Takamiya ( i n White and Trevor, 
1983) found t h a t i n the Japanese s u b s i d i a r i e s i n 
B r i t a i n t h a t he looked a t , l i f e t i m e employment, 
exceptional l e v e l s of welfare, and an emphasis on 
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'human r e l a t i o n s ' were not found. He also discovered 
t h a t workers were no more s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e i r 
employment than were other workers i n comparable 
B r i t i s h or American companies. But, the Japanese-owned 
s u b s i d i a r i e s achieved higher l e v e l s of labour 
p r o d u c t i v i t y and product q u a l i t y than normally found i n 
B r i t a i n . ' I t t h e r e f o r e seems from these observations 
t h a t Japanese success does not necessarily depend 
e i t h e r on the employment p r a c t i c e s usually thought of 
as d i s t i n c t i v e l y Japanese, nor on having p a r t i c u l a r l y 
"happy" or "motivated" workers. There must be other 
sources of Japanese e f f e c t i v e n e s s . ' (White and Trevor, 
1983:8). 
Takamiya's explanation was the o r g a n i s a t i o n of 
production work i t s e l f . 
'Their methods of production, located i n the 
workplace and o f t e n c o n s i s t i n g of r e l a t i v e l y f i n e 
d e t a i l s , would be much less conspicuous than many 
of the (perhaps s u p e r f i c i a l ) f e a t u r e s of Japanese 
employment systems which are popularly known. But 
by the same token they would be both more 
t r a n s f e r a b l e and more fundamental. Examples of 
the types of work p r a c t i c e s t o which Takamiya 
r e f e r r e d were: immediate r e c t i f i c a t i o n of 
d e f e c t i v e work, close involvement of technicians 
and supervisors i n d a i l y production tasks, and 
emphasis on small but continuous and cumulative 
t e c h n i c a l improvements ( o f t e n f i t t e d t o the 
i n d i v i d u a l — f o r instance, j i g s designed 
s p e c i f i c a l l y t o overcome weaknesses i n a worker's 
performance). Much t h a t Takamiya wais saying might 
be i n t e r p r e t e d as a type of i n t e n s i v e , 
c r a f t s m a n l i k e approach t o production management.' 
White and Trevor, 1983:8). 
C u l t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s have been the subject of 
great i n t e r e s t i n the debate over Japanese success. 
176 
Despite having a h i e r a r c h i c a l s o c i e t y , there i s an 
underlying idea of sameness, w i t h i n t e r e s t going beyond 
t h a t of a personal l e v e l . There i s 'great mutual 
l o y a l t y ' which has had s i g n i f i c a n t economic 
consequences as i t makes consensus p o l i c i e s possible as 
a l l i s done i n the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . This i s 
manifested i n business e n t e r p r i s e s i n terms of the 
l i f e t i m e employment p o l i c y and worker l o y a l t y t o the 
f i r m . H i s t o r i c a l l y t h i s idea of sameness was apparent 
i n the zaibatsus and t h e i r close r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the 
government. 
But are these c u l t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s the primary 
cause of Japanese growth? K. Smith (1984) argues t h a t 
i n f a c t t h i s consensus s o c i e t y r e s u l t e d from the 
'economic m i r a c l e ' , not v i c e versa. Before t h e i r 
success, he argues, Japanese s o c i e t y was a f a c t i o n a l l y 
and s o c i a l l y d i v i d e d system. L i f e t i m e employment was 
a l s o made possible by success — i t i s not possible f o r 
the West because of the insecure economic environment 
and the r i s k s t h e i r e n t e r p r i s e s face. 'Lifetime 
c o n t r a c t s are best viewed as an expression, by Japanese 
managers, of confidence i n continued growth, an 
expression of a b e l i e f t h a t they do not face 
s i g n i f i c a n t r i s k s which t h r e a t e n t h e i r corporate 
f u t u r e . ' (Smith, 1984:217). Furthermore, '...while 
worker l o y a l t y may w e l l be p a r t of the "Japanese 
ethos", we should remember t h a t economic s e c u r i t y , and 
177 
p a r t i c u l a r l y employment s e c u r i t y , i s very h i g h l y valued 
by people everywhere; once workers are guaranteed a 
degree of s e c u r i t y , t h e i r l o y a l t y t o the f i r m t h a t 
provides i t may not be a l l t h a t s u r p r i s i n g . ' (Smith, 
1984:217). 
Smith, then, maintains t h a t success has come as a 
r e s u l t not of c u l t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s but of the 
Japanese economic environment. The Japanese p o l i c y 
framework: there are 3 d i s t i n c t i v e features of the 
approach taken by Japanese p o l i c y makers. F i r s t , there 
i s a ' f i r m r e j e c t i o n of some orthodox ideas on 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e , concerning both the types of goods 
which Japan should be producing and exporting, and the 
d e s i r a b i l i t y of f r e e trade as opposed t o p r o t e c t i o n and 
import c o n t r o l s . ' (Smith, 1984:218). Second, there i s 
'an equ a l l y f i r m commitment t o the expansionary demand-
management ideas associated w i t h the economics of 
Keynes.' (Smith, 1984:218). T h i r d , there i s 'a kind of 
two faced a t t i t u d e t o competition w i t h i n the economy: 
i n general the Japanese economy has combined a high 
degree of government i n t e r v e n t i o n w i t h the promotion of 
competition. Competition has been encouraged where i t 
was f e l t t h a t t h i s would enhance e f f i c i e n c y ; but i t has 
been f i r m l y discouraged where i t would threaten the 
prospects f o r growth.' (Smith, 1984:218). 
I n regards t o the f i r s t , which i s the most 
important t o B r i t a i n , the Japanese rejec t e d the widely 
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accepted law of comparative advantage (a law from the 
theory of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r ade) and r e j e c t e d f r e e trade. 
Mr. Y. Ojima, v i c e - m i n i s t e r f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade and 
I n d u s t r y , has explained t h i s move: i t was 
'decided t h a t t o e s t a b l i s h i n Japan i n d u s t r i e s which 
required i n t e n s i v e employment of c a p i t a l and 
technology, i n d u s t r i e s t h a t i n consideration of 
comparative costs of production should be the most 
in a p p r o p r i a t e f o r Japan, i n d u s t r i e s such as s t e e l , o i l 
r e f i n i n g , petrochemicals, automobiles, a i r c r a f t , 
i n d u s t r i a l machinery of a l l s o r t s , and e l e c t r o n i c s 
i n c l u d i n g e l e c t r o n i c computers. From a short run, 
s t a t i c view p o i n t , encouragement of such i n d u s t r i e s 
would seem t o c o n f l i c t w i t h economic r a t i o n a l i s m . But 
from a long-range viewpoint, these are p r e c i s e l y the 
i n d u s t r i e s where ... demand i s high, technological 
progress i s r a p i d , and labour p r o d u c t i v i t y r i s e s f a s t . ' 
( I n Smith, 1984:220). 
These i n d u s t r i e s were protected i n t h e i r formative 
years w i t h import c o n t r o l s . I t was more d i f f i c u l t , 
however, t o a c t u a l l y set up these i n d u s t r i e s ; i t 
required more p o l i c i e s and, argues Smith, a s p e c i f i c 
i n s t i t u t i o n . This i n s t i t u t i o n which Smith believes t o 
be the main reason f o r Japanese success i s MITI. 
The measures a v a i l a b l e t o MITI have changed over 
the years, but Smith has compiled a l i s t of those t h a t 
have appeared a t some time during the reconstruction 
and growth period : 
1. 'The a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l the import and use of 
f o r e i g n technologies', i . e . MITI's approval was 
necessary t o use f o r e i g n patents and 'during ten 
years of f o r e i g n currency shortage, MITI had the 
power t o a l l o c a t e f o r e i g n currency f o r technology 
imports, and thus t o c o n t r o l the types of 
technology which were imported.' (p.223). 
2. 'The a b i l i t y t o modify competition and monopoly 
p o l i c y w i t h i n any sector, and thus t o c o n t r o l the 
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number and s i z e of f i r m s i n t h a t sector. 
Competition o f t e n increases e f f i c i e n c y , but i t can 
also increase r i s k , which i n h i b i t s the long-term 
investments needed f o r growth.' (p.223). 
3. 'The a b i l i t y t o d r a f t and enact laws concerning 
import c o n t r o l s , t a r i f f r a t e s , export subsidies 
and f o r e i g n investment i n Japan.' (p.223). 
4. 'The a b i l i t y t o encourage and c o n t r o l 
p a r t i c u l a r investment p r o j e c t s by c o n t r o l l i n g the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of funds f o r such p r o j e c t s , e i t h e r 
through the Japan Development Bank or through the 
p r i v a t e banks w i t h which MITI has close l i n k s . ' 
(p.223-224). 
5. ' I t can carry out p a r t i c u l a r research and 
development p r o j e c t s on i t s own account where 
these are not l i k e l y t o be p r o f i t a b l e f o r p r i v a t e 
f i r m s w i t h i n a reasonable time period.' (p.224). 
An example of t h i s i n the past has been major 
computer development p r o j e c t s . 
The above are 'used vi g o r o u s l y and f l e x i b l y i n 
many combinations i n a wide v a r i e t y of i n d u s t r i a l 
circumstances' (p.224) but there are four basic types 
of i n t e r v e n t i o n ( a l l four of these must be operated 
simultaneously) : 1. the c r e a t i o n and sustenance of new 
i n d u s t r i e s ; 2. programmes of ind u s t r y modernization, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n sectors w i t h many small f i r m s ; 3. c o n t r o l 
capacity i n p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r i e s , i . e . prevent 
excessive investment; 4. p o l i c i e s f o r d e c l i n i n g 
i n d u s t r i e s include: subsidies over the period while 
i n d u s t r i e s are reduced i n size or phased out, 
government purchase of obsolete equipment f o r 
scrapping, a i d t o workers i n moving t o other areas, and 
grants and subsidies f o r r e t r a i n i n g : ' t h i s i s c r u c i a l 
t o Japan's continued growth f o r .. economies must 
manage the process of decline and d e - i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n 
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a t l e a s t as wel l as they manage the process of c r e a t i n g 
new i n d u s t r i e s . Both complement each other i n economic 
growth.' (p.224). 
Others, however, down play the r o l e of government. 
Kanamori (1985), f o r instance, argues t h a t the 
'government's r o l e centred on a s s i s t i n g the f r e e 
a c t i v i t i e s of p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s . ' (p.223). I t d i d 
c o n t r i b u t e t o growth, mainly through gvosei-shido or 
'a d m i n i s t r a t i v e guidance' which involved the government 
persuading postponement of investment i f there are 
fea r s of o v e r i n v e s t i n g , but i t i s innovation which has 
played a much greater r o l e . 
G.C. A l l e n (1981) also argues t h a t the r o l e of the 
State should not be over-emphasized, as s h a l l be seen, 
and d e t a i l s what he believes t o be the many 
intermingled causes of Japan's economic progress since 
1952. They are as f o l l o w s . 
1. America's ' c o n t r i b u t i o n ' during the post-war 
occupation p e r i o d . This includes f i n a n c i a l ' a i d ' or 
'special procurement' t h a t was given, and some reforms 
which were introduced: f o r example, 
'the Land Reform i n i t i a l l y made some c o n t r i b u t i o n 
t o a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y as well as t o s o c i a l 
s t a b i l i t y , even though i n l a t e r years the legal 
r e s t r a i n t s imposed on the a l i e n a t i o n of peasant 
p r o p e r t i e s may have impeded the t r a n s i t i o n t o 
large-scale farming. The breaking up of the 
zaibatsu and the "purging" of the i n d u s t r i a l 
leaders f o r a time brought confusion t o the 
economy, but i n the end they probably helped t o 
s t i m u l a t e development by opening the way f o r new 
men and new methods.' (p.230). 
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2. The good luck of the Japanese at c r i t i c a l 
moments during the post-war period. For example, the 
Korean War, the world investment boom of the mid-1950s 
and, a f t e r 1964, the Vietnam War which, because of 
American expenditures, r e s u l t e d i n d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t 
demands on the Japanese f o r resources. 
3. I n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e change i n the e a r l y post-
war years. Of s i g n i f i c a n t importance was the 
transference from t e x t i l e s (which, apart from s i l k , was 
h i g h l y dependent upon overseas raw m a t e r i a l s f o r 
production) 'to types of manufacture of which the 
import-content was r e l a t i v e l y s m all.' (p.231). This 
was necessary f o r the Japanese t o be able t o finance 
the imports needed f o r i n d u s t r i a l expansion. 
4. A f t e r 1959, the importance of number three had 
declined and there was a steep increase i n exports. 
This increase was a s s i s t e d by several f a c t o r s but the 
main c o n t r i b u t o r was 'the increase i n her i n d u s t r i a l 
e f f i c i e n c y compared w i t h t h a t of other nations.' 
(p.232). 
A l l e n goes on t o q u a l i f y t h a t number four was not 
n e c e s s a r i l y the main instrument of growth as indicated 
by the r e l a t i v e l y low r a t i o of exports t o GNP. But 
s t i l l , i t was q u i t e e s s e n t i a l during times of 
recession. 
A l l e n also proposes c h i e f proximate causes of 
r a p i d economic development. 1. Increases i n the labour 
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supply. There was only a moderate population expansion 
but there was a s i g n i f i c a n t increase i n the number of 
those who had reached working age and there was a large 
number of underemployed a g r i c u l t u r a l workers who were 
able t o be t r a n s f e r r e d t o i n d u s t r y . The q u a l i t y of the 
workers was also high because of the e f f i c i e n t 
education system so t h a t the Japanese were 'able t o 
a s s i m i l a t e new t e c h n i c a l knowledge and t o introduce new 
p r o d u c t i v e methods without delay.' (p.232-233). 
Also i n regards t o labour and the i n t r o d u c t i o n of 
new methods, A l l e n emphasises the importance of two 
other f a c t o r s : the unions d i d n ' t present opposition and 
management promoted cooperation. 
2. The r i s e i n c a p i t a l stock. 'Gross savings 
increased from 24% of GNP i n the e a r l y 1950s t o 38% i n 
the l a t e 1960s, and a high p r o p o r t i o n of these savings 
were invested i n types of i n d u s t r i a l equipment which 
y i e l d e d quick and measurable r e s u l t s . ' (p.233). 
How was t h i s done? 
'Japan's massive investments, together w i t h her 
army of competent technicians made i t possible f o r 
her r a p i d l y t o absorb innovations imported from 
advanced c o u n t r i e s . I n t h i s way she soon reduced 
the wide gap t h a t e x i s t e d a t the end of the war 
between her l e v e l of t e c h n i c a l accomplishment and 
t h a t of Western Europe and America. By the middle 
1960s she had caught up w i t h Europe i n t h i s 
respect and was even beginning t o supply 'know-
how' t o f i r m s i n other i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s . ' 
(p.233). 
A l l e n maintains t h a t behind a l l these f a c t o r s was 
'a fundamental cause of her outstanding performance, 
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namely her whole-hearted p u r s u i t of a s i n g l e o b j e c t i v e , 
economic expansion.' (p.233). 
An example of t h i s devotion t o the b u i l d i n g up of 
the Japanese economy i s a statement made by Mr. S. 
Honda when he f i r s t established h i s company: 'Even i f 
my company becomes bankrupt because of the r a t e a t 
which I expand my p l a n t , the p l a n t i t s e l f w i l l remain 
t o be used f o r the development of Japanese industry. 
So I w i l l take the r i s k . ' (p.234). 
This single-mindedness led t o a p r i o r i t y being 
given t o i n d u s t r i a l e f f i c i e n c y : The Japanese di d n ' t 
b u i l d or purchase 'prestige' products, and they gave up 
i n d u s t r i e s which had poor prospects and concentrated 
only on those which appeared p r o f i t a b l e . 
I t also led t o impressive s o c i a l cohesion and 
morale — A l l e n believes t h a t the success of government 
p o l i c y was p a r t l y because of i t s acceptance by the 
Japanese people: 
'The government has, of course, been prominent i n 
decision-making i n the economic sphere. But i t s 
most valuable f u n c t i o n has been t h a t of 
i n t e r p r e t i n g , guiding and serving the n a t i o n a l 
purpose. I t i s the decisions of i n d i v i d u a l s , 
f i r m s and groups, working w i t h i n an environment of 
p r o p i t i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s and s u s t a i n i n g government 
p o l i c i e s t h a t have c a r r i e d Japan t o her present 
eminence. On t h i s argument, the government's 
c h i e f c o n t r i b u t i o n a f t e r the war was the c r e a t i o n 
of c o n d i t i o n s congenial t o the exercise of 
i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e . ' 
A l l e n , f i n a l l y , presents a few more possible 
c o n t r i b u t o r s : the Japanese s k i l l i n coping w i t h the 
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problem of an 'over-heated' economy caused by a serious 
d i s e q u i l i b r i u m i n the balance of payments; government 
checks and d e f l a t i o n a r y measures. 
This may not be a complete l i s t o f the other 
f a c t o r s which may have c o n t r i b u t e d t o Japan's economic 
success, but i t should s t i l l i n d i c a t e t h a t there are 
many f a c t o r s other than the fashionable ones, such as 
corporate c u l t u r e and management p r a c t i c e s , which have 
played a r o l e . Even from t h i s p a r t i a l l i s t i t can be 
seen t h a t there are many possible c o n t r i b u t o r s t o the 
success of the Japanese economy. I t i s impossible t o 
judge whether a l l or some of these f a c t o r s were so 
s i g n i f i c a n t and had such an e f f e c t on the economy t h a t , 
i f they hadn't happened, t h i s 'miracle' would not have 
taken place. I t i s possible and necessary t o accept, 
however, t h a t t o ignore any of these i s t o provide too 
s i m p l i s t i c an answer t o the question of how the West 
can b e n e f i t from the Japanese example. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of t h i s t h e s i s has been t o provide a 
more i n c l u s i v e discussion of the success of the 
Japanese economy than i s o f t e n found i n a r t i c l e s and 
books designed t o provide the s o l u t i o n t o the Western 
economic malaise. By presenting both the most common 
views, s p e c i f i c a l l y the r o l e of corporate c u l t u r e and 
more predominantly t h a t of the Japanese management 
system, along w i t h the less p u b l i c i s e d but s t i l l 
important views, p r i m a r i l y of economic h i s t o r i a n s , of 
the causes of t h i s success, I hope t o have provided a 
well-balanced account of the issues involved i n 
deciding what i s t o be benefited from the Japanese 
example by the West. By so doing, the i n t e n t i o n was 
both t o give readers the material w i t h which t o make 
t h e i r own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , and t o provide something of 
a cautionary message t h a t a s i m p l i s t i c transference of 
only one element i n the Japanese success may not be 
enough on i t s own and subsequently may not provide the 
easy remedy f o r the West's economic i l l s . That the 
system i s changing i n Japan i t s e l f also does not 
encourage i t s f u l l adoption i n the West. 
At the moment there i s no source of evidence t o 
support any of the t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y arguments: the use 
of s u b s i d i a r i e s i s confused by the issue of f o r e i g n 
c o n t r o l and c u l t u r e clash and there are no Western 
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companies t h a t have adopted Japanese methods wholesale. 
And although i n the past the Japanese themselves 
b e n e f i t e d from the lessons of the West, implying t h a t 
there's no reason t o assume t h a t the West can't now 
b e n e f i t from them, u n t i l a Western company does adopt 
the Japanese system, the question of whether 
transference of the Japanese employment system i s 
e i t h e r possible or useful w i l l remain unanswered. 
A more complete understanding of a l l the issues, 
however, w i l l help t o provide a less s u p e r f i c i a l and 
more educated theory than those generally found a t 
present as t o what aspect of the Japanese success sto r y 
can and w i l l provide the most b e n e f i t . 
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